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Yakovlev's Political Career Assessed

90UN2474A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 26, 8-15 Jul 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Vitaly Tretyakov: "Politburo's Nice Guy; Alexander Yakovlev and the Left-wing Alternative Within the CPSU"]

[Text] There are symbolic figures in big-time politics. Their appearance or disappearance is evidence of a sharp change of tack. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, many people saw the chief proof of the seriousness of his intentions in the appearance of Alexander Yakovlev at his side.

Political Biography to Date

Alexander Yakovlev's political career is quite typical of our society. He is 66 and a Russian, both "parameters" absolutely normal for a Party leader of his stature. Born into a peasant family, he saw action in the Great Patriotic War 1941-45, and after graduation from a teachers' college began climbing up the Party apparat ladder, first on a Regional Party Committee (in 1946-1953), then the Central Committee (1953-1973). His free-thinking went beyond the limits accepted in the Party apparat and interrupted his career. But instead of an abrupt fall, he was sent into honorary exile which kept him on the "nomenklatura" roll call.

After Brezhnev's death he was called back to Moscow and appointed to the prestigious and important post of Director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations.

In July 1985 Alexander Yakovlev, not even a member of the Central Committee, became chief of its propaganda department. In March 1986 he became Secretary of the Central Committee; in January 1987, an Alternate Member, and in June 1987, full member of the Politburo.

By that time even the people who knew nothing of the backstage struggle around perestroika realized Yakovlev was the "brains" behind the radical democratic wing in the Party leadership.

Politburo and Presidential Council Member

Yakovlev fails to conform to the Party type stereotype: though brought up to serve the apparat, he is oppressed by its methods, even to the extent of being oppressed by his membership in the apparat.

"...In the morning I'm snowed under with papers. Three quarters of them have nothing to do with me, but it is thought to be right to read and OK them. Also the telephone calls... This continues till lunch time. What can I do about it? In the afternoon, all sorts of talks and conferences follow. A meeting at seven... Papers here, papers there—I can't find a place for myself amid all those papers..."

The above is a quote from a recent sad interview Alexander Yakovlev granted to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 5 June 1990. (Later in the text this interview is quoted without a source reference.) Elsewhere in the same interview, Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Yakovlev not only admitted that his "paperwork" was unnecessary, but also regretted his isolation from the people, a most uncharacteristic avowal for any functionary:

"...I receive official and unofficial information in excess. I'd rather just get the essential things. When I talk to people directly, I get quite a different sort of information than what I read on paper. Conclusions are different, too, as well as feelings."

A public controversy at the February (1990) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, so rare in our highly polarized situation, between three Politburo members—Ligachev, Shevardnadze, and Yakovlev—concerned who made the decision about the punitive operation in Tbilisi last April, and what information it was based on. The controversy showed why Alexander Yakovlev views the sources now informing the Politburo members with misgivings. Incidentally, this controversy also revealed Yakovlev's inherent tendency to guard Gorbachev from blame for any mistake of perestroika.

Having had no state office before, Yakovlev recently became a member of Gorbachev's Presidential Council. He is one of the two Party workers to be included in this Council. I think, however, that he is there not so much as a Party worker, but as the theoretician of humane and democratic socialism who happens to work in the CPSU. Also he is there as a "democratic counterbalance" on the too "pluralistic" Council.

A Liberal From the CPSU

Many people knowing Yakovlev personally believe that he is a liberal. He is tolerant of other points of view and doesn't pressure his subordinates.

Of course, Yakovlev's innate liberalism is kept in check by the apparat code of behaviour. Much of what has been said above may therefore prove to be a Yakovlev myth rather than a reality. But not all myths are fully divorced from reality. Nor do myths like that stick to just anyone.

Yakovlev himself admits he is dominated by apparat forces:

"The apparat is a tough force. Like any other political institution, it has its own rules... The apparat gradually shapes the person's character and style of behaviour. The question is, how much of his or her personal honesty and decency remains."

Consciously or unconsciously, Yakovlev was hinting that one cannot remain completely honest and decent while working within the apparat. He just spoke of the degree of honesty and decency left. Because he has put it like that I fully trust him when he says this about himself:

"All my life I was sorry for those who were hurt. And I sometimes interceded for people not for ideological reasons, but because I could see they were hurt unjustly.

"I never raised my voice at anyone... If somebody fails to do his work properly, I'd rather do it myself. I know that this is wrong, and a violation of all rules. But I hate any kind of dressing-down."

This is quite unusual for a Politburo member. Or are Soviet dictionaries right when they define liberalism as "excessive tolerance, leniency, and harmful connivance"? Perhaps, by calling Alexander Yakovlev a liberal I do him a disservice? To avoid this, I did not use the mysterious foreign word "liberal" in the headline. Rather I used my own translation of its non-political meaning: "nice guy."

Can a Politburo member, i.e., a politician, be nice? The answer is not self-evident, because as long as you have to prove and argue that socialism ought to be humane and democratic, you might have to prove that a Communist ought to have a human face.

Advance and Rear Guard Rolled in One

In the course of perestroika Alexander Yakovlev has had a special role. He was destined to announce, first on the theoretical level, perestroika's novel ideas which were later to become the order of the day in Gorbachev's speeches. The fact that what Yakovlev said today was repeated by Gorbachev the day after was noticed by everybody, so the conservatives began trying to call in question or undo what Yakovlev said before the General Secretary faced them with the dilemma of contradicting the Party leader or swallowing the bitter pill.

In 1987-88, when high-level officials went round the country, ideological duels broke out between Central Committee secretaries. Touring the Baltics, Yakovlev said one thing, while Ligachev in the Belgorod Region said another, often directly opposite. PRAVDA, then still openly conservative, often ignored Yakovlev's statements, but gave a lot of space to his opponents. At the same time, the press in the Baltics gladly published everything Yakovlev said. In fact, until early 1989 the initiative for the settling of the urgent Baltic issue still belonged to the Centre.

At the same time, Yakovlev has the mission to defend perestroika's rear, that is the positions it has already won, but which are still under conservative attack. The most graphic example is the story of Nina Andreyeva's notorious letter published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on 13 March 1988 when both Gorbachev and Yakovlev were away. It was Alexander Yakovlev who wrote the reply to the Stalinist from Leningrad which appeared in PRAVDA three weeks later. Yakovlev's authorship of the PRAVDA rebuke was never admitted publicly, in keeping with the tradition of the CPSU "underground" code of behaviour in the country it has ruled for so long.

Therefore, let us agree that the above is only a conjecture on my part, though no other authorship has been suggested.

Another no less characteristic example has to do with the debate about the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The traditional Soviet interpretation of the "non-aggression pact" was doomed to collapse from the first days of glasnost. It was merely a question of time. The political struggle around this bit of history had a very negative effect on the relations between the Baltic Republics and Moscow. For the second time, the Centre lost its positive initiative, and the loss, coupled with other mistakes, made the decision of the Baltic Republics to cede from the USSR inevitable.

The issue of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had split the 1st Congress of USSR People's Deputies back in 1989.

Yakovlev, Yeltsin, Ligachev

The period when both Yakovlev and Yeltsin were members of the CPSU top leadership was rather short: between March 1986 and November 1987. But that was the period when differences within the Politburo were growing fast. As a consequence, Yeltsin and Yakovlev appeared as a political duet in which one was a left-wing radical and the other, a left-wing liberal. Yeltsin's radicalism was perceived by the conservatives as more dangerous, and, above all, more unpredictable than Yakovlev's liberalism. Therefore, the original confrontation went along the Ligachev v. Yeltsin axis.

In all probability, this allowed the liberal part of the Party apparatus to consolidate their positions on the quiet. Thus Yeltsin did the left-wingers a good turn. On the other hand, after Yeltsin was banished from the top, the left wing became noticeably weaker. Yeltsin's removal from the political struggle at the top until mid-1989 allowed the right wing, among other things, to concentrate their attacks on Yakovlev alone. But it's impossible to shoot at Yakovlev without hitting Gorbachev. Failing to convert Gorbachev, they tried at least to make him give up Yakovlev as the architect behind the ideology of anti-Stalinist socialism.

Yakovlev and Ligachev. It is hard to find two men or politicians so different in views and looks. And yet their political fortunes often coincide. For example, both have been most actively criticized in the official press. But while Ligachev's left-wing critics for the most part stick to good manners and rarely stoop to foul language, Yakovlev's right-wing critics do so regularly.

Apparently, politicians are not used to publicly thanking their allies. Yet there must be an exception to every rule. Alexander Yakovlev has done Mikhail Gorbachev many favours, by taking the blame for leftism, going too fast, wrecking Eastern Europe, provoking the Baltic crisis, etc. It was Yakovlev again who pacified militant left-wing journalists spoiling for a fight with perestroika's enemies, by persuading rather than intimidating them. Also, Yakovlev did some remarkable political tight-rope

walking when he defended Gorbachev from both the right and the left. Last time it happened at the 3rd Congress of USSR People's Deputies when his speech, along with those made by Academician Likhachev and writer Zalygin, put a full stop to the debate about a hasty presidential election. The three of them risked their good names by doing so. Indeed, the left-wing speakers accused them of using their authority to make what was seen as an undemocratic though important decision.

All this deserves special analysis, even if one knows nothing of the mud our "patriotic" chauvinists are throwing at Yakovlev, accusing him of complicity in the Jewish-Masonic plot to sell Mother Russia to overseas imperialists.

The authority of the head of state and the CPSU leader in this country has not yet sunk so low as to be ignored altogether. It would be quite enough for him to state his attitude to such outrages in public, just once. Especially since the anti-Western card is a trump card in the perestroika enemies' pack, and a marked card, to boot.

A Russian living a long time in the West (Yakovlev spent 10 years in Canada as Ambassador and another year doing research at a university in the United States), usually changes his attitude to the Soviet way of life. He usually turns into a cynical careerist, bringing back Western clothes and gadgets, hating his own country for its poverty, and feigning patriotic fervour to get better access to Western bounty.

Only a few return from the West with ideas about reform, often the very Russian ideas which fled to the West after 1917. People, like Yakovlev, risk their heads to challenge the time-honoured Russian ways and traditions in order to bring about democratic reform.

Personally, Yakovlev is too much of a gentleman so far as his attitude to his own "critics" is concerned. Here is what he said earlier this year at a meeting with Moscow University students and professors:

"The fact that conservatism is stubbornly refusing to leave the stage is a fact...Imagine a person who has served a certain ideal for, say, 40 years. He has got used to his situation and his lifestyle, as well as to power, which is the most corrupting factor in history... Life is really hard for such people now. Paradoxical as it might seem, I would rather show mercy and kindness to them. It is a matter of psychology, nothing more."

Whether Alexander Yakovlev is mistaken or sly, I cannot say. Of course, it is a matter of more than psychology. I wonder why the conservatives fail to show similar understanding and kindness to the left radicals? Why don't they ascribe nothing more than psychological reasons to the measures proposed by the democrats?

Where Is Yakovlev Leading Us?

This is the question that provokes such heated controversy around Alexander Yakovlev's person. The weakest

accusation hurled at him in this connection is that he is steering us towards social democratism, which, his critics say, is the revisionism of Marxism-Leninism, an attempt to explode the CPSU from within.

This is hardly a condemnation, since social democracy in a wealthy and free country is much more attractive than orthodox communism in a poor and non-free country. But tastes differ, as do political preferences. One can see historically that the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) is intimately related to the CPSU. It's a moot point who revised whom.

But where is Yakovlev leading us after all? Here I again let him speak his mind (journal *KOMMUNIST* No 4, 90):

"Socialism is all that is good for the individual, that benefits him, makes him happy and raises his dignity. In the final analysis, people living in free society is the most socialist idea."

"Socialism today must absorb what is being done in the West to socially protect the individual. It also should be based on the understanding of the experience of social democracy as a whole. And the new developments in capitalism too."

"I think that the dogmatic canonization of the doctrines of Marx and Lenin has done more harm than all the propaganda against them. It paralyzed our thinking and thinking is the main component of the socialist idea."

"I regard Lenin with utter respect. A person of great learning, supreme intellect and with an exceptional capacity for analysis. What I treasure in Lenin most was his ability to revise his own positions when life called for this."

Thus, Yakovlev is no more a Social Democrat than the Social Democrat who used to be at the head of not simply the RSDLP, but of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks).

As for me, Alexander Yakovlev is not a Social Democrat at all, but a normal liberal in both politics and everyday life. "Liberalism" derives from the word "liberty," the freedom of choice and freedom of competition for everyone. Competition, not war, especially a class or a civil war. If you look at how scientists define economic and political liberalism, you will clearly see where Yakovlev is leading us, and I'm happy to follow him. As a matter of fact, Marx, a liberal, would also follow him, and I hope it was not out of desperation that Marx said that the free development of each person is the condition for free development of all.

Gorbachev and Yakovlev

Relations between Gorbachev and Yakovlev, the two key figures of the democratic part of official policy of perestroika, are very important if not decisive.

Clearly, Yakovlev is more radical and liberal than Gorbachev, an obvious reason why Gorbachev included him

on his team. Being part of that team makes it necessary to play one's position to the full so that the team might win. Up to now, the team has been winning because of the strong political position of Gorbachev, so the team played up to him. Soviet left-wingers generally who also played up to Gorbachev felt free to criticize him, but vigorously defend him at the slightest sign of an attack by the right-wingers. Yakovlev, of course, even if he wished, could not afford to publicly criticize Gorbachev, the more so because Yakovlev's role—to stand constantly left of the Centre—allowed him to be more radical than the General Secretary. But this role is risky. Gorbachev might follow Yakovlev's lead, and then again he might not. Yakovlev's position in politics and in the eyes of public opinion was solid only if Gorbachev followed Yakovlev. When Gorbachev demurred, Yakovlev, the perestroika theorist, appeared to be a revisionist.

Recently, Alexander Yakovlev has not been making long speeches. Why? One version is that Gorbachev has caught up to Yakovlev in radicalism (in the past they differed in tactics rather than in strategy). The second version is that Yakovlev is not sure Gorbachev will follow him. My feeling is that events of the last months support this conclusion. The difference of tactics was there, for all I know, but the time for small steps is gone. Any steps now must be big, and what to expect after the big step proposed by Yakovlev is hard to forecast.

It's not a matter of cowardice. The point is he is afraid to walk too far ahead of the General Secretary, to leave him all alone at best, at the mercy of the conservatives at worst.

As a political figure Yakovlev is not without blemish. While doing the same job that Yeltsin does, i.e., criticizing the conservatives (albeit in more veiled and civilized terms), unlike Yeltsin, Yakovlev fends off right-wing and left-wing criticism aimed at the General Secretary, creating the impression that Gorbachev could do no wrong. But strange as it is, the left wing of the Politburo was united on this point with the right wing, faced with numerous mistakes. In the final analysis this policy brought Gorbachev, Yakovlev and the entire left-wing democratic bloc into a false position. As a result, the right-wingers have gained all the critical points and usurped the role of critics and defenders of public interests, the rescuers of common folk from the erratic leaders of perestroika. I can't imagine Alexander Yakovlev not having anticipated this danger. What was it that might have prevented him from falling into this obvious trap? It seems he overestimated the effectiveness of apparat methods of struggle against the apparat, and the apparat habit of having faultless allies.

Tragedy of Russian Liberalism

Unlike Yegor Ligachev, who until recently tried to persuade himself and people around him that no discord existed within the Politburo, Yakovlev gives this original explanation of why he favours unity among the CPSU top leaders:

"The most important quality today is the ability 'not to part ways' as we are moving along. Once we are harnessed to the cart of reform, let's pull it together. We can argue, we can try to persuade, but this should be done openly, honestly, without playing politics. Being consistent, being loyal to your comrades is in the final analysis a matter of new ethics and new political morals."

I can see only too well why Alexander Yakovlev said this. Still I can't subscribe to his words. They are not convincing.

Being loyal to your comrades is fine, but what if some loyal comrades are leading the country to ruin? Are you supposed to stay loyal until you go over the brink? Once we start pulling the load together, do we go down together? The trouble is that not only the "comrades" go over the brink, but also those they lead.

Alexander Yakovlev, as a person, has no missionary complex. Asked many times if there are people who can do his job better, he does not hesitate to say there are. I'm also sure that Yakovlev is not guilty of political irresponsibility towards people he "guides." What then? What can one suppose? There are two answers, I think.

First: corporate Bolshevism, lack of faith that the flock can choose its own shepherds.

Second: the moral imperative ("to always back up your comrades") which for Yakovlev is stronger than the political imperative. This raises the issue of the tragedy of Russian liberalism.

Russian, and later Soviet liberalism, which survived in conditions of absolutism, totalitarianism, and which even stayed close to the imperial throne or the reviewing stand on top of Lenin's Mausoleum, were never able to turn their liberalism into a political force, a political party planning to take power, not just to be guardian of public morals.

Liberals for some reason have believed that the tsars or general secretaries were more capable than themselves to put their plans to effect. They were mistaken each time. This is perhaps because earlier, intellectual liberalism had no roots in popular liberalism. The roots are there now. Perestroika has discovered these roots under the moss of totalitarianism. Today, Russian liberals have their last chance to carry out their long-awaited mission.

Perestroika Should Steer More to the Left

The Russian intelligentsia, those of them that have survived persecution, have in today's Politburo Alexander Yakovlev, the only person who upholds their interests and the interests of honest people in general, while making no claims to power. They look to him because he is a Russian intellectual too. Today's intellectuals, incidentally, are also left-wing democrats whatever their profession is.

As long as people, like Alexander Yakovlev, are still among the CPSU leaders, the democrats maintain faith

in the Party in the knowledge that there are people in the lower and upper echelons of the Party they can lean on. But democrats cannot lean on those who believe that democrats are either not supposed to struggle for power or that this is a cause unworthy of them. If all the worthy people quit this struggle, all power would be divided among the unworthy.

I think that Gorbachev too still keeps his office of General Secretary only because he is not sure that is place would be taken by someone, like Yakovlev. I understand Gorbachev: it is one thing to turn the CPSU into a reliable ally of democratic perestroyka independent of the President (which can be done only under a progressive Party leader) and it is quite another for the President to be confronted by a strong and conservative General Secretary opposed to perestroyka. Thus, it's better to keep Party power in his hands as long as possible.

Presidential and Party powers should be separated from each other. This is inevitable. Conservatives too have realized that this is necessary. They have only realized what democrats have long been discussing. At this point this is immaterial. But the President-General Secretary is caught in the cross fire from both the right-wingers and the left-wingers—the most precarious state for him. That criticism also hits Gorbachev's closest aides, Yakovlev included.

Yakovlev said: "Perestroyka itself is a left-wing movement. If someone is trying to get ahead of perestroyka on the left, perestroyka has to move even more to the left."

I would add that perestroyka should veer still more to the left to prevent someone getting head of it from the right. Today it has to veer more to the left or else it will go into reverse.

The power of the CPSU is crumbling but is still great. This power can be used to achieve victory for the left perestroyka. To make this possible, the CPSU should have as its head an independent left-wing politician who is close to the President. He should also be trusted by real left-wingers and real democrats.

Yakovlev and Gorbachev should make their choice, they should help the democratic forces within the Party to make the correct choice. There is the danger that the President and the CPSU might have a falling out, or they might be too close. There should only be cooperation based on democracy and liberalism.

Yakovlev has an important role here due to his personal and political qualities. Many left-wingers dislike in Yakovlev only one thing: the fact that he is a Communist. I would say a Communist with a human face. And that makes a world of difference.

May Armenian People's Deputies Election Analyzed

Pre-Election Poll Summarized

90US1103A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
17 May 90 p 1

[Article by G. Sayamov, junior scientific associate, Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Philosophy Institute: "Whom Will the Voters Follow?"]

[Text] The elections to the Supreme Soviets of union republics should undoubtedly be counted among the most important events in our country's political life. While they have already been completed in most republics, our preelection campaign has just entered its final phase

A gigantic burden of responsibility has been laid on the future Armenian parliament, in which many set certain hopes. Sociological studies and voter public opinion polls regarding the elections to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet acquire particular urgency in light of this.

One such study was conducted by the sociology department of the Philosophy and Law Institute of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences among voters of Mashotskiy and Spandaryanskiy rayons of the city of Yerevan. A total of over 2,000 people were polled. The aggregate sample, calculated on the basis of the lists of voters, reflects the social-demographic structure of the population of these rayons fairly accurately.

The fundamental purpose of the study was the determination of the political purposes of those polled with regard to the upcoming elections to local and the republic Supreme Soviet.

The level of the political activity of those polled was determined by their readiness to get involved both in the preelection campaign, and to participate in the elections directly.

The results of the poll indicate that those questioned, by and large, are more prepared to participate in the elections themselves rather than in the preelection campaign. Thus, while somewhat over half of those polled intended to participate in the elections, only one out of five was involved in the preelection campaign.

The group of responding voters who had not yet determined whether they would vote or not should particularly be noted. This is a fairly large group, about 25 percent of the total number of those polled, which, in the event of its participation, can significantly affect the outcome of the elections.

The sociodemographic distinction of the voters has a certain influence on political activity. It became clear

that men are more politically active than women independent of whether this concerned participation in the preelection campaign or in directly in the elections themselves.

The level of political activity increases with greater age of the respondents. The most passive group proved to be youth under 30. The peak of political activity was reached with the oldest age category of 60 and over.

Respondents with a higher educational level expressed a relatively greater aspiration to participate in the election campaign. Communists manifest a markedly higher political activity when compared with Komsomol members and non-party members.

On the whole, the low level of the voters' political activity is explained by an entire range of causes. Not least of these is the effect of the stereotypes and cliches of bygone years that have taken root in the political consciousness, when an entire political campaign was reminiscent of a well-planned show, and the election results were decided in advance.

Secondly, at the current level of political activity, the extraordinarily socioeconomic situation in the republic cannot but have an effect. The unresolved status of many problems, first and foremost Karabakh, the weakness of social and public structures, the intensification of social disorganization, all of this is generating and deepening social alienation and pessimism, making people all the more indifferent to all that is happening. Not seeing positive changes, many evaluate skeptically the possibility for the situation to change for the better. Hence not only the growth of passive, but the glaring growth of "negatively active" voters, that is, those consciously boycotting the elections. Incidentally, some 30-35 percent of those polled during last year's elections proved to be such. They should be covered in more detail during these elections, since they have left a fairly noticeable trace on the nature of the voters' political behavior.

Fresh in the minds of many are the "elections" under curfew conditions, when all forms of voters' political participation in the preelection campaign were prohibited. And while other union republics were observing at that time an unprecedented outburst of political self-awareness, the barometer of our political activity had dropped to a record low reading. As the poll indicated, only about 40 percent of the voters participated in the elections. All this could not but have been reflected in the political lines of the population regarding the elections to the republic Supreme Soviet, and cautious assessments of the nature of the latter are superfluous confirmation of this. On the question of what the upcoming elections would be like in comparison to the previous ones, the responses of those polled were fell along the following lines:

—"more democratic"—32.8 percent

—"the same as the previous elections"—24.9 percent

—"less democratic"—16.7 percent

—No definite response was given by 15.6 percent.

In the opinion of critically-minded voters, the undemocratic nature of the upcoming elections will be expressed in the failure to nominate alternative candidates and in the limitations of the rights of public representatives.

At the same time, the first results of the current preelection campaign testify that the voters' fears are in vain, particularly as concerns the chance of holding non-alternative elections. An average of 6 candidates for deputy competes for a single deputy position now, and in certain election okrugs, the number of candidates exceeds ten.

Of course, it is not easy to "choose" a deputy from a single candidate (as it was here in last year's elections in a number of okrugs, and therefore, in this we have demonstratively left many union republics behind), but how is it to be for the voters, who are presently dealing with the exact opposite situation, when, let's say, they have to choose the most worthy from among ten competitors. In such a case, a sort of "Buridanov" effect cannot be excluded, and it is possible that runoffs will have to be held in certain okrugs. In such a situation, the role of chance grows, and objective information on each candidate can weaken the effect of this factor. Best of all, of course, are preelection meetings with candidates, however, as the poll results indicate, such forms of preelection campaigning are preferred by only 15-25 percent of those polled. For example, the initiative of the Spandaryan Rayon party committee in creating a rayon club of voters is worthy; in it, meetings with candidates are organized regularly, and discussions are held.

Another channel of information is posters with the candidates' pictures, citing biographical data, as well as the basic postulates of their preelection programs. Yet even such "standardized" advertisements cannot give a comprehensive idea of this or that candidate. Sociological studies conducted in a number of union republics on election eve testify that only 10-20 percent of the voters knew the candidates for deputy.

In this most complicated situation, the most determining significance will be assigned first and foremost to the personal positions of the candidates, their recognition, and authority. Such a principle at the foundation of current election campaign is a necessary, but not yet sufficient condition of the formation of an active parliament, for when pluralism of opinions is not formed in the appropriate platforms and does not materialized in the political parties, it seems premature to speak of this. It is clear that the abolition of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution is not automatically leading to the creation of a multiparty system; in addition to the adoption of the appropriate laws, time is also needed for this. Another thing is obvious as well: It is not the parliament that must serve as a precondition for the creation of parties, but the opposite—a multiparty system and democratically conducted elections on its basis will create the

conditions for an effectively functioning parliament whose role will grow immeasurably with the institution of the office of republic president.

And then it will be enough for the voters to know through which parties (the programs and platforms of which will be known to all in advance) these or those candidates will be on the ballot, and which concrete party has justified the hopes of the voters, and to whom to present the bill for errors and failures; then it will no longer be permitted to heap everything on the intrigues of the "apparatchiks" and the omnipotence of the "aggressively obedient majority."

Election Results

90US1103B Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
22 May 90 p 1

[ARMENPRESS report: "The Report of the Central Election Commission on the Elections of Armenian SSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] It is reported from the Central Election Commission on elections of Armenian SSR people's deputies that of the 259 okrug election commissions, reports on the elections that took place 20 May have already been received from 219. Of the aforementioned 219 okrugs, the elections were recognized as valid in 150 election okrugs, 29 of which are in the city of Yerevan. Deputies were elected in 74 okrugs, of which 13 are in Yerevan. Elections were not held (that is, less than half the voters included in the lists participated in them) in 69 okrugs, of which 56 are in the city of Yerevan (of 85 okrugs). Thus, repeat elections will be held in 69 okrugs, 56 of them in Yerevan; in 71 okrugs, runoffs will be held (including 8 in Yerevan). No information on election results has come in yet from 40 okrugs, including NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Okrug]. On the basis of the petitions and complaints coming in from individual okrugs, the Central Election Commission, as well as the okrug election commissions are conducting additional investigations.

The tallying of the results of the elections of Armenian SSR people's deputies continues.

Armenian PanNational Movement Influence

90US1103C Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
22 May 90 p 1

[Report by KOMMUNIST Staff Correspondent N. Mesropyan: "Up Ahead—Round Two"]

[Text] Late in the evening I began to call around the election precincts of Kirovakan and heard optimistic forecasts on all sides: There is no talk of passivity; the voters are voting actively. Nevertheless, late at night it became clear that no more than 60 percent of the voters participated in the elections. Is this a lot or a little? If you consider that even the feeble old people demanded in advance that the election urns be brought home to them, it is little. If we recall the statements of many that they

consider the current elections an empty venture, and did not intend to participate in them, then it is a lot. The elections took place all the same, and while they have to be repeated in the majority of districts, that is only because no one of the candidates gathered more than half the votes.

In our view, the issue of for whom or for what the voters voted remains open. More likely, for whom. Despite the external diversity, the preelection platforms essentially differed very little from one another, and the problem of Artsakh was unfailingly present in all of them. The second most significant problems was that of the program for the restoration of the city destroyed by the earthquake, but here, too, the candidates did not seem to offer anything cardinal new to their voters. It is no coincidence that Ye. Kapustin, the chief of the city restoration headquarters, yielded in the first round to the famous, but now already ex-investigator for important cases from the USSR Procuracy, N. Ivanov. He was given much assistance by the AOD [Armenian Nationwide Movement].

The program for city restoration of gorispolkom chairman V. Karagezyan proved more attractive, and he too had a convincing victory in the first round. Of the other candidates victorious in the first round, we note R. Kocharyan, Karabakhskiy silk combine parkom secretary, who was on the ballot as a candidate of AOD, and O. Matinyan, another candidate of the movement.

It should be said that AOD has had a major victory. The constant rallies that were taking place on one of the central squares played their role; in the evenings, thousands of people gathered there. The lists of AOD candidates published in the newspaper AYK also helped, as did the colorful posters pasted throughout the city. The movement in general proved that it can fight for its candidates.

The city party organization did not manage to help its candidates not only because it obviously yielded both in visual and in oral, and in print propaganda, but for the reason that it did come up with a concrete, clear preelection program. Nor did the representatives of the association of national self-determination become masters of minds. It seems that their excessively harsh demands on the immediate departure from the USSR scared people away, as well as acts on removing monuments. In any event, not a single one of this association's candidates made it to the second round.

It is difficult to draw more profound conclusions now while the election trail is still warm; a second round is in store for seven out of eleven election okrugs, and objectivity requires us not only to be careful in predictions, which, in the majority of cases, did not justify themselves, but to create all conditions so that the voters can calmly, without pressure, make their choice.

Apathy Reported

90US1103D Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
22 May 90 p 1

[Article by KOMSOMOLETS Correspondent A. Aramyan: "A Deputy Was Not Elected"]

[Text] "But all the same we did not manage to bring the importance of the upcoming elections to the people during the preelection campaign"—this opinion of the chairman of the okrug election commission of okrug No. 83, the director of the institute of infectious disease prevention and general hygiene (and for those to whom it is of interest, the brother-in-law of Anton Kochinyan), V. Kogan, probably finds no arguments. People's activity on election day was low, even though the first voters gathered there before 7 am, waiting until they opened. The candidates for Armenian SSR people's deputies share in many ways the blame for people's low activity; they built their programs on identical forecasting problems. There are very few preelection campaigns that are developed on the basis of the candidate's profession. "Why should you be in the republic's parliament?"—many candidates could not give a sensible explanation for this question. This was clearly shown by the last meeting of the voters of election okrug No. 83, held on the day before the election. Economist professor V. Khodzhanbekyan, studying the problems of the birth rate, could not find a serious basis for how to fill the vacuum in the population formed in the republic during the course of the few seconds of the earthquake. Professor-internationalist M. Asatryan could not explain how he will apply his knowledge in parliament. What is this other than common dilettantism, a phenomenon that has harmed us very much and continues to harm us. Many voters have turned away from the election by the low intellect of many candidates.

However, let's return to the elections. By noon, only 10 percent of the voters had voted in the 69th precinct of okrug No. 83; in the 68th precinct, 16 percent. It must be said that many by force of habit came to vote literally with bundles of ballots, and such voters had to be sent back. A voter who gives his ballot to someone else is clearly demonstrating his indifference toward the elections. And better that they not vote at all than give their votes to the first candidate they pick out at random. By 12:30, the ballots in Russian had run out at the precincts. Voters who did not read Armenian needed translators, a problem that arose, as they say, all of its own accord...

Here are some of the comments overheard during the elections.

"I don't know who to vote for; all the programs are printed in Armenian, and I don't speak it. Tell me who to vote for."

"I'm a militia capitan, and it is my deep conviction that once again, we are going from one extreme to another; we've gone from elections without alternatives to elections with, for example, eight candidates at once in our

okrug. People aren't figuring it out, and it's hard for them to get their bearing and make the right choice."

"I prefer Akopyan; he's a patriot, and what else is important, he's modest. God save us from gung-ho patriots in parliament."

"I picked the one I know, the one who'll be of use to me."

"We have to make an effort that there be fewer chairs with "suits hanging over them" in the new parliament, fewer dilettantes and upstarts. And more serious, sensible, and honest people..."

A real hullabaloo enveloped the okrug's election precincts at 19:30, half an hour before the end of the elections. It was still about 300 votes short of a quorum (50 percent plus one vote). The elections were threatened with failure. The last voter cast his ballot at election precinct No 68 ten minutes before the end of the election. At exactly 20:00, election commission Chairman O. Martirosyan declared the elections completed. Several people late for the elections were not admitted. Outsiders left the precinct.

At 20:05, in the presence of the candidates' proxies, the seals are broken on the ballot boxes, and the ballots retrieved. The commission begins to systematize the ballots and tally the votes—this is done without basic calculators; pens, paper, and the four operations of arithmetic are in action. The rumor gets around at 23:00 that the elections will be declared invalid, since less than half voted in all the okrug's precincts. Finally, the election results are gathered from all 4 precincts by 24:00. Everyone sighs with relief... Fifty-one percent of the voters presented themselves for the elections. True, no one of the candidates gathered the sufficient number of votes (50 percent plus one vote) of those who voted. A total of 32 percent of the voters voted for Robert Akopyan; in second place in number of votes was Aram Mailyan, 27 percent. They will continue the fight between them in 2 weeks. In the meantime, one thing is clear: The rank-and-file voter is casting his ballot for a politically sovereign and economically developed Armenia.

Voter Comments Noted

90US1103E Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
29 May 90 p 1

[Article by N. Manucharova: "The People Chose"]

[Text] The members of the Central Election Commission are staying late at the House of Political Education these days; the election results are being tallied. Yet concurrent with the tally of the results, a review of the numerous complaints coming in as a might flow from the candidates for republic Supreme Soviet deputy, their proxies, public representatives... We were witness to one such case.

The members of okrug election commission of okrug No 42, Tashtotsskiy Rayon, the candidates who were on the

ballot in the given okrug, and their proxies, gathered together with the Central Election Commission to verify the statements of deputy candidates G. Ulubabyan and M. Mikayelyan on violations on election day. The claims were an artificially elevated number of voters, which finally led to the disruption of the quorum.

"Four candidates were on the ballot in our okrug, among them was E. Kocharyan, chairman of the Mashtotsskiy rayispolkom" says okrug election commission member L. Sarkisyan. "The election process itself went normally, without any complications. We got in touch with the Central Election Commission after tallying the votes, since we didn't know what to do with the lists of voters (there was no chance to store them in the school in which we were situated). They told us to take them to the rayispolkom. Then two ROVD [rayon department of internal affairs] staffers came, and together, we took all the documentation to the ispolkom. This was the cause of mistrust among the candidates; they were afraid that the local soviet could somehow influence the election results."

"In years past we did not have such elections," interjects another representative of the okrug election commission G. Ayvazyan. "Therefore we did not manage to avoid some of the glitches associated with the practice of previous years. We still have to carefully sort out the complaints concretely. But in general, a lack of preparation and organization in conducting the election campaign made its mark. The main thing is to learn some lessons for the future from this."

One of the candidates expressed his dissatisfaction with the organization of the preelection campaign; in his opinion, the candidates were not always provided equal rights, particularly in the issue of holding voters' meetings. Pressure on voters was also mentioned, and campaigning on election day.

Many complaints of similar content are being sent to the Central Election Commission.

"They are all being reviewed; final decisions will be made on each of them," said Central Election Commission Chairman R. Amiryan. "As far as the final election results are concerned, they have not yet been determined. According to preliminary figures, deputies have been elected in 98 okrugs, and there will be runoffs in 73. Moreover, in accordance with Article 53 of the law (runoff elections), we have requested of the Supreme Soviet Presidium that they clarify the mechanism of its application.

"I would also like to say that the irresponsibility of certain citizens is interfering with the work of the Central Election Commission; our people are not honored by all the groundless accusations. Incidentally, we have sent about 12 letters of complaint to the republic procuracy."

Yes, however imperfect our legislative acts were, they all the same specify responsibility for violating citizens'

political rights, in particular, hindering the right to vote is prosecuted, as well as forgery of election documents or an incorrect tally of votes.

We promise to inform the readers in the near future of the course of the examination of the complaints by the law enforcement organs.

Yet even today, questions have been designated that should not have arisen if the Law on elections were more complete. And again, everything depends upon the competence of the people's choices, in whose hands lies the adoption of the law most fully responding to the demands of democracy. And it is an insult that incompetence and a lack of professionalism to no small extent promote the indifference of those who "do not believe." Because of their lack of belief, we will still be paying for the new mistakes for a long time, and will be the captives of the illusions of bygone years, when everybody voted alike.

"We were more afraid of falsification, and violations in the election process, but the attack came from behind, from the voters—a quorum was not ensured in dozens of okrugs," says one of the candidates for deputy S. Shakhmuradyan, from election district No 36, 26 Commissars Rayon, who gathered the greatest number of votes from among 11 candidates. It is an insult for our compatriots, who rejected their first opportunity to form the Armenian Parliament, all the more so during such a decisive and difficult hour for Armenia. I also regret that I was forced to fight with ten other candidates, each of which individually could have done much good for the work of parliament. These are economist A. Yegiazaryan, legal scholar R. Navasardyan, famous ecologist K. Danielyan, and others. After all, there were okrugs in Armenia in which 2-3 candidates were on the ballot, or even one."

Unfortunately, it must be stated that the sociologists' forecasts for the elections did not come out. The voters' passivity and political indifference did their work. Well, this is also a natural reflection of the realities of the sociopolitical life of the republic.

And in conclusion, information for reflection (for the time being there are no official sources): 95 percent of the voters participated in the elections in Karabakh...

Election Commission Report

90US1103F Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
1 Jun 90 p 1

[Report of the Central Election Commission for the Election of Armenian SSR people's deputies: "On the Results of the Elections of Armenian SSR People's Deputies That Took Place on 20 May 1990"]

[Text] Having considered the records of the results of the voting in the election okrugs for the elections of Armenian SSR people's deputies that have come in from the okrug election commissions, the Central Election Commission reports:

There were included in the list of voters for the elections of Armenian SSR people's deputies 2,137,210 persons; 1,286,464 voters participated in the voting, which is 60.19 percent of the total number of voters.

In order to conduct the elections, 260 election okrugs were formed; in 259 of these 1,307 candidates for deputy were on the ballot on 20 May. In 5 okrugs, there were one candidate each on the election ballot, and in 36 okrugs, two candidates each, and in 215 okrugs, three or more candidates.

The elections took place in 259 election okrugs. People's deputies were elected in 99 okrugs.

In 82 election okrugs, in each of which more than 2 candidates were on the ballot and not one of them was elected, on the basis of Article 52 of the Law "On the elections of Armenian SSR people's deputies," runoffs will be held on 3 June of this year.

In 70 election okrugs in which the elections were declared invalid, and in 6 okrugs in which the elections were invalidated due to gross violations of the law on elections, repeat elections will be held in the course of 2 months.

Information on the election results has not come in from election okrugs Nos. 33 and 39 of the city of Yerevan.

Institute Preparing Updated Yerevan Seismological Map

90US1102A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
19 Jun 90 p 1

[Interview with Professor Suren Sokratovich Darbinyan, deputy director of the Scientific Research Institute of Geophysics and Engineering Seismology of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences by special correspondent R. Akopyan: "The Seismic Map of Yerevan"; date, place not specified]

[Text] The conversation of our special correspondent R. Akopyan and Professor Suren Sokratovich Darbinyan, deputy director of the Scientific Research Institute of Geophysics and Engineering Seismology of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences touches upon vitally important issues of concern not only to Yerevan and its residents but to all the residents of our republic.

[Correspondent] What is the the most important task facing your institute at this moment?

[Darbinyan] In the current year, a most important and urgent task has been entrusted to our institute—the creation of a microzone seismic map of Yerevan. What does this represent? By using various methodologies and approaches, we need to determine the possible maximal shocks in any rayon in the city. The direction of this work has been entrusted to me.

[Correspondent] Can it be that such a map of Yerevan has not yet existed?

[Darbinyan] There is such a map, but today, for the two following reasons, it cannot meet our needs: The city has grown significantly, and the appropriate research has not been conducted for the new rayons; the long term was not taken into consideration. Since the Spitak earthquake of 1988, the seismic danger over the territory of the entire republic has been "re-evaluated." New scientific studies have indicated that is located in a 9-point seismic zone, rather than the 8-point zone as had previously been considered.

[Correspondent] What will the new map yield?

[Darbinyan] We know that the overwhelming majority of state buildings constructed in Yerevan are calculated for shocks of 6-7, and only a small portion of them for 9-point shocks. In the event of a 9-point earthquake, these buildings will not withstand the shaking, which will lead to much more seriously terrible consequences than the tragedy of December 1988. Based upon the scale of the new map, the buildings must either be fortified to factor for a 9-point earthquake, or, if fortification is not possible, such buildings must be razed. An enormous scale of work is required in this area.

The second important purpose of this map is that it must become the normative document for the master plan of municipal construction. Even now it is necessary to build up the city anew, with strict consideration for the level of seismic danger.

[Correspondent] Does anything interfere with the work of creating a microzone seismic map? Are there difficulties?

[Darbinyan] First and foremost, the scale and scope of such work, and the deadlines are extremely tight—one year. It is natural that the institute is carrying on with its own constant topics at the same time. A powerful base of scientific equipment is needed, and our institute lacks this. We are forced to make due with what we have, working day and night.

A special expedition has been created under the direction of experienced specialist Sarkis Simonyan. The works are being done in three directions. A clarification of the seismographic conditions of the Ararat valley (director—Doctor of Sciences Sergey Nazaretyan), a clarification of the engineering-geographic conditions of the territory of Yerevan (director—Candidate of Sciences Amazasp Babadzanyan), and the creation of the seismic zoning map (director—Candidate of Sciences Stepan Piruzyan).

[Correspondent] Will you complete it by the established deadlines?

[Darbinyan] Despite the fact that the deadlines are very tight, we must finish the work by the end of the year. We cannot be late, since a numerous detachment of designers and construction workers awaits these results.

State Action on Earthquake Lessons Urged

90US1102B Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
12 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by A. Nikonov, doctor of geological-mineralogical sciences, chief of the paleoseismological laboratory of the Institute of Earth Physics imeni O.Yu. Shmidt, USSR Academy of Sciences: "Seismic Catastrophe: The Lesson of Armenia"]

[Text] The Price of the "Honor of the Uniform"

Eighteen months separate us from the catastrophe in Armenia. Now, as we are freeing ourselves from the shock and the horror of the first impressions, yet while the pain has not been lost and the very event is still fresh in mind, while we are enriched with the experience of life and activities during and after the catastrophe, is the time to think about what has happened. After all, we have survived so much, an unprecedented amount has been learned, so much has been done and is being done.

But all the same, perhaps we still have not done the most important thing. The most important, the mandatory thing is that it cannot be allowed that a catastrophe of such a scale be permitted to recede into the past. A comprehensive, open analysis of the miscalculations and errors in the organization of the research and recovery work has not yet been done; those guilty have not yet been publicly named, and a new structure of the organs and systems of measures for preventing such tragedies in the future has not yet been developed and made public. In other words, we have not yet learned to act and organize work in such situations on a nationwide, republic, rayon, and settlement level. Before, during, and after the natural disaster.

And after all, this is not the first time. It was this way during the Ashkhabad seismic catastrophe. Back then, in fall of 1948, an earthquake of similar magnitude burst open in immediate proximity to the capital of Turkmenia, completely destroying the city and killing eight out of every ten residents. In accordance with the practice of the time, the tragic totals of the catastrophe were not made public; the scientific results were not generalized sufficiently, and the priceless practical experience of actions under emergency circumstances were not conceptualized and codified. It seems that only the local builders utilized the tragic experience of Ashkhabad.

In 1988, the situation in the country had become entirely different. Information flowed from the scene of the event freely and relatively quickly, and the public both within the country and abroad could react accordingly. This substantially eased taking immediate measures. Yet all of this seemed to have to be done for the first time, unsystematically, hastily, getting bearings and making decisions on the run, more or less at random. No one, except, perhaps, for the fire fighters, proved prepared for the emergency.

The consequences of the Armenian earthquake proved to be so enormous that the question of its causes emerged

immediately. First and foremost, the specialists tried to find the answer—seismologists, designers, construction workers. For the most part, they sought the answers not in their own fields, but in the neighboring "shop." Ambition, the "honor of the uniform," fear for one's own reputation, and sometimes even one's fate predetermined the disagreement and contradiction of the answers. The discord among the specialists of various branches, staffers of central and local institutions, workers of various departments should more likely be called, "who is to blame," and not "what are the causes." But it is necessary to explain, since the issue lies elsewhere: against what, rather than whom, to struggle, what to observe, and not whom to fence off.

That is exactly what was studied by the special group commissioned by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo commission. Several months later, the commission presented 26 volumes of its report with objective data on the research, testing, analysis, comparisons, and, of course, conclusions and recommendations. The reasons for the unusually high human and material losses were also revealed, which must become the center of the lessons of the tragedy.

Yet the pity is that the aforementioned report apparently exists only in a few copies, and is accessible to only a narrow circle of individuals. And this means that the bulk of specialists directing the workers, hundreds of thousands of people somehow or another involved in the cause of Armenia, and society as a whole again cannot gain the lessons of the catastrophe in a complete, clear, though horrifyingly bare, but vitally necessary form. The lesson is necessary not only to the highest echelon of power; society as a whole must draw lessons from this. Individual publications, speeches, and reports are completely insufficient for this. None of this will change today's unfavorable situation as far as facing disaster is concerned, nor will it at all give a guarantee for the next time.

Familiar with the conclusions of the high commission only from brief reports expounded in newspapers, and thus not claiming a complete consideration of the problem, I turn to materials which are accessible to the scientist and in their own way, highly indicative.

Let us attempt, despite the lack of domestic information on the concrete indices, to determine the damage and loss from the earthquake on a comparative basis and thus approach an understanding of the causes of the great scale of the catastrophe.

As far as the material loss is concerned, the Soviet press sequentially indicated the following figures—R5, 8, and 10 billion. In October 1989, the material loss was already counted as R13 billion. It is also possible that this recent figure is not final. The expenditure of exactly that R13.4 billion, is planned for increasing the people's standard of living in 1990. As we know, the losses from the Chernobyl disaster are valued at a minimum of R10 billion.

The matter of counting the number of earthquake victims is more difficult. The official report of 17 February 1989 state that 24,985 people died. Until that time, the possible figure of dead was stated as 40,000-45,000, citing the specialists' calculations. Significantly higher estimates were cited in the foreign press. Certain press organs in our country reported that in the city of Spitak alone, half the 26,000 residents died.

Some 70,000 people lived in the ruined buildings of Leninakan (of the 290,000 comprising the population of the city). Many of them were in educational institutions and at enterprises at the moment of the earthquake. But the majority of these buildings were destroyed or damaged as well.

For today, we are correct to take the number 25,000 dead as a minimum, and 40,000-45,000 as completely probable. This is our starting point.

Let us compare the severity of the damage inflicted by other seismic catastrophes of the 20th century.

China, 1976, 243,000 dead.

China, 1920, 200,000 dead.

Japan, 1823 [sic], 143,000 dead (primarily from subsequent fires).

Italy, 1908, 120,000 dead.

USSR, 1948, Turkmenia, 130,000 dead (along with victims in Iran).

Peru, 1970, 67,000 dead.

Against the background of these major catastrophes of the century, the Armenian catastrophe seems moderate. Yet this is only the general impression. For an understanding of the essence of what occurred, it is more correct to compare the victims of the Spitak earthquake not with all the others, but only with those of analogous energy output, or magnitude, expressed in seismological terms.

Out of all the earthquakes originating on the earth's dry land of energy equivalent to that of the one under discussion, only one-fourth of the events were accompanied by deaths at all. Let us look at how these human losses are distributed in this one-fourth portion of such earthquakes.

Year	Country	Magnitude	Victims (thousands)
1980	Italy	7.0	3.1
1980	Algeria	7.3	5.0
1981	Iran	7.3	2.5
1981	Iran	6.9	3.0
1982	El Salvador	7.0	.016
1982	Mexico	7.2	.009
1983	Turkey	6.9	2.0

1984	USSR, Gazli	7.2	.001
1988	USSR, Spitak	7.0	25
1989	U.S., California	7.1	.06

Of course, the number of victims depends not only upon the energy output, but on a range of different characteristics of earthquakes—the time of day, the depth of the center, the mechanism of the latter, the phenomena concomitant with and subsequent to the event (fires, creeping). The effect's dependence upon population density and building quality is high.

The destruction of the Armenian earthquake had no extreme physical characteristics or supplemental factors, therefore it is impossible to ascribe the severity of the losses to nature under comparative examination. Yet even under unfavorable circumstances and in poorly developed countries with dense construction and unstable structures, earthquakes such as the Spitak one take 2-3-5 thousand live, if any at all.

The Armenian Earthquake Carried off a Higher Order

Before understanding, and in order to understand and explain this phenomenon, we will conduct a few more retrospective juxtapositions. The previous destructive earthquake in Northern Armenia, the Leninakan earthquake, took place in 1926. Its energy level and area was significantly less, but its intensity at the surface in Leninakan and its environs was the same as it was here in 1988, specifically, 8 points (in places, up to 9). Then, 62 years ago, 350 people died and 300 were wounded, even though up to 60 percent of the city's buildings were damaged. That means that .4 percent of the residents in the area of the earthquake perished, and an equal number were wounded. In 1988, human losses were 4 (6) percent, and wounded were about 3 percent. That there were fewer wounded than dead is exceptional in world experience. And this holds key meaning for the understanding of the causes of the catastrophe.

In 1988, Armenia lost 70-130 times more population in absolute calculations and a higher order with regard to the comparison to 1926.

Yet perhaps all this is natural? After all, the last earthquake was significantly more powerful and widespread, and both the population and its density have increased. But then why did 15 people die in Leninakan in 1928 and 62 years later, about 25,000? With the same 8-9 magnitude? Why in the first case was the damage \$6 million, and in the second, so many billions?

Perhaps mankind is inevitably paying a higher price for population density, the complication of the infrastructure, and favorable conditions?

Let us make a comparison again, this time an international one. Not 2 years had passed since the Spitak earthquake when a destructive earthquake took place in California, in the western U.S. The same amount of

energy was released; the event took place in a location even more densely populated.

And what happened?

The damage proved comparable, \$10 million (let's not forget the infrastructure and the relative wealth of California, the richest state of the richest country). But the dead numbered 65 (not primarily in buildings), and the wounded, about 3,000. There were about 14,000 who were without shelter (as opposed to 360,000-500,000 in Armenia).

To say that the residents of California were lucky would be to evade the essence of the matter. And in order to get closer to it, we compare the losses from this California earthquake with those from the one even stronger and encompassing more area in 1906. The losses then amounted to \$400 million, with 500 people killed, primarily by the subsequent major fire. Thus, 83 years later, the damage grew by a factor of 1.5, and the number of dead was lessened.

Let us turn once more to the relative number of victims. In 1906, approximately .1 percent died, and in 1989, .005 percent of the population was caught in the area's disaster. In Armenia, the two aforementioned earthquakes killed .4 and 4 percent respectively. Thus, under earthquakes of comparable energy in the center and force of manifestation on the surface, the ones in the most seismically dangerous state of the U.S. saw the relative number of dead decrease by a factor of 20 over 83 years, while at the same time, over 62 years, the totals increased by a factor of 10-15 in what is not the most seismically dangerous republic in the USSR. In total, about 600 people were lost in these two events in California, and in Armenia, 25,000.

If this is not indicative, let us take fresher, more general data. Over the last 50 years in the U.S., 500 people died from the strongest earthquakes. In the USSR, the total of victims was always protected as a secret, and has not been made public to this day. According to the modest calculations on the basis of the information available to the researcher, 160,000-200,000 people have died in approximately the same number of earthquakes. Accordingly, for every million residents, the U.S. has lost 2 people, and the Soviet Union, 600 people.

Of course, the size of the seismically dangerous territories and the number of people in our country are significantly larger, let us say, 2-5 times larger. But not 300-400 times larger!

So What is the Matter?

There can be several answers, of varying levels of complexity and detail. Yet in the specialist's view, the most simple one is indisputable: It is a matter of the system of construction, of the strategy and practice of ensuring safety.

This conclusion can be made without leaving the office. How much more interesting and useful it is to compare it with the official conclusion of a large group of specialists who worked in the disaster area for several months in 1988 commissioned by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. These conclusions sound as follows (as reported in a newspaper, yet we know of no other source for them): "...the fundamental cause of the catastrophic consequences of the earthquake was not so much the specificity of the shocks, multiplied by the hydrometeorological conditions of the disaster area, so much as the impermissible deviation from the norms of design, the glaring insufficiencies of the designs themselves, and the unusually low quality of construction." (IZVESTIYA, 13 May 1989).

On the basis of these conclusions, the CPSU Central Committee commission on eliminating the consequences of the Armenian earthquake decided to introduce the state receiving of all buildings under construction, and commissioned the USSR Procuracy to initiate a criminal case and hold all guilty parties responsible.

Even before the earthquake, the republic press had established that tens, hundreds of multi-storied buildings constructed in the last 25 years were incapable of serving their purpose, that lists of dangerous residential buildings were held for 28 cities in the entire republic, and that the situation in Leninakan was threatening, that the critical situation had not changed in decades. There were calls to make a scrupulous analysis of "this unprecedented crime, this cynical irresponsibility" the property of glasnost. N.I. Ryzhkov, the chairman of the the USSR Council of Ministers, who is also chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo commission, announced at a press conference in Yerevan one week after the earthquake: "When the investigation is completed, I assume that very serious conclusions will be drawn." Many assumed the same thing. Are there now results of the investigation? Who knows about them?

To learn the lessons of the Armenian catastrophe only as they apply to the disaster area, or even to Armenia, is only a beginning, and a small part of the problem. It is difficult to doubt that the shortcomings, violations, and criminal attitude to the cause manifested in Armenia, are inherent in the majority of the other republics and rayons also subject to earthquakes. What will happen to them?

The lessons of the tragedy in Armenia, and before that, in Turkmenia, the Kurile Islands, and Central Asia, can be considered mastered only in the event that they are taught on a union-wide scale, affirmed at the state level, and assimilated at the level of every resident, with regular "exams" given at all levels.

Nature is blind in its manifestations and deaf to human losses and suffering. That is natural. It is unnatural when people remain blind and deaf to their own interests, however many lessons nature delivers them.

Today we face a dilemma: To create a functioning system to ensure safety in the country, as developed countries do, or to "plan" new victims and new billions of expenditures to replace seismic losses.

Mutalibov Report to 32nd Azerbaijani CP Congress

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[Presentation of A.N. Mutalibov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, of Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Political Report "The Progress of Perestroyka and the Tasks of the Republic's Party Organizations" to 32nd Azerbaijan CP Congress]

[Text] Comrade Delegates!

The 32nd Azerbaijan Communist Party Congress has assembled at an abrupt, revolutionary turning point in the country's history. Five difficult years of perestroyka, which have cardinally changed our society and our ideas about socialism, are behind us.

We have assembled on the frontier of radical new changes to sum up the work that has been done and, figuratively speaking, synchronize the political clock with the current moment and determine reference points for the future.

In a historically short space of time the country has essentially covered an enormous path in the establishment of democratization and glasnost, the designing of a new system of the management of society and in the emancipation of man—the purpose and guarantor of revolutionary transformations. This has been a path of the spiritual reawakening of the people and a critical reinterpretation of our entire life. And we are aware that this is merely the start of the renewal movement.

It would not be party-minded not to speak plainly also about the criticism which has all these years accompanied perestroyka and the social upheavals being experienced by society. It is well known that any revolution means a painful breakup of social and simply human relations. Nor is perestroyka, as revolutionary action, any exception in this respect.

However, we cannot attribute all that is negative merely to objective factors. We need to boldly and candidly acknowledge the exasperating miscalculations and mistakes made in the course of perestroyka itself even. Of course, many of them could and should have been foreseen and anticipated, had a clear action program been drawn up from the very outset.

Having proclaimed perestroyka, the party was unable to completely overcome the inertia of conservatism in its practice. While declaring the need for a renewal of organizing activity, the CPSU, like society as a whole, nonetheless, as was its custom, linked the solution of most acute problems with the holding of Central Committee plenums. In fact, however, this developed into

just another propaganda campaign. Debate, even at such a high level, was not materialized in specific action for it was not buttressed by day-to-day practical work. Is this not why the decisions of many CPSU Central Committee plenums failed to have the anticipated effect.

Nor has there been sufficient consistency, decisiveness and scientific forecasting and sober calculation of the socioeconomic and national-psychological many-sidedness of Soviet society. Whence the drops in tempo and the political seesawing from extreme to extreme which are exasperating people, the growth of social tension and the crisis in interethnic relations. Whence the intensification of separatist tendencies and centrifugal forces jeopardizing the future of the Soviet Federation and the real danger of a split in the CPSU.

The program of an acceleration of society's development based on the achievements of the S&T revolution announced in 1985 was soon consigned to oblivion and given no further mention, practically.

Meanwhile nothing appreciable in the country's S&T development, without which there is no speaking of economic transformations and the efficiency of the national economy, has occurred. Science continued and is now continuing to exist on budget allocations, using them at times as a life annuity.

The attempts to speed up S&T progress with the aid of joint ventures could produce no in any way tangible result in the next few years. Our country is too big for some 2,000 enterprises or so to markedly update the engineering base of the state's production potential.

Thus the subsequent package of reforms, conceived of as radical, proved practically bankrupt, despite the concentrated propaganda thereof. And the people are still living in expectations of them.

The legalization of strikes was manifestly contrary to the Soviet way of life. This means authorizing strikes, given our most severe economic condition, while pushing aside the trade unions here. Would it not have been better enhancing the independence of the unions than destroying the economy in some intoxication of imitation once again? Understandably, if strikes are conducted under a market system, a conflict between the employer and the workers arises. But with us there is a division of the overall pie: the demands of some are satisfied at the expense of others. What kind of social justice is this.

Nor is the practice of the electivity of enterprise managers incontestable. Would it not be better to perfect the system of director training and instruction and then put them at the head of production. We, however, have decided to remove the blunders in the choice of personnel by so-called democratic election. As a result the leader has become an involuntary hostage to group interests in some outfits. And this has not improved the management of production, of course.

No less serious a mistake is the accelerated democratization syndrome which has taken possession of everyone. We have as a result forgotten that democracy and the law are a single whole. With us, however, democratization has by a whole verst outpaced its legal support.

This has been reflected particularly painfully at the time of the emergence of every conceivable public movement, many of which have been operating since the moment they were formed as parties. The people's fronts have unambiguously given notice of those against whom they will operate, having usurped the right to speak on behalf of the whole people. Even the ruling Communist Party has not permitted itself this. Meanwhile the law on public organizations and parties is still being drawn up. Is this not a glaring contradiction between real life and contrived solutions.

The consequences of such approaches are well known—the orgy of passions, mass-meeting chaos and bloody clashes, which can be contained only with the help of the army.

Having acknowledged specific problems in respect of individual nations born of Stalinism, we projected them onto the mutual relations of all nations, thereby awakening nationalism, which had been dormant for many years. We know to what this has led. Nor have the specific problems been solved. But, on the other hand, the holy of holies—the friendship of the peoples—which had been tested at abrupt turning points of our common fatherland and was sealed by blood in the years of the most pitiless war, has been forgotten. No soldiers asked one another what their nationalities were in the trenches. And this has been forgotten!

We appeal to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. The Azerbaijan party organization unanimously condemns the fact that the country's political leadership has yet to recognize that the interethnic conflict was unleashed by nationalists of the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] under the leadership of national chauvinists of Armenia. The communists and working people of the republic still consider this position to be flirting with certain forces and an incapacity for ensuring law and order in one's own home.

Comrades! The restructuring process is developing in extremely contradictory manner in Azerbaijan also. The reasons for and nature of the deceleration and the political zigzags, which have entailed a severe crisis in the republic and in the Communist Party and a comminution of national forces, were analyzed at a plenum of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee in March 1990. The 32nd congress has to develop the conclusions and rethink much of what has been experienced. And, of course, all this needs to be viewed in the context of the events occurring in our country.

The events of recent years—the interethnic animosity caused by the conflict in the NKAO, which has engendered a refugee problem, and the political and, recently,

armed confrontation of a neighboring republic with Azerbaijan—have made a profound impression on our whole life.

Never in the years of Soviet power have the Azerbaijani people experienced such serious upheavals. By virtue of this, the 32nd Communist Party congress has the significance of an extraordinary, special congress. And not only because the authority of the Central Committee envisaged by the rules has not expired. The special nature of the congress is further determined by the fact that the situation in the republic, as throughout the country, has reached a kind of "critical mass," the boundary at which it is decided whether perestroika will be or will not be and how the historical destiny of the people and the fate of the Azerbaijan Communist Party will take shape.

Having become bogged down in problems of an interethnic and, it should be emphasized, imposed conflict, the Communist Party has been unable to secure a breakthrough in the development of the economy, the social sphere and the political and spiritual life of the people. The incapacity of the republic party organization for self-cleansing and its lack of readiness for operating within the framework of the political pluralism, which is gaining momentum, and finding solutions adequate to the situation which is taking shape have exacerbated the social atmosphere particularly. Twice in the period under review the Communist Party leadership found itself plunged into profound political crises, and the actual resignation of the first secretaries of the Central Committee followed on both occasions. Such a thing was without precedent in the 70-year history of the Azerbaijan Communist Party.

Comrades! Whatever aspects of perestroika we examine, the main political question of the day was and will remain the place and role of the Communist Party in the changing socialist society. This problem affects the fundamental bases of our system, and it needs to be approached with regard for its historical significance, current realities and possible ideological and political consequences.

The most dynamic and fruitful stage of the history of Azerbaijan, in the course of which it became a highly developed republic with powerful economic and intellectual potential, was negotiated under the leadership of Communist Party. This is an indisputable fact. The Communist Party, as the leading structure and political force, has become a firm part of the people's historical consciousness. This is also a fact, which to ignore is not only impossible but dangerous. And if we can imagine the Communist Party voluntarily quitting the political arena, a vacuum which no public organization which has arisen on the wave of perestroika is capable of filling would take shape. This also is a reality, which has to be reckoned with.

But mention needs to be made unequivocally of something else also: the Communist Party may no longer

count on the understanding and support of the masses if, as before, it is guided by dogmatic ideology and blindly copies the policy of the center, fails to acquire independence and does not provide for the due democratic transformations in its ranks.

The Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee expressed its attitude toward the orientation toward humane, democratic socialism, radical economic reform, the revival of the genuine power of the people, the creation of a state based on the rule of law and a renewed Soviet Federation in the draft platform for the 32nd congress submitted for public discussion. While confirming the fundamental propositions of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th congress and the CPSU Rules, this document at the same time reflects singularities of Azerbaijan's national development, including the republic Communist Party's vision of the prospects of its renewal and further interaction with the CPSU.

In the pre-congress debate which developed the communists and nonparty people supported, on the whole, these conceptual documents. However, many critical comments and serviceable considerations and new propositions and approaches, not incontestable, perhaps, but interesting in their own way, were expressed also.

Specifically, many people observe that certain precepts of the documents suffer from pretentiousness and an absence of precise wording of the aims and tasks and are sometimes tied to old ideological notions.

Diametrically opposite opinions emerged apropos democratic centralism. Some consider it hopelessly outdated and an impediment to the democratization of intra-party life. Other comrades, however—and they are many—propose, as before, strict adherence to this principle for otherwise, they believe, the party will forfeit its organizational basis and become a kind of political club.

We believe that the party should emphatically renounce centralism. But of what kind? That same bureaucratic centralism, evolved diktat of the highest echelons and supercentralism realized in the form of a command style and methods which essentially distance the party masses from participation in the formulation of party policy. We are for a revival of democratic centralism in the Leninist understanding, which existed in Lenin's lifetime. At that time each document and important decision of the party were preceded by stormy, at times irreconcilable debate, arguments and clashes of different viewpoints. But when a decision had been adopted by a majority, it became binding on each communist. It was such approaches which were a guarantee of party equality and respect for the interests of the minority combined with strict party discipline.

In this sense the principle of democratic centralism is the backbone of the party determining its particular character as a party of a progressive idea and revolutionary action. And we consider the revival of a genuine democratic atmosphere and relations in the party ranks a

matter of fundamental importance. This is the highway of the party's genuine renewal.

The question of the status of the Azerbaijan Communist Party and of its relations with the CPSU is undoubtedly central. And mutually exclusive viewpoints of both a left and right persuasion have been expressed here. I believe that there should be no rush to conclusions on such a fundamental matter. The congress delegates will surely set forth their position also. For we must go to the highest forum of the country's communists with our own vision of this most important problem.

The conceptual approach of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee is as follows.

Our people need a party whose program documents do not break with the ideological and organizational structures of the CPSU but which could independently decide all its own organizational, personnel, financial and economic and publishing matters.

Our people need a party which has its own program of national development and pursues on the basis thereof the policy line in the sphere of constitutional, socio-economic and cultural building.

Our people need a party of genuinely democratic relations which, while affirming the principles of respect for national values and interests, develops its internationalist traditions. Which, while remaining the ruling party, ensures pluralism and political consensus in the republic.

This is how we see a renewed Communist Party.

Comrades! There is a direct connection between the party's capacity for renewal and adaptation to the changing conditions and its quantitative and qualitative composition and social base.

As of 1 April 1990 the number of communists in Azerbaijan's party organization constituted 397,381. In the period under review 48,700 persons were admitted to the party, and over 15,000 were expelled or left, including 11,084 in the course of the January events.

Of course, the most severe emotional shock of those dramatic days may be understood. But those who demonstratively threw away, burned and surrendered their party cards to the Azerbaijan People's Front and flaunted this even cannot be considered martyrs and slaves to party honor. The party committees, which examined this personal and public tragedy most attentively and on a purely individual basis, acted correctly. As a result 10,000 communists had their party cards returned.

Most careful selection for the party, on the basis of ideological conviction, is necessary. The party must be protected against careerists of all stripes and those who have wanted and still want to take away a little more while giving nothing. It is such people, in the main, who are today leaving the party ranks. And we need not fear this, this is self-cleansing.

But we need to reflect on something else also: among those who have handed in their party cards there are many workers, and this is disturbing. After all, this does not mean ideological turncoats, things go deeper, considerably deeper, than this. It amounts to both a loss of ideals and a consequence of the metastases of passiveness and sluggishness which have affected whole party organizations.

The strength and power of such a mighty social and political organism as the CPSU have always been determined by its broad social base. It makes sense today closely scrutinizing the social portrait of the republic Communist Party. It is as follows: workers, 49.2 percent, kolkhoz members, 18.6 percent, office workers, 32.2 percent, young people 30 years and under, 22 percent, women, 28.7 percent, persons of nonindigenous nationality, 18.9 percent.

Some 30,000 workers or 61.5 percent of the total number of those who received candidate's cards have been admitted to the party since the 31st congress. And, as a whole, the number of workers in the party has declined by almost 12 percent. What is the reason for this? The fact, I believe, that we have made too much of an absolute of the significance of the worker stratum and encouraged its formal expansion in every possible way. At the same time, however, there has been a growth before our very eyes of a problem which may be defined as the intellectual impoverishment of the party ranks. We have always been short of striking, creative personalities with ideological convictions and fundamental knowledge, but have perceived the full seriousness of this in the events of the past 2 years. What, has our land dried up? No! How many outstanding, erudite personalities with modern thinking there are among party members! How many capable young people, full of energy and patriotism, cannot make a way for themselves and remain unengaged, outside the party! This problem will make itself felt even more when the party joins in the election struggle and when we become a part of the thick seams of multiparty conditions and political pluralism.

Discussing the draft CPSU Rules, many communists did not support the proposal concerning the abolition of recommendations. They believe that responsibility for the new intake should be personal. But there is another viewpoint also—abandoning the recommendations. It is substantiated by the fact that this tradition was conceived in the years of clandestine activity, when vouching for someone really was necessary. In time this need disappeared, and for admittance today it is sufficient merely that a person share the CPSU Program and Rules. The delegates will, I believe, have their say on this matter of considerable importance also.

Another most important path of renewal is the creation of a mechanism of drive belts between the party committees and the entire party masses. Without having closed the gap that has emerged, we will be unable to ensure the involvement of each communist in all-party matters. And the main burden here is borne by the

primary party organizations. It is to here that the center of all political and organizational work is now shifting.

I would like in this connection to emphasize the following thought. As practice shows, the new political parties are operating per the place of residence. Therefore the primaries should shift considerable emphasis of work to where the communists and their families live. The first experience in this field merits attention. Party organizations uniting all communists residing on the territory of a given soviet are being formed in a number of villages. It is planned that the structure of the apparatus will contain employees oriented toward work per the place of residence. The idea concerning the creation of councils of secretaries of primary party organizations, which may be formed in the city and rayon and large industrial associations, is of interest also.

I believe that the transition of professional party and, yes, soviet officials to the party register in the workforce also would serve to strengthen the relations of the directive and primary party components. Such a practice existed in party in the first years of the revolution. The Central Committee is for restoration of this tradition. Thus the more than 2,000 party organizations, which register approximately 300,000 communists, would be connected even more strongly with the party committees—from the Central Committee through the raykom. The party organization of the party apparatus would be preserved here. And the primaries would have an opportunity to nominate from their ranks those most deserving of professional party work and subsequently to monitor and really interact with them. The congress could instruct the comrades who will be working on the party building panel to comprehensively study this proposal.

The content and thrust of the work of the elective party authorities, primarily of the Central Committee—the collective political leader—is changing under the new conditions. And for this reason it is very important to abandon the practice of formation of the Central Committee per the seniority principle. We need with all scrupulousness to approach the selection of its new composition from the ranks of enterprising comrades devoted to perestroika. And, of course, alternative approaches should not be forgotten here.

We have here attending plenums many complaisant men of few words who are prepared to raise their hands in the wake of the secretary. Do we now need such activists? There are 180,000 communists in the Communist Party's elective bodies. They could be an enormous force if there is no ballast among them and if they are elected by the genuinely democratic path.

There needs to be special discussion of the apparatus of the party authorities and the social atmosphere which has taken shape around it recently. Sweeping criticism of the apparatus and an endeavor to charge party officials with all conceivable and inconceivable transgressions have become bon ton virtually for present times and a

kind of permit into the political arena. Of course, fair criticism is being heard also, and we are accepting it and drawing the conclusions. This is how it should be in a normal democratic society. But we simply cannot agree here with the calls for "opening fire on headquarters," "driving out the apparatus" and so forth. We simply cannot agree that the apparatus, as such, is past its time and can essentially only be an appendage of a command bureaucracy. In a word, our conclusion is such: we will not allow the defamation of party personnel, and this should be clear to all.

The apparatus is a most important instrument of the party and it is essential to it, as, incidentally, to any political organization. If the party aspires to preserve its ability to operate, it should have a qualified composition of full-time officials of the optimum manning level. That what is needed is an apparatus which is not renewed even but new, in the sense of thinking and ability to work under modern conditions, is another matter.

How do we conceive of its structure here? The following standing commissions could, for example, be formed in the Central Committee: party building and cadre work, ideology, socioeconomic development, food and reorganization of the countryside, constitutional law development and interethnic relations, youth problems and work with women. These commissions would be headed by secretaries and members of the Central Committee Bureau, and the instructors and consultants now concentrated in other departments would be the working apparatus.

In the gorkoms and raykoms it would be expedient, in our view, to have two or three commissions pertaining to the main areas of party work headed by secretaries of the party committees and also a group of party organizers to assist them.

Other versions are possible also. The main thing is to eliminate undue centralization and multistaging, abandon sectoral custodianship and reduce the manning levels of permanent staff to levels which assure self-financing.

In the light of the increased requirements the question of a new cadre policy arises also. It is necessary to seriously investigate many of its components and critically revise the settled practice of the training and promotion of personnel. Its replaceability is a natural process, but any reshuffling should be well-founded, which cannot be said about what has been happening recently. Eighty percent of first secretaries, one out of six second secretaries and every tenth secretary of obkom, gorkom and raykom have been replaced in the past 18 months. The changes have affected the Central Committee Bureau also. Twelve members and candidates of the Bureau, including five secretaries, have been replaced. There arises the question: of what is there more here—well-conceived personnel policy or personnel leap-frogging?

On the one hand it has been possible, it would seem, to enlist fresh forces. On the other, the average statistical gorkom and raykom secretary has not become younger in the least, remaining at 44 years of age. In addition, as a result of the hasty moves the party committees have been deprived of many valuable officials who had gained experience under extreme conditions.

The new approaches may only be realized via the further democratization of personnel policy. The first steps in this direction have already been taken. A choice of candidates at nomination time is becoming a part of practice, and the official list of the Central Committee Bureau has been reduced and will continue to be cut back.

There has long been an urgent need for a fundamental restructuring of the entire system of party personnel training and retraining. An important step in this direction could be the reorganization of the ideological, educational and research subdivisions of the Communist Party and the creation of a single center based on the Baku Higher Party School, the Party History Institute, the Political Education Center, the University of Marxism-Leninism and the Central Committee journals. It could be the organizational and ideological nucleus of the system of training and retraining of professional party cadres and party activists.

Similar reorganization is required to ensure the profoundly scientific social investigation of urgent problems of social life and party-political and ideological activity and qualified study of public opinion and, what is most important, to stimulate the development in the republic of Marxist-Leninist thought and Marxist social science.

The fruitful activity of a political organization is directly connected with its strong material base and its property. Strictly speaking, this is, if you will, an obligatory attribute of party sovereignty. We will in the very near future, to judge by everything, have ceased receiving a subsidy from the CPSU Central Committee, and for this reason it is necessary even now to concern ourselves with new sources of replenishment of the party coffers. We should, possibly, take the path of the creation of our own enterprises, such as attract foreign currency proceeds included. All local party organizations, acting, for example, as founders of associations, unions and so forth, are obliged to join in this work. There will thus be a real opportunity not only to finance the party apparatus but also to create a social fund for assisting communist veterans, personnel training and acts of charity.

Many unsolved problems have accumulated, as you can see. Although there has been progress, we have not yet managed a breakthrough in the set of measures geared to a renewal of the work of the party committees and their apparatus. The communists have the right with all severity to hold the Central Committee Bureau and Secretariat responsible for the slowness in the solution of

structural questions and the serious mistakes and miscalculations in personnel policy.

Comrades! Our congress has to answer a key question—what should the role of the Azerbaijan Communist Party be in the republic's political system. The main thing, of course, is active participation in the formation of the structures of a democratic state based on the rule of law. This means primarily the soviets of people's deputies.

The Communist Party supports the elections to the soviets being a field of the honest competition of representatives of all strata of society, communists, public organizations and movements and personalities and ideas. We regard communists in the soviets as a real force, which, as the political reform deepens, will render their formation and development the utmost assistance. It is they who should assume the political responsibility for a strengthening of cooperation between the party committees and the soviet and state authorities.

I would like in this connection to share the following thoughts. Having declared as its goal the building of humane, democratic socialism, the party advocates the transfer of power to the soviets. But the reality is such that the soviets lack as yet the new organizational mechanisms of the exercise of power, and its legal and financial foundation is only just being created.

On the other hand, fearful of drawing down onto themselves new charges of impeding perestroika, certain party committees are endeavoring to divest themselves of competent authority as quickly as possible, and not only in the economic sphere, unfortunately. Not even a diarchy but simply anarchy has resulted in places. This vacuum is being filled instantly by shadowy forces relying on considerable material resources. This cannot be allowed.

Perestroika has confronted the party with the need to revise relations with the traditional public organizations which are a part of the political structure of society. It is perfectly obvious that the trends toward independence being experienced by the whole country are increasingly predominant in the activity of the unions, the Komsomol and others. The issue is thus: abandoning the command style and petty tutelage, the Communist Party should help these organizations acquire genuine independence and teach them to accomplish their assignments efficiently under the new political conditions.

The trade union movement, which is in a painful quest for its place in the restructuring process, is undergoing a difficult period. And it may find the former only if it breaks decisively with the ossified bureaucratic structure in whose depths far-fetched initiatives were born and only on whose paper, what is more, was socialist competition developed. One has the impression that the trade union committees are simply unable to catch the changing mood in the worker milieu. It is essential to assist the unions in the cultivation of a social and political orientation which enables them to address the

interests of each outfit and each worker and defend in practice their social and economic rights.

It would seem also that we are displaying unforgivable complacency in respect of the exasperating situation which has taken shape among the youth. It is astonishing that since the 31st congress the Central Committee has not once thoroughly analyzed the work with the youth, the activity of the Komsomol and problems of provision of the younger generation with social amenities. Yet the numbers of young people in the republic have more than doubled in the past two decades. And today young people who are not studying and not working constitute two-thirds of the entire nonemployed population of Azerbaijan.

I believe that the republic's most populous youth organization—the Komsomol—has on this issue also lacked perseverance, consistency and decisiveness. Is this not why it is losing the youth's confidence and currently experiencing so profound a crisis.

The cause of perestroika needs the energy of young people—the strike force of the renewal of society. We need a well-oiled system of socioeconomic, political and legal and organizational measures and guarantees of the formation of the young person and the use of his creative possibilities in the interests of the individual and society. Taking account of the scale and urgency of the problem, it would be expedient, in our view, to pose the question of the elaboration in the republic Supreme Soviet of a youth law.

The women's movement, organizations of veterans and soldier-internationalists and others are making their presence felt increasingly in the country's social and political life. This is a great force. In respect of Azerbaijan their potential and possibilities have far from been revealed. Yet if we glance at the republic's recent past, it is not hard to recall what splendid traditions were conceived back at the dawn of the century in, for example, the women's movement. How many are the illustrious names of Azerbaijani women revolutionaries, women activists and women workers in our republic! It is offensive that much today has been lost and forgotten.

The party committees need to help all these organizations gain a second wind and become firmly established in the republic's political system in renovation.

Public attention is focused on the Communist Party's relations with the new social and political organizations and movements. There is around this all kinds of talk, gossip and, to be frank, outright speculation. The congress must express its position on this pertinent matter.

What are our approaches and vision of the problem? Dozens of parties, public organizations and groupings have in a short space of time emerged on the republic's political scene. The greatest activity is being manifested by the Azerbaijan People's Front. Confirming its readiness for national dialogue and cooperation with those

who advocate a socialist choice and observe the constitution and laws, the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee has taken a number of steps. A series of meetings and an exchange of opinions have been held, the Democratic Congress has been created and the republic Supreme Soviet Consultative Council is operating. The work that has been done should be viewed positively, on the whole. And it could have prospects if our opponents are similarly open to dialogue and learn to conduct it patiently and without emotional disruptions and a peremptory tone and, of course, without violation of understandings which have been reached.

Yet, and this has to be stated as conclusively as can be, one is put on one's guard in the actions of a number of the new public formations not so much by their pretensions in their struggle for power as their lack of discrimination in their means. It is no accident that so many suspicious personalities, declassé elements and outright criminals have affiliated with them. A struggle for leadership, personal ambitions and virtually unconcealed landmen, group and other interests have been manifested right away in their ranks. We say this by no means to cast a shadow on the incipient democratic movement. It is necessary to do everything to ensure that it develop within the framework of civilized ideas. An unwarranted propensity for speaking on behalf of the whole people and monopolizing the truth is still strong among certain informal leaders.

I would like to hope that they learn the lessons from the recent past, when the emphasis was put on power pressure, uncontrolled anarchy and strikes. To what this led we are all well aware. Politically such methods lead to a winding down of democracy, economically, they throw the republic back, introduce chaos and make the people's social condition worse.

Democracy does not accept violence and diktat. I wish to emphasize this once again in view of the fact that some people perceive multiparty conditions as an opportunity for striving for psychological pressure on the communists. We cannot and must not put up with the anti-democratic, unlawful actions of any demagogues and political intriguers, their speculation on the nationality issue, their methods of crude pressure and intimidation and attempts to demoralize the party and soviet authorities and whip up in society animosity and bitterness, anxiety and uncertainty.

There follows from all that has been said an important conclusion: a certain period of political development has to be negotiated for the new social and political organizations to take shape as parties of a democratic persuasion and for leaders with the moral right to speak on behalf of the people and capable of leading them toward worthy goals to emerge. We do not as yet, however, see the forces and personalities with the moral and political right to lay claim to power and, what is most important, possessing the necessary experience and intellectual potential to lead such a republic as ours. Particularly today, when the people of Azerbaijan are faced with a

historic choice. It is necessary for the people to see and discern what the leaders of the new parties and movements are made of, what they have in their hearts and of what they are capable.

We declare once again that turning the republic onto the path of economic growth, social life and a decent life is possible only given the consolidation of all national forces. And the unifying, integrating force is the Communist Party—the political organization with the greatest experience of the management of society and organizational and intellectual potential.

Comrades! A determining direction in the activity of the Azerbaijan Communist Party at the present stage, and this has been reflected in the draft CPSU Platform, is the development of the national statehood of the Azerbaijani people, the sovereignty and political and economic independence of the republic and the integrity of its territory.

At the same time the Communist Party proceeds from the fact that a strengthening of sovereignty should not occur to the detriment of the interests of the federation in renewal and our common home. This is why we see an improvement in national statehood in close connection with the conclusion of a new federation treaty. It should clearly determine the status of the union republics as sovereign states and the authority of the USSR. Only thus is it possible to guarantee protection of the fundamental interests of the Azerbaijani republic and secure the rights and interests of all nationalities living there.

It is essential en route to real sovereignty to engage in a great deal of lawmaking work. The constitutional law "Sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR," which creates important legal foundations for the republic's political and economic independence, has already been enacted. The office of president of the Azerbaijan SSR, which is a guarantee of the protection of the national interests of the people of Azerbaijan, the republic's sovereignty and its security and territorial integrity, has been established.

I would like once again today to express sincere gratitude for the high trust shown in me and to assure the high party forum that I am deeply aware of the entire immense responsibility which I bear at such a difficult time for our republic. I will do everything to justify the trust of the people and Communist Party of Azerbaijan.

The time has come when we must think seriously about participation in the elaboration of a new Azerbaijan SSR Constitution. This is a big and very difficult undertaking, and even today it is essential to begin the comprehensive study of questions of its organization.

The development of democratic processes and the creation of a state based on the rule of law are inconceivable without a strengthening of legality and public order. The Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee considers essential a fundamental improvement in the activity of the entire law enforcement system and the coordination of its components. It is necessary to make

vigorous efforts to strengthen the law and order authorities with politically mature, professionally trained personnel to enhance party responsibility and service discipline.

We believe that the congress has the right to demand of communists of the law enforcement system a cardinal restructuring of their work, the formulation of an effective scientifically conceived crime-fighting and crime-prevention program and the assurance in practice of the legal protection of society, each family and each citizen.

Comrades! The entire party and political activity of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee in the period under review was concentrated on overcoming the interethnic confrontation brought about by the events in Nagornyy Karabakh and the formulation and consistent implementation of a policy aimed at the recovery and harmonization of interethnic relations. This work is being performed on the basis of realism and the recently adopted party and government decisions and the directives of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee March (1990) Plenum.

There is no need, I believe, to dwell in detail on the prehistory of the issue and the development of events. I will say just one thing. The Azerbaijan Communist Party avoided for an intolerably long period of time public proclamation of the true facts of the conflict and the motives of the actions of the forces and persons which ignited the interethnic discord. The country's public was, therefore, disoriented to a large extent and considered both parties equally to blame for what happened. We said for the first time at the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) Plenum much of what had remained in the background, but which had exerted a decisive influence on the course and development of the conflict. And we do not intend retreating from this policy, a policy of truth, realism and party-minded adherence to principle.

Essentially, Azerbaijan's communists have the right today to present the country's political leadership with a bill for the unforgivable mistakes made from the very outset in the approaches and interpretation of the events, which had been provoked, and to demand a scrupulous evaluation of those to blame for what is still happening in the region. It is unforgivable that the center was unable to discern in the conflict unleashed by NKAO separatists the danger of the idea of a recarving of borders destructive for the whole country. It is unforgivable that unconcealed nationalism and separatism were for a long time covered up by talk about an infringement of the socioeconomic liberties of the Armenian part of the population which had allegedly taken place.

We would recall something else also. At that ill-fated time, when the conflict had only just flared up, a member of the Central Committee Politburo, speaking in Baku, declared from high-minded positions the impermissibility of a recarving of borders. This same day in

Yerevan another member of the Politburo was in fact supporting separatism in the NKAO on the pretext of self-determination.

The center's position, which was wrong in principle, engendered mistaken decisions in a normalization of the situation, and each new step essentially made it worse and led to a growth of tragedy and the loss of hundreds of people.

The principal destabilizing fact in the region currently are the extra-constitutional Armenian armed formations. Their very existence and unpunished acts of aggression against Azerbaijan are perceived in our republic with tremendous anger and unease. The public has the right to evaluate these armed preparations as the tacit sanctioning of wholly unconcealed blackmail and pressure in a solution of the NKAO problem. The completely uncontrolled terrorist organizations are also jeopardizing strategic facilities of the USSR on Armenian territory with all the consequences ensuing therefrom.

The surmounting of the conflict in the NKAO is a question of the well-being and peaceful life of each family and the entire population of our republic. We have found, at last, an effective political instrument of a normalization of the situation in the oblast and the restoration therein of the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR—the Republic Organizing Committee for the NKAO. It will henceforward exercise the fullness of state and political authority in Nagornyy Karabakh.

Overcoming the stubborn resistance of extremists, the military commandant's office and the Organizing Committee are doing much to ensure the safety of all inhabitants of the autonomous oblast. A process of disarmament of the militants terrorizing the peaceful population is under way, roads have been cleared and a normal work rhythm is being restored. After many months of tension and worry, hope for the restoration of peace and tranquillity have emerged in people.

However, the normalization which has begun to show is manifestly not to the liking of the Armenian nationalists, who are the enemies primarily of their own people. Endeavoring to retain power over a deceived people and make them hostage to their criminal plans, these self-styled leaders are impeding in every possible way each step toward conciliation. Many party and soviet leaders of the oblast are in the ranks of these political adventurers. Having betrayed party and internationalist principles, they have essentially come to head the nationalist extremist movement.

All the actions of the Armenian side, including the attempt to hold illegal elections in the NKAO, have been geared to just one thing—provoking us and prompting a new twist of the confrontation spiral. And thereby yet again making blood-compounded political capital from the latest provocation.

I have recalled these failed elections to emphasize once again, comrades, that we cannot give way to provocation. From all appearances, there will still be many such escapades. And forbearance, composure and fortitude must not fail us. Let us be vigilant, comrades.

It is now becoming clear and obvious to everyone that, living as parasites on national feelings, the separatists are subordinating to their egotistic goals the democratic movement in the country. A logical consequence of the Karabakh conflict has been the fact that it has caused both republics to lag behind the democratic processes and progressive trends of social development gaining momentum in the country. Each day the smoldering Karabakh bonfire burns the bridges linking both republics with the world of creation and a better future.

Is there a way out of the current situation? We believe that there are possibilities of a settlement. For this is it essential to abandon all attempts to recarve the current borders and adhere strictly to the rules of their permanency which are generally recognized in the civilized world. The republics should reciprocally observe sovereignty, not interfering in one another's internal affairs. It is essential to exclude any use of force whatever given the emergence of conflict situations.

The Azerbaijan SSR, in turn, will guarantee the assurance and development of all constitutional principles of autonomy, security and equal rights and liberties for all citizens residing on its territory. We are ready to embark on the re-creation of the state and party structure of the oblast. Just one thing is required for this—abandonment of the flawed idea of the dismemberment of the NKAO from the republic, the complete disarming of the terrorists and a readiness to cooperate with the Organizing Committee and the Azerbaijan SSR Government. In other words, all forces involved in the conflict should understand that there is no alternative to a settlement on a constitutional, political basis.

Active assistance in the realization of programs pertaining to the achievement of interethnic concord and a normalization of the situation in the NKAO should be rendered by the party, soviet and state authorities. It has been observed repeatedly that each patriot of Azerbaijan is obliged, figuratively speaking, to be a member of the Republic Organizing Committee for the NKAO.

It has to be said that a great deal of work has been performed recently in Nagornyy Karabakh on the buildup of villages with an Azerbaijani population, which, incidentally, to speak of discrimination, have for many years been in just such a situation. We recently made a tour of the oblast, and it is hard to convey the depressing state of the Azerbaijani villages. Has this come about in the past 2 years, one wonders? Of course not. It is the direct consequence of the most flagrant mistakes of the republic leadership in the past two decades.

On the question of our borders. The creation in Armenia of a virtually legal national army, which is being extensively publicized, what is more, on Central Television included, requires the adoption of the most serious measures for the protection of peaceful inhabitants in Azerbaijan's border areas. The leadership of the republic is forced to put the question squarely: a situation is taking shape, not through our fault, what is more, such that within the framework of the USSR it is necessary to establish between the two republics a veritable guarded border. The Armenian side has for a month now boycotted the proposal concerning the adoption of a decision on the introduction the length of the joint border of a 5-km emergency zone in order to put a stop to all attempts by terrorists to encroach on the territory of Azerbaijan. If the congress gives its consent, we will appeal to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet for the examination and adoption of a decree unilaterally.

Comrades, much was done in the period under review to satisfy the national-cultural requirements of the small nationalities and national groups. In accordance with the decisions of the Communist Party Central Committee, a number of national cultural centers was created, study of a number of national languages in the general schools was organized and the publication of literature in the languages of nonindigenous peoples is expanding.

All this is merely the start of a great deal of work. It should be organized on the basis of a systemic approach and a special republic program incorporating republic conferences or congresses of the small national groups. This would make it possible to keep abreast of people's cherished aspirations and concerns and opportunely make adjustments to current policy.

The Azerbaijan Communist Party will continue to make of paramount importance in all its organizing, political and ideological activity consideration of the nationality factor, seeking the proportional representation of all nationalities in the political power system.

It is very important to bring the republic's legislation into line with the law enacted by the USSR Supreme Soviet "The Free National Development of Citizens of the USSR Residing Outside of Their National-State Formations or Lacking Such on the Territory of the USSR". Taking this law as the basis, the task is to strive for the harmonization of national relations and the establishment in interethnic dealings of the principles of mutual respect and socialist internationalism.

Vigorous measures are needed pertaining to the shaping of a high standard of interethnic intercourse and the establishment of new bridges of trust and friendship. It is necessary to cut short decisively and universally the least attempts to encroach on citizens' national dignity. It was these humanitarian traditions of the Azerbaijani people which guided the republic Communist Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers when they adopted the decree "Organizational and Socioeconomic Measures To Ensure the Return to the Republic of the

Russian-Speaking Population and a Halt to its Unwarranted Departure". We will continue to abide by our internationalist traditions, doing everything to ensure that our republic always be home for all peoples.

The Azerbaijan Communist Party firmly declares that, relying on the historical experience of the Azerbaijani people and the democratic ideas of its outstanding educators, it will unswervingly pursue a policy aimed at strengthening friendship with Russia. This was and remains our national motto.

We will never allow the infringement of Azerbaijani-Russian relations and will uncompromisingly rebuff all who attempt to drive a wedge between the Azerbaijani and Russian peoples.

This position of ours is unshakable. It accords with the national interests and strategic goals of the Azerbaijani people.

We are sure that the congress of the republic's communists will confirm this fundamental policy.

We report to the congress also on the specific steps pertaining the restructuring of the political control of the processes of interethnic relations. A special department headed by a Central Committee secretary has been formed in the structure of the Central Committee apparatus. Permanent subdivisions have been introduced or officials appointed within the party, state, trade union and Komsomol bodies for dealing specially with problems of the improvement and development of interethnic relations. A similar department has been set up in the Council of Ministers, as have sections in the Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions and the Azerbaijan Leninist Communist Youth League Central Committee. The organization in the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences of a center for national relations should be speeded up, and thought should be given to how we should organize this work in the workforce and at the place of residence.

The system of administration which is taking shape will undoubtedly continuously be perfected in accordance with life's requirements. And the primary party organizations, particularly when it comes to the creation of a propitious atmosphere in the workforce, have a great role here. Each, even the most trifling, incident and conflict situation on interethnic grounds should be the subject of serious high-minded discussion in the local party component.

Under the conditions of a federation in renovation all the republics are entering into a period of qualitatively new relations at all levels and in all areas. This means the establishment of relations between communist parties, which are essentially lacking currently, and the development of state and government relations. Azerbaijan's economic and cultural cooperation with other members of the federation which has taken shape needs to be enriched. New contacts and ties in keeping with the spirit of the times and political realities are needed. In a

word, we are truly at the point of the designing of a new type of relations based on mutual respect and a combination of the interests of the republic and the federation.

Comrade! The creation of a free and democratic republic is inconceivable without its spiritual and moral revival. A most important condition is the development of the people's historical memory. This implies an objective study of history and a strictly scientific interpretation of the events of the past and the truthful illustration of the formation and development of the democratic and revolutionary movement in Azerbaijan.

And I would like here to warn against the tendency which has been noticed recently to idealize some historical phenomena, processes and personalities and present partially and cross out whole stages, names and undoubted achievements. In this way we will soon once again lose the art of distinguishing between lies and the truth if we consent to live under the press of what are now new stereotypes.

The Communist Party Central Committee was the sponsor of the elaboration of the draft official program of the study, teaching and popularization of the history of Azerbaijan. It provides for a wide-ranging set of measures pertaining to an improvement in scientific research, the pooling of scholars' efforts in the sphere of the scientific-theoretical interpretation of the historical process, an enhancement of the standard of teaching and study of the history of Azerbaijan and the spread of historical learning.

An important task of the party organizations of academy and VUZ establishments is heading the work on the scientific re-creation of an integral history of the Azerbaijani people and the path trodden by the republic and study of the so-called "blanks". The preparation and publication of works on the history of Azerbaijan and the history of the philosophy, language, literature and art of our people remain the priority direction.

It has to be seen that the change in the direction of de-ideologization in this sphere is being perceived by some scholars and commentators in somewhat simplistic, if not to say vulgarized, manner. Whence the impermissible excesses and carping and, at times, demagoguery and political speculation. Ideas frequently garbed in the form of scientific judgments denying all that is positive that has been achieved on the path of socialist building are frequently being introduced consciously in the guise of pluralism of opinions.

We simply cannot agree with the attempts of certain latter-day democrats to unleash a campaign of defamation of the 70-year history of the Azerbaijan Communist Party and the socialist development of the Azerbaijan SSR. History needs neither amending or improving, it needs to be presented truthfully and only truthfully.

The task of ideological personnel and social scientists is to deliver a scrupulous rebuff to those who are sowing distrust in our historical choice and in the guise of a new

reading of history insulting the memory of whole generations and the best sons and daughters of the Azerbaijani people. We will expose the prescriptions of a particular tinge being bandied about from a particular corner as alien to the socialist choice and our spiritual values.

We should today have an official policy in the sphere of education and the higher school adequate to the present pivotal stage. After all, the reform of public education was contemplated under one set of conditions. Today we have approached the phase of cardinal changes in the entire system of social structures. And education should always not only reflect but somewhat outpace possible changes in order that society may prepare itself to receive new ideas, approaches and rules of life.

The "Pedagogical Concept of Continuous Education" was drawn up on the initiative of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee with the participation of alternative groups of scholars and lecturers. It contains an integral system of measures pertaining to the reorganization of the management of public education, transition to multi-variant syllabi and the priority of humanitarian values.

In a word, a great deal of work has to be done to enhance the social status and prestige of public education and raise the authority of the teacher. A most important component thereof is precise definition of the requirements of the republic's national economy in respect of qualified specialists of all levels and on this basis regulation of the enrollment in VUZ's and technical schools. The time is ripe for streamlining the structure of specialties and the territorial location of educational institutions and for ensuring the priority of training in specialties and occupations determining S&T progress. It is important to strive for a considerable increase in the proportion of expenditure on public education in the national income of the republic and the attraction to this end of the resources of labor outfits, organizations and departments and thus raise the teaching and research facilities of public education to the modern level.

Incidentally, we have many enterprises and organizations with sources of foreign currency. Why could they, displaying patriotism and concern for the republic's future, not set aside some of these resources for the training at the best overseas universities of the most capable young people from Azerbaijan? This would be a truly noble undertaking.

An exceptional place is occupied by the problem of enhancement of the status of Azeri as a decisive factor of the national distinctiveness of the people. A special decision adopted by the Communist Party Central Committee determines measures for the more assertive use of Azeri as the official language and for a broadening of its social and political and cultural functions.

Together with this particular concern should continue to be manifested for the development of national-Russian

and Russian-national bilingualism and also for the preservation and development of the languages of small peoples. And no distortions can be allowed here.

An indispensable condition of a national-spiritual upsurge is the constant enrichment and effective use of scientific potential. However, it has to be said today, regrettably, that republic science is, as before, in a state of stagnation: there are no scientific schools and major discoveries, and basic research is not being conducted. Shallowness of subject matter is predominant in the social sciences, and the theoretical and methodological standard is low.

It is time, for the communists primarily, to reflect on why our science has come to be in such a neglected condition. There has never been any lack of serious criticism of the republic Academy of Sciences. But there is as yet insufficient desire to look into, as they say, the business of supporting science. It is essential to find additional opportunities for an increase in allocations and material resources for strengthening the testing and experimental facilities and for a fundamental restructuring of the entire system of the training, retraining and assignment of research personnel. We need to open wide the doors to gifted scientific youth and to participate actively in interrepublic and international scientific cooperation. Only on this basis can the due intellectual and S&T backing for perestroika be achieved.

The painful social collisions which we have witnessed in recent years have thrown light on the serious blunders and oversights in the sphere of cultural policy. The republic's cultural life has become impoverished before our very eyes.

It is galling and distressing that many of our figures of literature and art have essentially become reconciled to it, having forgotten their high purpose as educators of the people. The traditions of public service of Mirza Fatali Akhundov and Sabir, Dzhalil Mamedkulizade and Uzeir Gadzhibekov, Yusif Mamedaliyev and Samed Vurgun are being lost.

It is time to self-critically acknowledge that immense damage was done to the development of culture by the distortions of the principles of party influence on artistic processes. The attempts to fit in a Procrustean bed of socialist realism the entire diversity of the artistic self-expression of the artist and his vision of reality engendered a catastrophic discrepancy between the fruits of his labor and real life. This largely was the reason for the erosion of taste and the mass enthusiasm for imitation works and the primitivization of cultural life.

Whence also the party task—not to administrate and not to invade the artistic kitchen but to seek out and help the formation of talent and not fear its unusual view, critical even, of what is going on around us. Party policy in this plane should increasingly be suffused with public-spirited, national-patriotic content if we really aspire to put art at the service of the people.

A particular concern of the party organizations should be the cohesion of the artistic intelligentsia, constant contacts therewith and the creation of favorable conditions for fruitful work. The proposal concerning the need for the development of artistic patronage in the good sense of this word merits attention also. This could be a help to official policy and government budget appropriations.

The problem of the interaction of ideology and culture is most complex. We cannot accept uncritically the demand for the de-ideologization of culture. This is altogether not that soluble a problem—freeing culture from ideology. We should evidently be speaking of something else. Of the fact that cultural values and the results of artistic creativity cannot be measured purely by ideologized criteria and that we should bear in mind primarily their significance common to all mankind and conformity with the requirements of man and society as a whole.

Something else is observed with us at times. Under the slogan of the de-ideologization of culture some people are attempting to replace one ideology with another. Under the flag of criticism of undue ideologization entire seams of culture are being jettisoned.

It is essential that a fundamental change in the attitude toward culture not only be declared at our congress but also acquire real outlines and be reflected in its documents. The attitude toward culture is not only an indicator of the degree of a society's civilization, it is also a most essential condition of transformations in the economy, in science and in policy.

Speaking of an upsurge in the culture of the people and the preservation of their distinctiveness, account has to be taken of the relationship of national culture and religion. It is very important in the channel of the new approaches to restructure atheistic education and revise the traditional dogmatic attitude toward religion. At the same time, employing methods of persuasion, the Azerbaijan Communist Party will mold in the working people a scientific-materialist world outlook.

It is essential to formulate new approaches in leadership of the press and to have done once for all with the role of omnipotent party editor. The more so in that we are faced with the creation of our purely party system of mass media. It should be recognized that whereas the publications of new social and political organizations have in fact switched to a frontal attack on the party, party journalists are displaying an incomprehensible timorousness and preferring to avoid serious discussion and polemics. There is peace and quiet on the blue screen and on the air also. Yet radio and television occupy a monopoly position in the shaping of public opinion.

The failures in the work of the mass media and the insipid nature of party influence thereon have cost the republic dear. It is essential to strengthen appreciably the leadership of the party press, enhance the responsibility

of communist journalists for their assigned work and raise the standard and militancy of editorial office primary party organizations.

Speaking of the mass media, I would like to emphasize that, as you recall, we have raised the question repeatedly—and at quite high levels also—concerning the news blockade of Azerbaijan. Boycotting our republic virtually, the central papers, television and radio have been molding in the Soviet public a perverted, distorted idea of our people and the processes occurring with us. This is giving rise to our people's legitimate anger and causing them moral injury.

This cannot continue. We need to raise the question of Central Television affording all the union republics an opportunity to objectively illustrate the events occurring in them. Since we are moving toward a renewed federation, it cannot be permitted that the all-union propaganda vehicle be subordinated to group interests and opinions.

Summing up this section of the report, I would like to say the following. Referring to the fundamental importance of questions of people's spiritual upbringing and scientific creativity, it would seem expedient to instruct the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau to give thought in conjunction with the government and ministries and departments to a set of measures geared to the republic's extrication from the crisis state of spiritual life. This question deserves to be discussed at a special plenum of the Central Committee and a session of the republic Supreme Soviet. The national nature of the problem demands that the decisions which are adopted be put under the supervision of the whole people.

Comrades! Any ruling party proclaiming as program goals national revival and the achievement of the sovereignty and independence of its people bears the main responsibility for the elaboration of economic policy and its realization.

Considering the critical state of Azerbaijan's national economy, the galloping inflation and the decline in the people's living standard, the congress, having analyzed the situation in depth, must provide clear reference points of our prospects. It is necessary to formulate our position for the coming transition of the economy to a market track and unambiguously explain to the people how communists understand a controlled socialist market and the painful processes associated therewith.

Soberly evaluating the path trodden and taking account of the contradictoriness of the processes occurring in the republic, we can say that, despite the significant losses and other negative phenomena in the economy and social sphere, the people have worked, and it would be unjust not to mention the actual progress, albeit slight, real nonetheless.

Still, it has to be acknowledged that the economic situation as a whole remains extremely complex, and

many negative trends have intensified even. The dynamism of the economy achieved at the start of the current 5-year plan has subsequently diminished constantly.

The weakening of planned principles under the conditions of the diktat of the producer, the imperfection of economic methods of leadership and, most importantly, the decline in labor and performance discipline have led to the disruption of the direct cooperative ties which had become established over many years and an increase in malfunctions along all chains of most intricate economic relations. As a whole, the increase in the industrial product in the 4 years constituted only 5.8 percent compared with the targeted 18 percent. There was an appreciable reduction in the industrial product of practically all cities and rayons of the republic. The quotas and contract commitments in respect of many most important types of product were not met. There was a pronounced deterioration in the financial condition of the economy, and the profit shortfall of the republic's enterprises and organizations was more than R700 million.

I would like to remind you, comrades, that as a result of strikes alone the national economy lost almost R1.5 billion. This figure conceals hundreds of apartment houses, schools and children's establishments unbuilt and a huge quantity of products not manufactured.

All this has made more complex the solution of many social problems. We have found ourselves quite far from the large-scale goals which were determined at the previous congress. The lag in terms of the level of consumption of many benefits and services not only has not been overcome but has increased even more. There has been an extreme exacerbation of the situation on the consumer market, and there has been no pronounced improvement in the solution of the housing problem and the construction of social and general amenities. The shortcomings in medical services, in rural localities particularly, are not being overcome quickly enough.

Such is the unprecedented position from which we approached the 32nd republic Communist Party congress.

The policy of the republic party organization pertaining to an upsurge of the socioeconomic sphere was set forth in the Central Committee Platform. Without dwelling in detail on all its aspects, I shall touch merely on certain basic points.

The Communist Party Central Committee will strive insistently for the republic's exclusive right to dispose of its own natural resources and accumulated economic and S&T potential. This means that the oil and petroleum-refining, petrochemical and chemical complexes based thereon should serve first and foremost the interests of the Azerbaijani people. A great deal of work is now being done on determining the optimum amounts of the production of oil and gas, with regard for the recovery of the ecology of the Caspian, the increased

depth of the processing and the enhanced quality and expanded range of petroleum products.

We have to fundamentally reorient the petrochemical and chemical sectors, bring the raw material resources which they produce, in the main, to the state of finished product and organize the production and an increase in the manufacture of critical construction materials, polymers and household chemicals, of which the republic is in dire need and which are competitive on the foreign market. The Central Committee sees as the future not the destruction of the potential created in these leading sectors by the labor of many generations but the rational use and improvement thereof on the basis of progressive technology precluding environmental pollution. Measures will be adopted in this context for the recovery of Apsheron and the recultivation of its land.

It is necessary to seriously reconsider the situation in cotton growing, viticulture, tobacco growing and tea growing, which account for more than half the product of the republic's farming. Merely on account of the fact that three-fourths of the winestock which we produce is shipped unbottled, the republic budget loses approximately R1 billion. The losses from the supplies of cotton outside of the republic are appreciable also. Is it normal that, as one of the country's few cotton producers, the republic is in last place virtually in terms of provision with cotton cloth. Our immediate task is to increase ginning capacity to the maximum and bring the raw material which we produce to the state of the end product with the rational distribution thereof both for the needs of the republic and for export, overseas included.

The Communist Party Central Committee confirms the priority nature of programs adopted earlier aimed at a rise in the people's living standard. Unfortunately, the social reorientation of the economy has yet to produce the desired results. Production of the means of production in 4 years grew 13.3 percent, but consumer goods production constituted only 89.1 percent of the 1985 level.

The problem of saturation of the market with consumer goods requires special attention. The level of provision of the population in terms of many of them is 1.5 times less than the union average. We have mentioned repeatedly the insufficient participation of group "A" enterprises in the buildup of production of goods in mass demand. Yet there have been no due changes here either.

Everyone needs to understand full well that under the conditions of market relations and the strained state of the consumer market there will be on the store counters basically only what we ourselves manufacture, sew and make. The strain may be removed only thanks to the fuller use of existing potential, an extension of the processing of local raw material on the basis of the

creation of new industries, a reprofiling of the enterprises and the extensive retooling of light and food industry, thanks to the attraction of foreign capital included.

It has to be said also that investment policy has clearly slipped out of control in recent years. The efficiency of the invested capital has declined sharply. The amount of incomplete construction in the republic has reached the unprecedented level of R3.9 billion, given an annual ceiling of capital investments of R2.4 billion. A considerable amount of material, labor and financial resources is tied up, and the construction complex is in fact on the verge of bankruptcy.

There was a shortfall in the assimilation of R600 million and the commissioning of more than two-thirds of the projects which were a part of the government order was thwarted last year alone. Our people experienced a shortfall of 12,000 apartments and many schools, preschool establishments and health care facilities. Not only is the waiting list for housing in the republic not shortening, it is growing even, and it increased 7 percent in Baku alone.

A reason for this were the ill-conceived and at times confused decisions of the soviet authorities in an attempt to improve the structure of the construction complexes. Upon the transition to associations the contract ministries changed not the essence but only the signboard, and some were concentrated in the Gosstroy, others, hastily disbanded, what is more. This loosened even more discipline and organization at the construction sites. The current structure of administration and the planning of capital investments and the material and technical provision of the construction projects, on the other hand, is engendering lack of responsibility and remiss management.

In the period of preparation for work under the conditions of market relations, the upcoming reduction in investment demand and the decline in the amount of centralized investments the republic government, the planning authorities and the leaders of the construction complex will bear great responsibility for making a thorough analysis and formulating mechanisms and structures which ensure a transition to the new conditions with the minimum costs.

It is essential even now to decide the fate of unprofitable trusts and administrations, introduce the sale of their stock, boldly transfer enterprises to leasing and think about the creation on the basis of projects which are late in completion of joint ventures. In a word, energetic action for adapting the construction complex to the conditions of the market economy are needed.

Comrades, a most acute problem of our society—the food problem—is now, without exaggeration, assuming a political nature.

However, the situation in the agro-industrial complex, with whose creation so many hopes were once linked, is,

alas, joyless. The returns from quite powerful production potential in the countryside are extremely low. There was a considerable decline last year in the production of grain, cotton, grapes and animal husbandry products. Economic methods of management and leasing relations are being slow to become established with us. The republic State Agro-Industrial Committee and the communist managers of its central and local authorities have essentially reconciled themselves to the low yield of the land and productiveness of animal husbandry. In addition, individual raykoms have occupied the incomprehensible position of detached observer, having in fact divested themselves of the political responsibility for the situation in the agro-industrial complex.

There have been many arguments and suggestions in the republic recently concerning paths of a steep upturn in agricultural production. But there is no harmonious, substantiated model. Idle pettyfoggish ideas and outwardly attractive proposals concerning a change in the structure of farming are being bandied about also. Exaggerated notions of the allegedly incredible possibilities of some one sector or other, grain farming particularly, and of the need for a winding down of the production of cotton and grapes are being impressed upon us. The forcible introduction of the priority of some sectors at the expense of the downgrading of others caused the republic's agriculture many problems in the past. Have we not learned the proper lessons from this bitter experience?

Aware of its responsibility for the future of agriculture, the Communist Party Central Committee rejects far-fetched, untenable hare-brained schemes. We are for fundamental transformations of production relations in the countryside and for the peasant becoming the true master on the land. We are for diverse forms of management and the complete equality of various forms of ownership. A large field of activity for the realization of the recently enacted laws on land, leasing and property opens up here.

The generous land of Azerbaijan is capable of feeding our people. We need only to turn to face the countryside. It is no secret that a dismissive attitude toward the work and everyday conditions of rural workers prevailed for decades. The simple truth that if the breadwinner-peasant is o.k., all of society is o.k. was forgotten. For this reason the problem of the countryside and the development of its production and social infrastructure is an extremely important task for the whole republic. The countryside cannot be left alone with its problems and difficulties at the crucial stage of transition to the market economy.

The land, the preservation and multiplication of its fertility and the rational use of land resources must be a subject of particular concern. Ruthless exploitation and the disruption of scientifically substantiated systems of farming led to the degradation, salinization and erosion of the soils. Irreparable damage was done to the soil and the habitat over decades by the uncontrolled use of

chemical agents for restoration of the productiveness of the land and plant protection. A common program of the rational use of land and water resources is essential.

An integral part of the program of socioeconomic development is the increased employment of the population. A highly disturbing situation in respect of the use of labor resources, in the countryside particularly, has taken shape in the republic. Its seriousness has increased noticeably in connection with the arrival of the refugees. We see as the solution of the problem the organization of new jobs with the minimum investment outlays, the extensive development of a network of small businesses, the organization of affiliates, the active use of leasing and cooperative forms of management and individual forms of labor activity.

Comrades, it has to be confessed plainly that the exacerbation of the problems of the socioeconomic development of Azerbaijan, as of other regions of the country also, incidentally, has been largely a consequence of centralization and the departmental approach and the limitation of the rights and financial and material-technical possibilities of the republic and the local soviets. It is sufficient to say that until quite recently even the republic government had charge of only 8 percent approximately of total industrial production.

The situation is now changing. The share of facilities of Azerbaijan in the aggregate social product of the republic has increased to 65 percent. And this is not the limit. We intend extending the jurisdiction of republic management authorities to all of Azerbaijan's productive forces. It will be necessary here to give careful thought to all aspects lest we deprive industries, whose level does not correspond to modern requirements, of engineering support.

Particular significance is attached currently to questions of the rationalization of interrepublic economic relations. There is an urgent need in this connection for the staged structural reorganization of industry. For example, mechanical engineering, instrument making, electronics and machine-tool building, which currently determine to a considerable extent the nature of the republic's specialization in the all-union division of labor, have been developed actively with us in recent years. This is a positive factor, on the whole. At the same time their orientation mainly toward the needs of other regions of the country is troubling. We see as the solution the reduction to a minimum of dependence on the external market and the creation of small businesses and works flexibly oriented toward the changing demand of the national economy and the population.

Important potential for economic recovery and the solution of many social problems is a further improvement in and extension of foreign economic relations. However, our annual exports currently are not in excess of 1.7 percent of the gross social product. A number of foreign trade organizations, associations and joint ventures has

been created in the republic recently. The returns from them are small as yet, and there are many problems.

Understandably, this is a new preoccupation for everyone, and there are many objective difficulties also connected, for example, with the licensing of the majority of types of product and restrictions on exports thereof overseas on the part of the central authorities. But nor is use being made of actual possibilities even. The Central Committee and the republic Council of Ministers have recently resolved in the government of the country a number of extremely important issues connected with an expansion of our foreign relations. Permission to sell overseas half a million tons of scrap metal, which will bring in approximately \$50 million, has been obtained. The question of the withdrawal of the "Azneft" Association from the USSR Ministry of Petroleum and Gas Industry and of the transfer to the republic free of charge of its fixed capital and residual oil reserves has been raised. This would afford practicable opportunities for the solution of the housing problem of more than 50,000 Baku residents living in an ecological disaster zone, on polluted and oilfield territory, for the recultivation and restoration of tens of thousands of hectares of fuel oil-polluted and marshy land, the cleanup of Baku Bay and so forth.

An understanding has been reached on the creation of joint ventures for large-panel housing construction and the production of bricks, sanitary engineering products and other construction materials. Opportunities have been found for the acquisition overseas of ready-made individual homes for the refugees.

The Azerbaijan republic bank of the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Relations has been formed. Questions of a strengthening of S&T relations and economic cooperation with the countries bordering Azerbaijan and the creation in the republic of free economic zones and so forth are being studied.

There has long been an urgent need for the establishment of a single coordinating center and the elaboration of a program of the attraction of foreign investments.

The priority problems include the balanced socioeconomic development of all the republic's administrative-territorial units. Unfortunately, serious disproportions have taken shape owing to the absence of a precise, scientifically substantiated regional policy and the preponderance of subjective, voluntarist approaches to the development of individual territories. Deviations in the consumption level constitute a factor of 2-3 and more in terms of certain regions of the republic.

This problem is particularly acute in the Nakhichevan ASSR, the Azerbaijani villages of the NKAO and the mountainous areas and those bordering Armenia. The majority of villages here lacks elementary social conditions, and people do not have well-appointed housing and basic necessities. For many local inhabitants, as for the refugees which have arrived here also, there is no work. And for this reason there is a great outflow of the

young people. In a word, unless decisive measures are adopted, many villages will essentially perish. Of course, the situation cannot be rectified by the adoption of new resolutions; actual work, practical assistance, a kind heart and the human participation of all are needed.

Among the priority tasks is a considerable recovery of the environment. We have to observe that there has been somewhat of a stimulation of this work of late. Water-protection facilities have been commissioned, the capacity of the purification works and water supply systems has been increased and particularly harmful processes at a number of enterprises of Baku and Sumgait have been closed. Certain measures to improve the ecological situation in Gyandzha, Ali-Bayramly and Mingechaur and rayons of the republic have been adopted. But there have still been no serious improvements.

Unfortunately, many ministries and departments and local party and soviet authorities are, as before, indifferent and passive witnesses to the deterioration in the ecological situation. In addition, some of their actions and decisions are complicating the situation even.

Comrades! All life henceforward will be lived under the conditions of a controlled market economy. It is perfectly obvious that this will require the accomplishment of fundamentally new and exceptionally complex tasks and a fundamental break with methods of management of the economy. And for this it is essential first and foremost to really take account of many factors of our economy: the long-standing budget deficit, the reduction in people's living standard, the growth of inflation, environmental pollution, the low quality of merchandise and much else. All this could complicate and become an insurmountable barrier on the way toward the market economy.

I would like to speak particularly apropos the concern of our population which has arisen in connection with the proposed increase in the price of bread, which has traditionally been a food staple in the republic. If there are price increases on a country-wide scale, we will, I believe, find an opportunity to avert a steep increase in the cost of bread products in our republic.

Further, the republic should have a precise position of its own in respect of the market. The duplication of union guidelines without regard for our specifics could take us further away from the charted goals.

In this connection specialists are proposing that extensive use be made of joint-stock forms of the economy and a securities market, which would guard against abrupt crisis phenomena. It is necessary simultaneously to implement a purposeful tax policy and seek the establishment of a reasonable level of the government commission.

The formation and development of the joint-stock form of the economy should be preceded by handover to the republic of the right to independently dispose of its

property. It is essential, given any version, to determine the share of the union and republic contributions to its creation and thereby effect a redistribution of income.

We all need to recognize the growing role of the credit and finance system and the role of the banks, which are the basis of the market and the main instrument of its regulation. Disregard for these matters has led to the disarray of the credit system, whose role has been reduced, in the main, to covering government spending and its unsuccessful decisions. It is sufficient to recall the anti-alcohol campaign. Throughout the world the government lives by its own pocket, that is, the budget, and this is a reliable preserver of the economy against collapse. With us, however, this preserver was disrupted dozens of years back, and only now and very hesitantly are we attempting to restore it. In addition, if we wish to ensure accelerated development, an outlet to foreign banks in order to open the door to investment is essential.

Yes, we need a market, but only one which is really controlled by the state and is necessarily socially protected. This is a very serious matter since over one-third of the population of the republic currently lives at the poverty line, and the employment problem is, as I have already said, acute. We must under no circumstances permit market relations to lead to a decline in the people's living standard. For this reason it is essential even now to foresee, as far as possible, all the negative aspects which could emerge in the coming period in order to alleviate their undesirable consequences as much as possible.

The formation of the market is a task of more than just 1 year, but its commodity filling should begin today. We need to work, and work well. The speculative demand and confusion in people's hearts which are growing currently are not so much an economic as political problem and they could grow into the people's distrust of the government. The political wisdom of the authorities should amount to all crisis situations and contradictions being tackled with the minimum of losses for society. This is the sole path of retention of a vote of confidence in our policy.

Comrades! Such is our political vision of the path and course of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, whose main purpose was and remains service of the interests of the people and the interests of the republic.

Our congress is designed to convince people that the party is, as before, the leading national political force capable of extricating the republic from the political, economic and spiritual crisis. The congress' decisions must arm the communists with faith in the soundness of the charted path.

As resolved at the Central Committee plenum, the congress will suspend its work, and, after the 28th CPSU Congress, we will return once more to a discussion of our positions on the urgent problems troubling society.

I would like to express the hope that the 32nd Azerbaijan Communist Party Congress will occupy a fitting place in the history of our republic and our people.

Mutalibov Interviewed on Restructuring of Party, Socialism

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[Interview with Ayaz Mutalibov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, replying to questions posed by the newspaper KOMMUNIST: "The Dialectics of Perestroika"]

[Text] At present, as was the case 5 years ago, perestroika has not only ardent supporters. The deeper and farther it advances, the louder and harsher the criticism addressed to it.

Where is perestroika leading? is the question asked by politicians, economists and journalists. And not only in the Soviet Union. Just what is this: a reflection of the moods of a certain type of forces, a conservatism inherent to all systems or is it social concern for the fate of socialism, the nation and the republic? The people wish to understand the processes occurring and find answers to the questions troubling them. The renewal of Soviet society and the reforming of socialism is an undertaking primarily and chiefly, at least at the current stage, of practical policy. Unfortunately, our party and state leaders as well as our political scientists are avoiding making sound statements on the fundamental questions of our life and our future as posed by perestroika. As for now we do not have enough serious, analytical party statements, a systematic view which would define the essence of this political phenomenon. To some degree, the journalistic treatment of the reforms being carried out has overshadowed a purely theoretical understanding of the problem and a strictly scientific approach to studying and analyzing the new political course of the CPSU. The discussion between the reviewer of the newspaper KOMMUNIST and the First Secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, Ayaz Mutalibov, is a sort of invitation for our social scientists, political scientists and economists to review the problem of the revolutionary renewal of society precisely in this aspect.

[KOMMUNIST] So, the first 5 years of perestroika are drawing to a close. Its material results are lamentable as we have done to live worse. The unhealed wounds of interethnic clashes, the contradictory nexus of mutual claims by the republics and the Union and the 600,000 refugees are bitter proof of the social and moral losses suffered by society. This is the incomplete reckoning now being presented by the public to the nation's leadership.

[Mutalibov] Five years ago, when this rather ordinary word of perestroika was first heard, scarcely anyone could guess that it concealed the idea of a great social

experiment the volcanic power of which has overwhelmed the lives of millions of people, frightening and casting a spell over them with the miracle of changes the depth and radicalism of which make it possible to equate them to the outstanding events of the 20th Century.

The word itself has already become an international political term. And it means not merely a recognition of the ability of socialism to reform itself, but what is more important, the emergence of the idea to world levels and its establishment as a driving force which transforms the established world-political values.

Perestroika has entered the minds of millions of people precisely in this quality, having picked up energetic force sufficient to become an irreversible process.

At the same time, in society acute and involved debates are underway concerning the past 5-year stage and the ways of further development. At present, at the end of the 5-year period and on the eve of the 28th Congress, which also promises heated ideological clashes, it is essential objectively to analyze all the experience of perestroika in order to fully utilize the prospects which have opened up for renewal.

There has never been any significant breaking up of social relations which did not occur without conflict. There is the different question of what has resulted more—the positive or the negative. Has everything been done to carry out the transition of society from one date, in the given instance, stagnation, to a qualitatively new one, to a democratic, dynamic modern society, as painfully as possible. An overall and closer view of perestroika makes it possible to pick up and isolate its main accomplishment, the reason why it was commenced. And this was namely the reconstruction of the dogmatic, totalitarian Stalinist-Brezhnev ideology which was fettered in rigid chains and the real, social formation which had, regardless of the distortions and deformations, all the same a socialist nature. This was work for years to come, very difficult and diverse work. Hence, the first 5 years of perestroika have not been either in vain or wrong. And it cannot be asserted that the party and the nation as a whole vacillated too long. Time was needed for society to mature to receive the idea. Even greater time is needed to implement the idea, to overcome the resistance and, in particular, the conservatism. It is not even a matter solely of the obtuseness of thinking. Everything that perestroika brings about—democracy, glasnost, the introduction of a market economy—threatens the material, ideological and group interests of various sociopolitical strata. And the first results of perestroika and its accomplishments must also be viewed from this stance.

Since April 1985, in social life much has been established which defines the humanistic content of socialism: the priority of liberty, democracy, human dignity and legally-based relations.

This alone is sufficient to recognize the work done as a fundamental change.

But we have not simply proclaimed glasnost and democracy. Political structures have been established which are to be the basis and the guarantee of a free society including a democratic, professional parliament. This is the most radical step in the direction toward real democracy. We can speak about the imperfection of the work of the parliament, the nature of the debates which at times have been more reminiscent of street meetings, or the poor quality of many documents, the manifestations (not too quickly!!) of lobbies, in a word, the Supreme Soviet can be criticized for much. But one thing is indisputable and that is a most important political instrument has been established for the renewal of society, and a completely new structure has been set up which by the adopting of a series of legislative enactments has provided a legal basis for the commenced reforms. The law on ownership and the transition to controlled market relations establish a sound economic foundation for the basis of perestroika. Even all that has been stated is sufficient to say that the Soviet Union is living through a social revolution the consequences of which for our peoples will be just as far reaching as the two revolutions of 1917, for it is a question that on the domestic political level we are revising the fundamental bases of Soviet society, and on the geopolitical one, the entire status quo of international relations as they have come into being after World War II. And here perestroika has been more positive than anything known by the socialist world hitherto. Significant progress has been made in global disarmament and movement is continuing in this direction. Military rivalry between the super powers is being curtailed, a number of bloody regional conflicts has been settled peacefully, including the one which brought the Soviet people the greatest material and moral harm, the Afghan one. The nations of Eastern Europe are living through a stormy time of democratization.

[KOMMUNIST] Some call perestroika a new Russian Revolution, while others style it a reforming of socialism. At the same time, still fresh in our memories are the times when M.S. Gorbachev in trips throughout the nation constantly explained what he understood by this term. Does it not seem to you that such agitation and propaganda work should have preceded the practical implementation of the idea? The notion of perestroika was formulated together with political steps to realize this. And precisely on this level, as an ideological and political system of views aimed at transforming the socialist society, it has in many regards remained unclear up to now. Is this not the reason for the inconsistency of the perestroika process and the diverse perception of it by the various social strata?

[Mutalibov] It makes sense to view the problem more widely. The CPSU entered the political arena as a party the strategy of which was largely determined by its own creative analysis of Marxism. And no matter how at present our opponents interpret party history, one thing is indisputable and that is the strong point of the CPSU for an extended time was not only the organizational

structure but also the profound theoretical elaboration of scientific and practical socialism. It has been precisely the loss of this quality, at a certain stage, which resulted in many calamities for the party and the nation.

At present, we are confronted with the necessity of reviewing the entire theoretical baggage of the party and the scientifically tested course of its political and strategic line. We are revising much in the arsenal of our philosophy but at the same time this revision has still not brought us to a systematic view of the changing world or the place and role of socialism in it.

The notions of socialism as formulated at the beginning of the century under certain Russian and general European, even worldwide conditions, could not remain unchanged. The surrounding world has changed. And we ourselves have changed in this world transformed by ourselves and this is the dialectics of life. I am profoundly convinced that the CPSU as never before needs at present a theoretical breakthrough. A qualitatively new socialist thinking is required. Perestroika is a revolutionary decision, a revolution in politics. It must have its own philosophy, its system of theoretical concepts which reflect, as was correctly written by Academician Abalkin, a deeper degree of understanding social relations and a new state of the theory and practice of socialism. The new concept of socialism, if you wish, is an imperative of the times. People have been disappointed not by the idea, not by the socialist ideal, but by how these have been affirmed in consciousness and in life.

In the party and scientific milieu there is a growing condition of the need to return to classic Marxism, that is, a new reading of it. In the broader sense this means a critical reassessment of our theoretical heritage and on this basis the renewal of the theoretical base of scientific socialism.

[KOMMUNIST] There are new approaches in this area. Take just one of the fundamental ideas which have broadened the limits of the modern Marxist understanding of the problems of integrating socialism with the world community, namely the primacy of common human values.

[Mutalibov] I agree as after an entire theoretical era of the absolutizing of the class struggle and class interests, we are entering, possibly, a new age when common human needs and values become the dominant in the world process. However, there is reason to feel that this Marxist postulate has been understood and interpreted as has repeatedly happened in the past in a vulgarized manner. Possibly I am in error or am exaggerating. In the same manner as the Marxist theory of class struggle became a dead dogma in the writings of the Stalinists, at present the primacy of common human values at times is offered as a reality and not as a need of our times, as the complete absence of the class nature of social systems, the withering away of class differences and interests with the complete triumph of common human ideas and

trends. Is not the living dialectic of Marx again being turned into a fashionable philosophy. In recognizing eternal human values such as the preservation of life, goodness, beauty and freedom, we long for an integrated perception of the world community. But are we to brush aside or clearly deny, as some have urged, the class essence of the formed systems, including the socialist? I assume that we should not foster illusions or rush forward and depict the desired as reality. Yes, the world at present has largely become one and has largely become similar. And this includes also in the understanding of "common human values." But at present there are differences, and very essential ones, in the understanding of the ways and the acceptable methods of realizing these values in social ideals. And we must not close our eyes to this now.

Theoretical thought should treat and broaden our notions of the nature of socialism and perestroika, their relationships, as well as the conformity of the socialist ideal and its practical embodiment, the diversity of forms and ways of moving toward an advanced model of socialism. And from here stems another important thesis on the triumph of socialism from the dissemination of the idea itself to its practical embodiment in the October Revolution and the establishing of the dictatorship of the proletariat, we have been led by a party armed with Marxist-Leninist teachings. A retrospective view of its founding and its activities through multiple stages presupposes an objective consideration of the concretely historical context, the political milieu of a certain era, and the broad range of its social, spiritual, philosophical and other realities influencing in a formative manner the philosophical and political tenets of the communists. Alas, at present an oversimplified approach to such an important problem is in fashion. The trail followed and the history of the party now prefer to be viewed through the glasses of today.

[KOMMUNIST] In the context of posing such a question, the need arises for a scientifically verified viewpoint onto what degree we have in practice been able to realize socialist principles. Certainly it is no secret that this has been put to doubt and not without grounds.

[Mutalibov] Let us pose the question in the following manner. It cannot be denied that the communist movement which assumed a mission of world historical importance has done titanic work. Due to this, communism has become for a significant portion of mankind the desired goal, the dream, the essence of existence and the efforts of many peoples. For more than a hundred and fifty years now, the communists have been a powerful political movement the influence and role of which on world development at certain stages have been determining.

Great have been the achievements of the seven decades in the construction of a socialist society, from that role which the USSR played in saving the world from fascism to a range of social measures including low rent for housing, free public health and higher education and so

forth and these have had a significant impact on the entire course of world development. "The workers of the capitalist states could never have achieved many social victories if the Russian working class had not been the first to liquidate the system of the exploitation of man by man." This was the opinion not of a Soviet academician from the period of stagnation. This was the viewpoint of Julio Anguita, the Secretary General of the Spanish Communist Party. And this is a party which has always adhered to its own particular view of the communist movement and has been so bold to think in an unorthodox manner even when any little step from the general line was declared to be an anathema.

Of interest in this defense is the stance of the Spanish CP which was reflected in the program document of the 6th National Conference: "...Communist ideas based upon freedom, democracy, human solidarity and equality have not only not died out but have assumed even greater permanent theoretical and ideological significance. These principles as before are key in the desire of mankind for a radical, more humane change in the conditions of life, labor and cultural development."

At present, certain scientists and politicians flippantly cross off communism, without leaving any place for the communists in the world political arena. I propose that the heavy attack on the communist fortress while depriving the very idea of its halo will not stop the movement. It will continue to remain a political reality, a powerful ideological and organizational force.

And here we might refer to the conclusions of a number of communist parties which feel that Marxism, as an analytical method, has not disappeared, it has not dissolved, as some are inclined to say. Here it is recognized with complete validity that the models of socialism and communism based on totalitarianism under which there is an absence of elementary freedoms and strict democratic control and which employed the worst methods of suppressing creative thinking to extend their existence should inevitably disappear from the political stage.

It is possible to move toward socialism, as a society of social justice and as a certain type of formation in human civilization, by various routes, for social development and social progress in principle are diverse. Consequently, in the modern concept of socialism it is fundamentally important to recognize the pattern of the diversity of its forms and models. In essence, the communist and social democratic models have also been diverse. And life is still introducing many corrections, and rather serious ones, in these two powerful currents of social development. As a model of human society, socialism is inevitable. Russia and the peoples inhabiting it prepared their own separate path of socialism. Possibly we set off on the path having underestimated its great difficulty and having overestimated our own forces, but we are already along the way and we must move farther without repeating previous errors when we relied not on scientific prediction but rather on the enthusiasm of the masses. In this sense it is possible to agree with you that

it is essential to provide a scientific answer to the question: What is the society in which we are living? This is why perestroika needs scientific studies just as the party needs renovation.

[KOMMUNIST] However, does not the process of renewal lead to the splitting of the party? Certainly there are fundamental differences of opinion over the most fundamental questions of theory and tactics. Possibly they are right in saying that first there must be a separating apart?

[Mutalibov] The party needs first of all a purging. It must get rid of the conservatives as quickly as possible who adhere to dogmas and do not wish renewal as well as eliminate the new type of liquidators who refuse to struggle for the establishment of the socialist ideal.

The preCongress debate on the role and place of the CPSU in the renewed socialist society will be of crucial importance for the self-renewal of the party.

Incidentally, this process has already started and is gaining strength. Clearly, in a transformed society the party itself is in a transformed guise. Even now in line with the transferral of power functions to the soviets, the content and methods of the work of the CPSU and the nature of its interaction with the other sociopolitical organizations and movements are changing and internal party relations are being democratized.

But it would also be wrong to keep silent about a parallel trend. Under the flag of perestroika, forces are organizing which are fighting against the party. In presenting themselves as the sole supporters of radical changes, they put in doubt not only the entire history but specifically the socialist choice itself made by our people.

I feel that in the given instance it is not simply a matter of dissidents or, as V.I. Lenin said, about party members who "take a different approach to the question."

Propaganda and organizational activities are underway. This is no longer simply pluralism in society or in the ranks of one party but rather a major political game. In declaring that they are in no way linked to the CPSU, certain "democrats" nevertheless do not leave its ranks. This is why a separation—ideological and in a number of instances also organizational—is essential with such figures and I feel this is inevitable.

This is essential primarily in order to prevent the party from being turned into some amorphous formation split into a multiplicity of parts precisely at the moment when its unity and solidarity are vitally essential and when perestroika is living through perhaps the most difficult and dramatic period of its development.

As the party of socialist choice the CPSU unites or, to put it more accurately, should unite everyone who shares its program goals and its course of the renewal of society and the establishing of socialism.

As a political party, the CPSU cannot refuse to fight for influence and power. It should carry out this struggle in an alliance, in a bloc with all the forces and social movements supporting common positions of socialist choice and democratic renewal.

As for our vision of the place and the role of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, we have stated this at the recently held first stage of our 22d Congress.

We feel that the Azerbaijan Communist Party, without breaking with the ideological and organizational structures of the CPSU, should assume the right independently to work out its own program and to resolve all its own organizational, cadre, financial-economic and publishing questions.

[KOMMUNIST] Does it not seem to you that if the azimuth of perestroika had been set with the aid of sociological approaches, then many of the painful phenomena could have been avoided? Certainly with the present level of scientific forecasting, many painful phenomena could have been anticipated and consequently avoided. Possibly perestroika would have advanced more slowly but would have moved more quickly as this does not mean to move more accurately.

[Mutalibov] Possibly that is the case. Possibly, this is a mistake. But certainly even without science it is clear, for instance, that complete and universal democratization, glasnost without limits as declared one fine day naturally would be understood differently in Vilnius and Baku, Yerevan and Moscow, Dushanbe and Tallinn. The question, it seems to me, is not one so much of sociological approaches to perestroika as it is in complex contradictions in the political awareness of the masses and the reforms being carried out.

An American journalist, in seeing how our newspapers revel in their glasnost, commented: "I want the Soviet people to know that glasnost in the United States has a 200-year-old history." Democracy, like electronics, must be mastered in order to feel comfortable surrounded by modern equipment and use its advantages.

Seemingly, even Jean-Jacques Rousseau commented that there are laws that are more important than the laws of the state. By this the great figure of the Enlightenment meant morals and habits and social awareness.

Much remains to be changed in the stereotypes of our thinking and in mass psychology before the general political culture will correspond to the tasks of renewal confronting society.

What has been said should not be understood as meaning we should curtail the processes of democratization, close down the newspapers or prohibit new parties. But it must be recognized that the commenced democratization should also have self-limiters which would restrain permissiveness and anarchy.

Democratization and glasnost are very important instruments and at the same time goals of perestroika. Combined with the principle of deideologization extended virtually into all spheres of social life, these lead to a separation between, for instance, the mass information media and society. The noticeable trend of the forming of a center of power in the form of the media, no matter how paradoxical this may seem, does entail a definite threat to the very process of democratization. In essence, the means of influencing the public are concentrated in the hands of individual groups and persons. Important ideological mouthpieces are monopolized by different, even independent groupings. As a result, the totalitarian thinking of one sort replaced by them—dogmatically Marxist and narrowly party—is replaced by another. Instead of a pluralism of opinions, society is threatened with the next phase of imposing ideological doctrines which are shared by far from all. I say imposed because many newly announced democrats, like a number of the media, simply do not accept a different opinion. In exposing the authoritarian system to merciless criticism, they in their implacability merely affirm that like the conservatives they are the product of this system with its birthmarks.

These processes are directly linked with another important direction in the policy of perestroika, that is, establishing a state under the law. The reform of the political system and separating the spheres of influence of the party and state, the disassembly of the cumbersome structures of power and the formation of the legal bases of the Soviet community and the rights of the individual have advanced far. We now have a new framework, a new construction of power.

The honing of the structures of the radically renewed political system will show the effectiveness of the disassembly carried out. Of decisive significance will be its ability to maintain and develop the unique federative form of the socialist formation, the USSR, and breathe new life into it. For this we must take into account the new political realities, including the geopolitical context, and not lastly the changes in the national self-awareness of the peoples inhabiting our country.

[KOMMUNIST] If I have understood you correctly, the way out of the profound crisis which Soviet society has never known before is seen by you still along the path to socialism.

[Mutalibov] To real socialism. On the theoretical level this means the establishing, finally, of an ordered, scientifically based economic concept of socialism. Even Bukharin pointed out that "capitalism was not built, rather it built itself. We will build socialism as an organized system."

There must be a profound penetration into the genesis of the economic relations from the preperestroika period in order to provide a maximally painless transition to establishing a new socialist economy. What in essence is the socialism which we know from experience? It is

primarily a theory of distribution the main weakness of which is the problem of motivating efficient production. For now we have not been able to solve this either theoretically or practically.

[KOMMUNIST] And at present, judging from everything, all hopes are linked to a market economy. At the same time, many economists in the immediate future do not expect anything good from it. Rather the contrary. It is felt that a turn to a market economy entails, possibly, goods in the long run but we will not escape what the market has always entailed with the poor becoming poorer and the rich richer.

[Mutalibov] Nevertheless, the introduction of a market economy will be a step of historical significance. And this step must be taken for the balancing on two incompatible structures—administrative-command and market—would mean a stalemate. The introduction of a market economy is also essential and inevitable as a conclusion to the economic reform. It would be short-sighted to set out on a path of "shock therapy." But there should be a well planned and gradual movement toward a market with clearly defined priorities at each stage. Here much is in the process of discussion and search. But it is clear that the goal of switching to the market is to improve the quality of life for the people. The market will make it possible decisively to improve economic blood circulation and improve the standard of living of the people.

[KOMMUNIST] A single and universal conversion to a so-called regulated market economy susceptible to new technology does not appear to be a persuasive formula for all economists.

[Mutalibov] I can understand that. A market means a spontaneous process. To what degree and most importantly by what mechanism is it possible to regulate this spontaneous process? What is the limiter of the spontaneity? Where is it, this mysterious regulator, which would act as the guarantor for preserving socialist principles in the economy? Will not the spontaneity of the market lead to a rise and, as some consider not without grounds, unchecked rise in prices with the inevitable impoverishment of the poorly paid strata of the public in this instance? If such a thing happens, then the inevitability of the growth of social tension into an explosion of conflicts between the dispossessed and the authorities, alas, is inevitable.

On the other hand, perestroika will bog down if we are engaged in a simple improvement of that form of the economy which exists for us now. There may be a certain improvement, but we will not be able to reach the level of efficiency of the Western economy. I am convinced of this.

Furthermore, what will become of our main socialist victory and due to which real socialism has been able to extinguish the dissatisfaction of broad strata of the population, that is, the public consumption funds. It is assumed that taxing the producer will make it possible to

increase the scale of the funds. But this mechanism, if it works, does not do so instantaneously. The current unrestrained rise in prices, the unavailability of goods on the market and the galloping inflation already are reducing the social effect of the public funds. And a decline in their real influence on the standard of living of millions means, in essence, the loss of the last shoots of socialism.

It must not be forgotten that the entire state will convert to market relations as a whole, with its highly developed space technology, its hypertrophied military-industrial complex, and with its diversity in culture and scientific-technical levels of the nationality regions which even now are openly showing an inclination for local selfishness.

We should clearly realize and understand the following: it is impossible to convert to a market without creating a regulatory system, for this will be a wild market capable of destroying the economy and society itself. We must quickly and decisively replace the system of the direct control of the economy with a system of its regulation. But the disassembly of the elements of the former is obligatory with the simultaneous introduction of the elements of the latter. And here I would like to concur with the opinion of the authoritative jurists in the nation voiced recently on the pages of the newspaper PRAVDA: As for now we do not have the legal basis for a controlled market economy and that the documents presently being worked out are merely enactments which regulate the transition to the market.

And in actuality, the legislation which has been worked out is a powerful regulator of the market which "establishes the 'rules of the game in the market' and turns it from the savage into the civilized based not only on economic justice, equivalent exchange but also on the observance of the legal rules of protecting the economically weaker party, the ordinary citizen, the consumer, the small producer and so forth" (PRAVDA, 7 June 1990, p 2).

Would it not be better to convert to a market by experimenting in zones? Then we could better and more dependably hone that self-regulator, the key by which we seek to reconcile the incompatible, that is, regulate spontaneity? And then, it is felt, it would be possible to avoid another dangerous reef beneath the bottom of the economic ship already overloaded with acute problems, namely the threat of certain regions becoming the raw material suppliers of others. Certainly, the starting conditions for entry into the market are far from the same. Some offer computers on the market and others offer cotton and oil, to put it briefly, raw materials. And what about Azerbaijan which not so long ago, some 40-50 years ago, produced 50-70 percent of the Soviet oil and with true Caucasian magnanimity turned it over, like the gas and other gifts of its land, for the entire Union table? Is it moral to ignore this? Is it correct politically?

These arguments certainly will exhaust neither the entire subject nor the multiplicity of questions provoked by the new abrupt turn in the helm of the economic ship. But these must not be understood in such a manner that in looking skeptically at the attempts of M.S. Gorbachev to bring about a major change using the new strategic choice, we fully deny the positive potential residing in a market economy. In no way. The positive features do work and should work. The question is merely that the positive balance of the new course outweigh its negative consequences. This can be achieved, we feel, by establishing the best opportunities for the economic experiment.

The entire question, the whole essence is that the very form of ownership is to change. Nationalized property is not socialist in a pure form. In Great Britain, for example, over 30 percent of industrial production was nationalized and Margaret Thatcher had to carry out a denationalization, since in these 30 percent bureaucracy began to appear actively in the same manner as under socialism.

Socialist property in the form which it exists in our country, public property is a fiction, an offspring of totalitarianism. Only mixed, free, different forms of ownership can exist. And in relying on these, it is possible to count on raising the productive forces.

It is essential to provide the development of the economy relying on the scientific and technical revolution. Such spontaneous developing relying on a diversity of property forms and advanced technology subsequently will rend apart the ideological and political superstructure fetters which have been harshly heightened by the creators of the command-administrative system. This process of the true liberation of labor all the more promises to be successful, comparatively easy and much less painful in that it will be carried out under conditions of restructuring the very system of the management of society, when a change in the forms of management, the disassembly of certain structures, the fundamental replacement of others and the creation of new ones will be carried out from above and gradually. Gradually! Only that way!

[KOMMUNIST] But belief in socialism no longer has such an inspiring ring for many as it did before. You cannot help but be aware that both in the West and in our country it is felt that the historical disputes between capitalism and socialism has been completely lost by the latter. It is also asserted that the socialist experiment ended in failure and so forth.

[Mutalibov] In the 1930s, when capitalism was experiencing a major depression, many communist theorists wrote about the end of the age of imperialism. These theories appeared completely persuasive. But Roosevelt appeared and was able by his new course to free the system from what seemingly was an incurable ailment. And now social scientists are forced to admit that capitalism has been rather flexible, viable and capable of

mobilizing its inner resources and restructuring itself. Why should we not believe that perestroika will lead socialism out of a state of depression?!

(KOMMUNIST, 22 June 1990)

Admiral Chernavin on NKAO, Service as Deputy
90US1087A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
17 May 90 p 3

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Fleet Admiral, Hero of the Soviet Union V.N. Chernavin by Vasif Samedov, KOMMUNIST correspondent, specially for Azerinform "The Main Thing in Life—Truth and Justice"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Vladimir Nikolayevich [Chernavin], for more than 2 years now all the Soviet people have been anxiously following the events in the Transcaucasus. For this reason, I would like to begin our conversation with this subject which concerns all. Certainly you, as the USSR people's deputy from our republic, cannot help but be concerned by the situation which has arisen in the region over the problem of the NKAO [Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] which has been dreamed up by the Armenian nationalists. As you know, recently there have been more frequent instances of armed attacks by the "fighters" from the neighboring republic on the border population points of Azerbaijan. It would be of interest for our readers to know your opinion on this question as a military man.

[Chernavin] Let me immediately stipulate what seems clear to me: the so-called NKAO problem has been taken up by a group of dishonest persons who are pursuing their far-reaching selfish goals. Having skillfully fitted it into the perestroika process, for more than 2 years now and not without the aid of a number of central bodies and the mass information media have been creating a barbarian image of the Azerbaijani people, causing harm to the already tense relations of the two neighbors, they intensify human passions and form a distorted public opinion on this question. The "initiative"—and for me this has long been apparent—belongs to a certain group which is holding the entire Armenian people in fear and misleading the Soviet people and the world public. In my view, the USSR Supreme Soviet has with absolute correctness condemned the illegal actions of Armenia in recovering the NKAO. I fully support the position of the higher legislative body and government of the nation that the questions of redrawing the frontiers generally and the NKAO in particular must not be reviewed. It is essential to lead and manage the territorial units in relying on the USSR Constitution. I voiced my ideas during a television interview. I received very many letters in which the simple Soviet people shared and supported my opinion and I was pleased by this. But also among the letters there were those that were very evil and even brazen. For example, an inhabitant of Rostov-na-Donu and an Armenian by nationality, wrote: "You, as can be seen, have been worked over well by the Azeris

and have been bought for a large amount of money so that you work so hard for them." This libel evoked in me a feeling of disgust toward the author whose name I do not even want to mention. Certainly, he cannot understand that I am expressing my personal conviction which I consider objective and just toward the given problem generally and toward the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples in particular as well as for all the peoples of our nation.

As for the situation in the regions of Azerbaijan bordering on Armenia, my opinion is unswerving: a state of emergency must be introduced simultaneously on the territory of both Azerbaijan and Armenia. The delaying on this question will loosen the hands of the armed bandits who, in committing outrages, continue to organize their subunits in Armenia, accumulate combat weapons, move up their detachments toward the frontiers of Azerbaijan, they create shelling and fires and raids on the peaceful population among whom there are killed and wounded, and cause significant material damage. Here are some data from the recent reports. Near Yerevan, where an air squadron was stationed, the "fighters" dressed as men of the Soviet Army during the night attacked the guards of an ammunition dump, then they disarmed them and seized several hundred units of firearms including assault rifles and pistols. Up to now the weapons have not been recovered. And similar instances, unfortunately, have become more frequent. The "fighters" use these weapons for their own dirty purposes.

I feel that we must immediately establish an iron barrier along the frontier of the two republics, we must adopt every measure to prevent the illegal actions of the "fighters," we must disarm them, isolate the leaders, eliminate the bases and immediately sit down at the table for talks and give some thought to the future relations of the two neighbors. This, of course, is the prerogative of the nation's president. The deputy corps from Azerbaijan, and myself in particular, has repeatedly said in meetings with M.S. Gorbachev and the members of the Presidential Council that the time has come to introduce order, to halt the brigandage on the frontier and give their due to anyone who dares violate the Soviet laws. Certainly every day brings tragedies and people die.

[Correspondent] Comrade Admiral, excuse us for the frankness, but you are not the first deputy elected from Azerbaijan who actually works in Moscow. In the not distant past, many of them had a mandate from our republic and wore a deputy's button. But they did not have any time to meet with their voters. You have already mentioned meetings with voters and their instructions. We would like to learn a little more about the plans of the USSR people's deputies for carrying out these orders.

[Chernavin] During trips to the electoral district, I visited many enterprises and farms, I met with hundreds of people and became acquainted with the conditions of

their labor and life. Understandably, I was particularly interested in their concerns and needs. And my voters who are hardworking, hospitable and love their land have many of these. As a deputy, I want to help solve these questions. The main problem in my rayons is the problem of providing employment for the able-bodied population and creating new jobs. Because there is no work, the young people leave for the industrial cities of the republic and even go beyond it. And for those who do work, and it is hard to even imagine, there is a miserly wage averaging 70-100 rubles a month. There are numerous problems with medicine, construction, social, cultural and domestic services, border conditions and a number of others. At the beginning of the current year, I personally informed the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov about all of this and he promised his support in resolving these vitally important questions for the region.

And at present, I can already report to my voters that the first steps are already being taken in this direction: thus, upon my appeal, the Minister of the USSR Shipbuilding Industry I.V. Koksanov found it possible to allocate 3 million rubles for building a plant in Port-Ilich, where almost 700 persons will be employed. At present, in Kiev the design and estimate specifications for this enterprise are being worked out rapidly and construction should begin this year. We propose that the plant will go into operation 2 years earlier than set by the plans. In the future, there are plans to open affiliates in Masally, Astara and Yardymly. I would like to express special thanks to the Director of the Nord NPO [Scientific-Production Association], T.M. Agizov, who has personally done a great deal to resolve this question. In addition, in all regions of the district there are plans to set up a network of small enterprises which produce mass-demand goods. For organizing home jobs for women and they are very numerous in our region, by the end of the year we have been promised the allocation of several hundred knitting machines. At many sovkhoses which I visited, the people complained of a shortage of trucks. At present, with the aid of the Red Banner Caspian Fleet, this question is also being resolved. Over 30 large-capacity vehicles have already been sold in our rayons.

I would also like to say that my voters should not get the false impression that I, sitting in Moscow, forget about them. There are also other orders from them which are now being worked on. Among these are the measures to reinforce and raise the banks of the Caspian, the opening of a new tea-packaging factory, the establishing of a fishing kolkhoz and others. I receive many letters from the voters and I must take up each as they involve human fates. And how many requests there are! Every day I sign as a minimum at least 10 petitions, I settle many questions with the leaders of the ministries and departments of the nation, the republics, and I defend the interests of my voters. I plan soon to travel to meet with my voters, to report to them on the work done, to listen to them as well as select an assistant for myself

from among the district inhabitants. Certainly, a USSR people's deputy should have such an assistant but for now I do not.

[Correspondent] During the events in Baku, many families of the Russian-speaking population, including servicemen, left initially in an organized manner and then in a panic. What would you do as a deputy to bring these people back where their neighbors, friends and relatives live?

[Chernavin] It is impossible to blame persons for leaving upon hearing the rumors. Each of us is naturally concerned for his family, older relatives, children and will do anything to protect them. Even such a desperate action as abandoning everything and leaving, without giving any thought to what a heavy burden this would mean for the Ministry of Defense. During the first days, it was unbelievably difficult for me as the commander-in-chief as it was essential to deal with the question of the billeting, food and the issuing of aid at Navy expense to an enormous number of families. Of course, after the shock had passed, a majority of them returned to Baku. In truth, individuals who have now remained in Moscow, Leningrad and other cities are endeavoring to benefit from our common grief and achieve their goals of living better. We are not encouraging such desires and

are working to explain the situation in the republic so that everyone who left would return to his place.

[Correspondent] Our readers would be interested in knowing about the life and family of their deputy. If it is not a secret, a few words about yourself.

[Chernavin] First about my family. My wife and I have a daughter and one joy for the entire family, a 7-month-old grandson. I have dedicated all my life after completing my studies in 1947 at the Baku Naval School to the Navy. For more than 30 years, I served in the North, and 5 of these I was in command of the Northern Fleet. This is my eighth year now in Moscow. I like to hunt and fish but, unfortunately, there is virtually no time remaining for this. For virtually all these years, my workday has been from 8 in the morning until 8 in the evening. Generally speaking, it is not an enviable personal life. On the other hand, I gain satisfaction from this hard work and I understand that things are difficult for us, particularly recently, when there have been more frequent demagogic appeals to refuse to serve in the army as well as various attacks on it. Whenever possible, I have appeared in the press to deal with these questions.

In conclusion I would again like to express the kindest words to the Azerbaijani people whom I love and deeply respect.

Peaceful, 'Sacred' Goals of Armenian Nationalists Elaborated

90US1104A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
5 Jun 90 p 4

[Article by T. Akopyan: "Boomerang"]

[Text] On 29 May, a day of general mourning, the editorial teletype hammered out a message to the country's President. I quote the entire text.

Appeal of Military Servicemen to the USSR President

Baku, 29 May, AZERINFORM-TASS. A meeting of military servicemen of the internal troops and associates of the internal affairs organs of the rayon command of the state of emergency of NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and the adjacent rayons of the Azerbaijan SSR took place here today. It adopted an appeal to USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

In part, this document states:

Esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich!

We, the military servicemen of the internal troops of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], associates of the internal affairs organs executing the Government tasks of maintaining public order in the area of the state of emergency in NKAO and the adjacent rayons of the Azerbaijan SSR appeal to you once again. And this is first and foremost linked to the fact that the streets of Stepanakert once again echo with gunshots, again our comrades' blood flows through the fault of the Armenian terrorists. The shooting by automatic weapons of a bus with staffers of the USSR MVD operations-investigations group in the city center in broad daylight, the brazen armed attacks on entry control points and posts for maintaining public order have led to the death of our friend, Russian private Vladimir Valentinovich Kirillov, and the wounding of five servicemen of the internal troops...

More grievous tidings from Yerevan—a bandit bullet of Armenian terrorists cut short the life of one with whom we served, Lieutenant Colonel Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Chekmarev. A courageous officer passed 2 fiery years through the difficult roads of Afghanistan, and died in peacetime at the hands of base murderers.

We comprehend the complexity and responsibility of the tasks entrusted to us, and despite all difficulties, we are prepared to steadfastly bear all the burdens and deprivations of military service, to spare neither our blood nor our lives to preserve the peaceful labor of Soviet people, regardless of their national affiliation.

Yet we are profoundly indignant at the inaction of the leadership of the Armenian SSR, which gazes calmly at the outrages committed by the terrorists, whom they for some reason call "home guards," undoubtedly affecting the sociopolitical situation in NKAO.

We want; no, we demand the truth. The truth about what advantage there is to the peaceful population from the new victims among military servicemen. The truth about who, hiding under national interests, is leading the Armenian people to the abyss. The truth and objectivity in the evaluation of the activity of the internal troops.

We are convinced that those guilty of exacerbating interethnic relations must be held most strictly accountable.

So, then, let us restrict ourselves to only the truth and objectivity. Everybody needs it today: the dirty-blond guys in uniform wounded on the train platform, the innocent passers-by who fall victim, and the crew-cut kids cut down by automatic rounds, and Colonel Chekmarev, all of us, the living and the dead.

Over the past 2 years, the Armenian people has subjected its history and political organization to a tortuous re-evaluation; it is losing faith in many of the historically formed concepts. It is bitter to speak of this, but it is so.

There never were nor could there ever be anti-army sentiments in Armenia. There was faith and love toward the Russian soldier, expressed in the almost prayerful exclamation of Khachatur Abovyan, "Blessed be the foot of the Russian soldier that steps on Armenian soil," faith in our conviction that the warriors of the 11th Army, upon entering Armenia in 1920, learned Armenian writing in a short time. It is now difficult to say whether this was legend or reality, but it was a part of our historical consciousness...

The first shot at a soldier in Armenia resounded this year. Yet an automatic weapon bolt clanked much earlier. Perhaps when the peaceful squares of Yerevan were filled with combat equipment on 25 March 1988? But then the girls gave the soldier boys flowers, and the grandmothers gave them cookies, and the soldiers shared their smokes. But people did not want to see in the military helicopters rumbling over the city one of the first actions of the "terrorize scenario," and half-jokingly called them the "harbingers of perestroika in Armenia." No, not then. In early 1988, we were proud of "our velvet revolution," our unity, non-violent actions, slogans in support of perestroika and its chief architect. The people considered it their moral victory that they did not react to "Sumgait" with violence, and the first refugees from Azerbaijan were grateful to the soldiers for their deliverance.

But after a while, a dashing officer, a participant in the "March action" in Yerevan, asserted in a newspaper that Armenian men offered "money, drugs, and their women" for letting themselves be just temporarily distracted from their weapons. Infringing upon the moral underpinnings of any people leads to alienation. Shouldn't the numerous special correspondents and other "experts" sowing lies and disinformation on the pages of the newspapers have thought about this?

Then in July we survived the events at the "Zvartnots" airport. Without giving it any emotional overtones, let us

all the same admit that this was a political action, whose participants, after the silence on the "Karabakh problem" at the 19th party conference, attempted to attract the attention of the union public to the events in the region, which were taking a threatening direction. That step was naive and unnecessary, but it was also non-violent. But it was met with violence. The combat guys, the colleagues of those same servicemen whose collective appeals to the USSR President with demands for the truth and objectivity, set upon the demonstrators with truncheons and eyes filled with hatred. They hit people in the face and legs, defenseless picketers, innocent passengers, women. Kh. Zakaryan, a photographer bold enough to shoot this outrage on film, was killed. This single death shook Armenia, because this man was not killed by a criminal, by a low-life gang. The army shot at him, that same "heroic," "liberator" army "standing guard over the interests of the people." And on Central Television, they showed a soldier whimpering about a cut on his ear he got from an Armenian "extremist." That's how it goes!

Was Zakaryan's murderer punished? We don't know about it.

And then we learned that the soldiers who crippled people at "Zvartnots" are "our children." What was it like to hear such a thing for the relatives of the one killed or for my acquaintance, an ambulance physician who was wounded and knocked down by a truncheon while trying to help (and certainly he was in a white coat!). These truncheons do not teach; they destroy faith...

The policy of "parity" took effect after "Zvartnots," the division of blame for the blood and the violence between the two peoples. Thus were interpreted the September events in Khodzhalu (NKAO), and there was simply silence on the beating of Armenians in Kirovabad and other cities of Azerbaijan.

But again, in Armenia, they did not cross over to blood. Here, they went on strike (it was only later that the strike was recognized in our country as a legal means of economic and political struggle), they demanded that the organizers of the genocide in Sumgait be punished, and appealed to the Constitution, international legal acts, justice...

They responded to these demands by imposing a curfew in Yerevan and other regions of the republic, but paradoxically, not in those areas where there lives a mixed Armenian-Azerbaijani population...

There were many tanks in Yerevan in late November 1988, soldiers with complete combat gear, and this was the end of the "romantic" stage of the Karabakh movement. And back then I heard a man no longer young, from a group of people chased out of a bus, yell maliciously at the young guys in uniform, "occupiers." I heard this for the first time in my life...

Then the terrible earthquake. The "general meeting of servicemen" cannot understand the full measure of the

gratitude of the Armenian people toward the army, including the internal troops. Those same young guys in uniform were some of the first to come help us. Yet during those same days, journalist-Colonel Studenikin asserted in PRAVDA that a Russian soldier was killed at the hands of a "low-down murderer" in Spitak. This was a lie refuted by that same newspaper. Did the liar with stars on his epaulets, guilty of inflaming anti-Armenian and anti-army moods, receive any punishment? No. He continued to sow his lie on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

Has anyone counted the measure of despair, of the people's powerless rage, multiplied by hundreds by this "informational banditry"?

Since November, the attacks on the Armenian villages bordering with Azerbaijan have become more frequent, and the first victims appeared among Armenians on their own land. Armed Azerbaijani fighters blockaded the Armenian villages of Shaumyanskiy Rayon and Getashen, and began to gather on the border with Nagorno-Karabakh. Our valiant border troops could not prevent the destruction of the 600-kilometer border with the Nakhichevan SSR, and sent here, from Iran to Azerbaijan, were not only consumer items, but combat arms. The troops, as usual, were either late, or showed up where they were not needed.

The pogroms in Baku lasted 7 days, and in Kirovabad, the beastly scum killed Armenians, the elderly residents of a shelter. Whatever else one can say, it turns out that the state has "forgotten" its responsibilities to defend the security and the very lives of its citizens.

This is when people in Armenia spontaneously began to capture arms. Because violence begets violence. Because every people must be able to defend itself. This is the truth about which we have not wished to speak for a long time.

My neighbor, a talented young artist, took his grandfather's old dagger from the wall and went to the village of Khachik, to the heat of the real war unfolding on the border between the two republics, a village that has been shot at from the Azerbaijani Nakhichevan side over the course of many days. We tried to persuade him for a long time not to go, to "heed the voice of reason," "not to respond to provocation." We discussed the fact that with our non-violent actions aimed at resolving the problems by constitutional means we were winning a moral victory; the sympathy of democratic forces were on our side, and over all, we are liked... He just laughed bitterly: "But I don't want everybody to like me, and while you are here winning your moral victories, Armenians are being killed, and despite the democratic forces' sympathy for us, Karabakh has been turned into a real concentration camp." How could I answer him?

"Once again, gunfire resounds on the streets of Stepanakert." How should this "once again" be understood? Either the members of the "servicemen's meeting" have forgotten how the internal troops have opened fire on the

streets of the city on more than one occasion, and how the blood of innocent people has been spilled?

"Who is guilty of exacerbating interethnic relations?" queries the "servicemen's meeting." There are many guilty parties. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA cited on of them recently in the article "Baku Tragedy." It writes that "V. Polyanichko, the former adviser to Najibullah, currently second secretary of the Azerbaijani CP Central Committee, having just arrived from Afghanistan, insistently recommended in 1989 that the board of the Azerbaijani Popular Front paint its program in blue-green tones, that it, introduce into it Turkish and Islamic motifs." Apparently his advice was heeded (that same famous pan-Turkist and pogrom promoter Panakhov), and there began an intensive playing of the "Turkish" and "Islamic" card. Threats of a "jihad" against the Armenian people were sprinkled. Could this not have led to the further alienation among the neighboring peoples? So, today, this "adviser" works along with you, esteemed "meeting," in "close collaboration and mutual activity" with the military authorities of NKAO, with your immediate chief, General Safonov. Today, relying on combat bayonets, he continues to rage in Karabakh.

And how is the Karabakh resident, humbled, humiliated, with his human and national dignity trampled by that same soldier's boot and deprived of any link with Armenia supposed to behave himself, when he is terrified day and night that they are going to break down people's doors "executing the Government task of maintaining public order in NKAO." Meaning, let the Karabakh resident shut his eyes, let him fully feel the primacy of power over all else in this country, feel his own helplessness, nothingness, and take up a stone or his father's double-barreled shotgun in his impotent rage and... Vengeance will come immediately.

What sort of truth and justice is the "servicemen's meeting" demanding? Are these the ones whose colleagues, or even themselves have proven incapable of defending their weapons storehouses, so that they not fall into the hands of the Armenian or Azerbaijani, Georgian or Abkhaz. Those who arrested the representatives of the oblast's Armenian intelligentsia only because on 24 April they were bold enough to meet and call attention to their 1.5 million compatriots who fell victim to the monstrous butchery of 1915. Those who at the will of the center made possible the oblast's deprivation of television broadcasts, and who "cannot" open to traffic the 25-kilometer Stepanakert-Lachin-Goris road, but at 3 AM on the night of 20 May soldiers can tear up, by special order of General Safonov, the landing-take off strip of the rayon center of Mardakert, so that all the residents "make a sortie" there, and receive and dispatch airplanes to have a last link with mother Armenia, and so that the Mardakert resident, beside himself with despair say something "uncalled for" against the "limb of the law" with his lips trembling with indignation, and then...

One may write about a great many things. And such truth is necessary not only to defend the crewcut kids cut

down by automatic rounds at the railroad station in Nubarashen (the dead know no shame). I am not in the least trying to justify the senseless shooting of soldiers, or the right of the latter to rebuff encroachment on their lives. I simply was to explain how this tragedy came about.

For me, the conversation of whether or not the exchange of fire at the Yerevan train station was provoked seems senseless. For in any case, the violence loosed by a repressive state apparatus against a people who have made so bold as to declare their national rights cannot but generate violence in kind. Power elevated to an absolute cannot but cause a mood among a sector of the population that their basic rights can be achieved by anything by violence.

Not one single people consists only of angels, people who think in a "civilized" manner, who are insured against the appearance of extremist groups. Yet our historical memory for a very, very long time restrained the entire people from violent actions; we knew the cost of terror and did not, do not want build a temple on blood.

The link of time has been broken today. For the "psychological rehabilitation" of a people that has survived a terrible earthquake with hundreds of thousands of refugees, a people that has reached spiritual and physical desperation, has been conducted via a blockade, siege, truncheons, curfew, political arrests, and a cynical newspaper and magazine campaign. The law of the boomerang has worked.

I will not speak of the hypocrisy of the servicemen's appeal, calling for "truth and objectivity" from the territory of that same Azerbaijan, where dozens of soldiers and officers have been killed, where the most genuine terror has been loosed against women and children simply because they are the family members of military servicemen. Such appeals did not progress along TASS channels then. Perhaps this is because the country did not yet have a president at that time? I don't know.

But I am certain of one thing, that the shots in Yerevan on 27 May will be utilized successfully, in order to return events in the two neighboring republics to the framework of "parity," that same immoral "parity" that collapsed after the well-known events in Baku.

To say that Armenia is living through hard times is to say nothing. We must purge ourselves of all this "scum": criminals and armed bandits.

Those who discredit the sacred goals of our nationalist movement do not have the right to hold weapons in their hands. For it is impermissible to "make" policy on people's natural fear for their security. Yes, the people's historical experience testifies that national military formations and home guards have risen up to defend the native land during the times most difficult for Armenia. But this circumstance must not serve today as the subject of political speculation. Self-defense must not be transformed into an outburst of crime, of brazen impunity of

armed people to whom national interests are alien. Their arms must be taken from them—that is simple. And it is we who must do this, by the single will of the people, by the powers of all state and public structures of the republic. Otherwise, the army will begin to execute the order. Blood will flow again. There have been enough victims and violence. Here the thought involuntarily suggests itself that those of our citizens who are committing armed attacks on military servicemen, peaceful citizens, who openly chase means of transportation of state institutions, who shoot in cities and rayon centers, sowing fear and panic among the population are pursuing the unseemly goal of pushing the people up against the army. And then the center will declare a state of emergency in the republic. Who needs this? At least, not we residents of Armenia.

In spite of everything, we must have faith in the future democratic union and in Russia, however much the "parity people" of various ranks and positions want to destroy this faith. We have been provoked for 2 years now. We will survive. We will survive this hypocritical appeal to the President as well.

And there is no such "abyss" with which they terrorize us night and day. Our people has always had enough restraint and common sense to overcome any obstacles on its historical path.

Leader Details Activities of Armenian 'Gushamatyan' Society

90US1084A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
19 May 90 p 3

[Interview with Vartan Mushegyan, chairman of the Gushamatyan Social Council by Correspondent R. Zorabyan: "For the Historical Truth"]

[Text] At the beginning of April, the Historical Educational Society Gushamatyan was registered by the Armenian Council of Ministers.

During the short period of its existence, the society has initiated extensive activities and has gained definite renown not only in our republic but also beyond it. The research and educational activities of the society have encompassed a broad range of sociopolitical, legal and nationality problems arising out of the totalitarian state administrative system, it has examined the prerequisites of illegal actions occurring both in the history of our nation and at present and is struggling for the rights of man and the peoples.

The Chairman of the Gushamatyan Social Council Vartan Mushegyan describes the activities of the society to Correspondent R. Zorabyan.

[Correspondent] Recently in the republic newspapers an announcement reappeared from your society on counting and aiding the victims of Stalinist repression in Armenia. What work are you doing in this area?

[Mushegyan] We have received a large number of letters both from the victims themselves as well as from the members of their families. Each day we receive numerous documents, memoirs, letters and photographs from those sad times. We are confronted with the sad, tragic fates of the innocent persons who fell under the millstones of mass repression.

Some of them even now have not been rehabilitated and others have not received the corresponding compensation. We are collecting the materials, we are establishing archives and are undertaking specific measures so that they receive the appropriate social benefits. The basic aim of the work done by our society is to disclose the true dimensions in the losses of our people's gene pool.

Working extensively and fruitfully in this area are the members of the Society Council, Doctor of Historical Sciences Konstantin Khudaveryan and Vladimir Kazakhtyan, Candidates of Historical Sciences Amatuni Virabyan and Sergey Amiryan, the lawyers Kim Balayan, Ruben Rahtuni, Vaginak Kazaryan and Ilya Mikayelyan.

We are collaborating closely with the working commission of the board and the divisions of the All-Union Historical-Educational Society Memorial. They are preparing the data for us on the repressed Armenians and the places of their burial across the entire GULAG map.

It is particularly hard to investigate the fates of those who by a miracle survived the 1915 genocide and were executed or exiled as Turkish spies in the 1920s and 1930s. Or the fates of the Armenians repatriated from Syria and Lebanon who returned with great hope to the motherland and in 1949 were exiled to the remote Altay Kray. In this area there is still extensive painstaking and extended work for us to do.

As the materials are collected and studied, we intend to publish them in separate collections.

[Correspondent] The Gushamatyan Society has published a pamphlet entitled "Sumgait...Genocide...Glasnost...?" where you have printed the evidence given by eyewitnesses related to the genocide of the Armenians in Sumgait and the materials of the court trials. Is work being done to treat these and other acts of genocide which occurred on the territory of Azerbaijan in 1988-1990?

[Mushegyan] Yes, such work is being done. We have set up working groups which are engaged in collecting information on the pogroms and facts of genocide in Kirovabad and Baku. Here we particularly want to emphasize the evil deeds which occurred in Kirovabad and Shamkhorskiy Rayon, where the Armenians were literally driven from their historical homeland. In essence, the deportation of Armenians from Gandzak which began in the mid-19th century was completed in 1988, under the conditions of converting to a state under the law!

Basically, we have described the unified nature of all the crimes committed on the territory of Azerbaijan and a complete picture has been created of the crimes organized on the state level.

[Correspondent] Assisting in the democratizing of society and the establishing of a state under the law is a program goal of society. What is being done by you in this sphere?

[Mushegyan] Our organization includes many highly skilled lawyers, sociologists and political scientists. Their scientific research and practical activities are aimed at disclosing and analyzing the essence of the entire range of mechanisms of the totalitarian system in our country. During the period of totalitarianism, society underwent substantial warpings of a sociopsychological and political nature.

The organizing of the spheres of life and activity of people around a single ideology completely eradicated any dissidence, and established a society with obedient and compulsory thinking for all, where the individual had the right to be only an equal among those without rights, common human values were distorted and the spiritual potential of the peoples was mercilessly eradicated. At present, it is most urgent to have a complete and all-encompassing study of all the factors which infected society with the virus of spiritual sterility.

Gushamatyan is collecting and studying all legal enactments on which the complex mechanism of totalitarianism is based. This will be an unique "Code of Totalitarianism" and the publishing of it will aid in initiating a broad legislative campaign directed at democratizing the principles of government.

Here there have been beneficial activities by the members of the Social Council of the society, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Sergey Vartazaryan, the sociologist and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Agaron Adibekyan, the public affairs writer, Doctor of Philological Sciences Suren Zolyan and others.

The society is carrying out measures aimed at raising the level of the people's legal culture. In this regard, we are preparing proposals to revise the curriculums of the VUZes and schools on "Soviet Law." The society favors the depolitization of all legal bodies and is in favor of the independence of judicial power from executive. It has made legislative initiatives. Significant work has been done by lawyers including the member of the Social Council Kim Balayan, the members of the society's Legal Commission Ruben Rshtuni, Ruben Saakyan, Vaginak Kazaryan and others.

[Correspondent] What do you see as the sociopolitical and legal changes in Armenia in its current crisis situation?

[Mushegyan] That is a rather difficult question as here you have the unabating political tension related to the

Artsakh problem, the complete collapse of the reconstruction program for the disaster zone which was announced 2 years ago, the problem of refugees, an economy which is split by a blockade and at the same time devastated, the political separateness of the democratic movements and the absence of a consolidating program of actions.

The picture, it must be said, is simply tragic.

But clearly we must proceed from the general political situation which has arisen throughout the nation and the world as a whole. It is impossible to view all our problems in isolation from the general political processes. It must be remembered that the "Union" is still in tact, that the system of totalitarian rule has not been defeated and is endeavoring to transform itself into something new. As of now, not one of the laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet (except for the state of emergency law) has the corresponding legal sanctions and the perestroika processes are being replaced by political declarations. A form of a new federation is already emerging where economic relationships and absolute power of the Union ministries merely emphasize the formality of the idea of an internal market, of a so-called "market economy," and where the proposed political and administrative changes in the structure of the self-governing national formations lead to an even greater strengthening of the center.

There can be no certainty that the deideologization of the socialist society and the creation of a multiparty system can lead the state administration to complete democracy.

The total system of power in the hands of any political force cannot become democratic. Only clear legislation which ensures the fullest legal defense of the individual and society can lead to the decentralization of power. This is a complex process which for our nation can have rather an evolutionary nature than a revolutionary one.

In my view, a person who does not want objectively to view the essence of the political processes which are underway cannot completely defend the national interests of his people.

It is essential to study exhaustively and define objectively the economic potential of Armenia, the paths of its development and possible place in the economy of the Union and the world community as a whole, and determine the means of self-support for the Armenian people, having worked out a consistent program for their realization.

I fully share the opinion of those who feel that a people should rely solely on themselves and their capabilities. Each people in the struggle for their interests searches for an ally and finds him in the best instance when their interests coincide. It is essential to discard the naive optimism inherent to us, and not view the desired as reality. It is essential to create our own national legislation which will become the legal guarantee for all the

necessary political and economic changes and will defend the national interests of our people.

I consider, first of all, the key question to be the complete and stable relieving of the republic and the NKAO [Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast]. In pursuit of this the Armenian Supreme Soviet must adopt a corresponding appeal to the Supreme Soviets of the Union republics, and when necessary, to the parliaments of all the nations of the world and to those whose generous aid to Armenia has been most immorally blocked off.

Secondly, the establishing of a free economic zone in the regions which have been subjected to the destructive earthquake. Thirdly, the turning over to the republic government of the funds allocated by the USSR Council of Ministers for rebuilding the disaster zone with material support from the Union funds. Fourthly, the freeing of the republic from all state impositions and taxes until the complete recovery of the disaster zone. Fifthly, the transforming of the republic's economic structure as a whole in the direction of scientific-intensive, energy-and resource-saving production.

All of these and the other tasks require just one thing—the coordinated actions and the maximum application of all the forces and capabilities of each Armenian.

[Correspondent] How do you view the future parliament?

[Mushegyan] Judging from the activeness of the voters and the presence of an alternative choice in the coming elections, it is to be hoped that they will be democratic. I think that the composition of the forthcoming parliament will be complicated and will not completely accurately represent the interests and opinions of the different strata of society. For precisely this reason, it is advisable to limit the term of the currently elected deputies to 2 years.

As for the work of the parliament itself, we must hope on the professionalism of the future deputies, that is, on the fact that in the course of their daily and full parliamentary work they will gain the necessary legislative and other competence. It is essential to establish an atmosphere in which the former inactivity of the deputies is rendered inconceivable.

Former Senior Investigator on Manucharov Affair
90US1105A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
7 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with K. K. Maydanyuk, former senior investigator in the USSR Procurator-General's Office, by Garik Karapetyan: "Yesterday, a Deputy Behind Bars—Today, One Who Cannot be Ousted? A confessional interview with a former senior investigator of especially important matters with the USSR General Procurator's Office—for whom the Manucharov case turned out to be the final assignment of a brilliant 17-year career"]

[Text] "Arkadiy Manucharov is to be released from Butyrka Prison tomorrow!" The news on the telephone from a colleague in Moscow did not catch me entirely unawares. Furthermore, it aroused no particular sense of optimism. And not only because the news was "presented" to us on the eve of the funeral for the victims of the tragic events of 27 May in Yerevan. The story of the rapid release of A.M. had been steeped in sensationalism by everyone, including his family, who had been flown in from Moscow, and the journalists for whom the "Manucharov Affair" had become a thorn in the flesh.

A month and a half previously, I myself had participated in a "dress rehearsal" for A. M.'s meeting with representatives of the world press outside the gates of Butyrka Prison. "A retreat to happier times," USSR People's Deputy Starovoytova told me with a grim sense of indignation. Following the death of Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov, she launched a large-scale campaign for A. M.'s release from detention. Twice elected to represent Armenia as a member of Parliament, he had been incarcerated in an investigation isolation ward for the previous year and a half.

I would give a good deal to know the name of that great director of the human dramas endured by our compatriots during the oppressive spring of 1990, which we unwillingly witnessed. Now, in all probability, it is easier to imagine how I struggled with mixed feelings of joy and sorrow as, on television, rows of my contemporaries in black funeral coats could be seen raising their fists, while over the telephone could be heard elated voices of people at last embracing Arkadiy Manvelovich Manucharov after a year and a half in Butyrka Prison. (Editor's Note: The details of this were summarized in KOMSOMOLETS on 31 May 1990 after being transcribed from the television coverage and relayed to this newspaper.)

At the same time that we, the press and its readers, were only just beginning to accustom ourselves to the civilized language of pluralism in expressing opinions, a majority of the publications surrounding the Manucharov affair served to remind of the aphorism that in the field of combat, it is easiest to hold one's own ground. Then on 24 March of this year in the pages of IZVESTIYA Konstantin Karlovich Maydanyuk started to speak in public, as a way of cleansing himself of 17 years of work as a first-class criminal investigator. Although his ruminations on human rights in a law-governed state were not without interest, he had not a word to say about his having been stationed in Nagorno-Kabarakh; nor did he give so much as a hint of the case of Manucharov, although he had been in charge of the investigation from beginning to end. Nevertheless, I decided then and there: Maydanyuk, as a professional, was the very person from whom I could and must get the facts at last—let the chips fall where they may.

My esteemed colleague with access to Maydanyuk, without divulging his whereabouts, told me that he did not at present want to speak publicly on the subject of

Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Such "friendly assistance" by my colleague only whetted my interest, and I flew to Moscow. A kindly telephone operator at "09," the information number in the capital, was unable to withstand my reporter's persistence: There was only one telephone listed with this surname and first initials in Moscow.

Unfortunately, as it turned out, my colleague had failed to pass on my request for an interview. (I am deeply disillusioned with this fellow of solid reputation—with whom so much was shared "off the record" at a certain editorial luncheon counter.) At first, K. M. wanted to think over his motivation (his favorite word) for declining to be interviewed, but after I promised that only portions of the stenographic record would be published after he had an opportunity to correct them, the meeting took place. Since that time, the names of Manucharov and Maydanyuk have been listed in my thick private telephone directory one after another.

[G. Karapetyan] Without getting drawn into details, as you have rightly cautioned against, would you please explain to me if you can why—in view of the facts as disclosed in detail in the local press as well as by yourself—A. M. has not been sentenced and convicted? What continues to amaze me is this: You delivered from the Office of the Procurator-General to the USSR Supreme Court a case ready for trial. In the interim three or four judicial inquiries have failed to dispose of it. Meanwhile, the fellow remains behind bars. (Author's Note: As might be supposed, our conversation occurred before A. M. was released from prison, on condition, as agreed to in writing, that he remain in Stepanakert.) If he is indeed a criminal, and if, as I have been given to understand, his managerial practices were thoroughly studied in two Japanese computers, why is it that he has not yet been found guilty in accordance with the law? And this brings me to the final aspect of my initial question: In the form in which the case was presented originally, was this an economic or political crime?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] I must acknowledge that in principle you are raising the appropriate questions. Inasmuch as the local procurator's office in Stepanakert, disregarding instructions from the authorities in Moscow, made no compromises whatever, and had not returned the keys to the local civil service bureau (CSB), which had been confiscated by its investigators, there was only one way left to avoid full exposure—to do everything possible to halt the activities of the procurator's office. I will not comment on how or with whom they conducted their negotiations—how this was accomplished, where, and under what conditions all this occurred. The fact is that massive public disturbances were organized with the ultimate objective of opening up the civil service bureau, purging the files, and then perhaps returning the keys. After this took place, let any investigators from Moscow come and try to check up on things.

They arranged these massive disturbances and carried out their objective. The keys were made available to

them. They purloined the documents in question and burned them. Thus they carried out their mission with remarkable success.

I will now respond to the question of why Manucharov has not so far been convicted of any crime. I arrested him. It was my opinion then, as it is now, that we obtained sufficient evidence to convict him. The evidence was submitted to the USSR Procurator-General on more than one occasion. The fact is that from the very beginning I was subjected to massive pressure from Moscow.

[G. Karapetyan] Could you tell me or even give me a hint concerning such an occurrence?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] A week and a half after the arrest of Manucharov, the head of the investigative isolation ward called on the telephone and informed me that two USSR MVD colonels had arrived and demanded that Manucharov be turned over to them. At first I thought that this might be some kind of practical joke. The two "guests" behaved ingratiatingly ill at ease, not knowing how to present the matter. When the prison official said, "It is necessary to have an authorization, at the very least approved by the oblast procurator, and arrangements must be made for a special convoy," he was told curtly, "You have your orders." Some time later I received a call from Sukharev, who was then—this was in November 1988—USSR Procurator-General. He said: "It is necessary to send Manucharov immediately to Moscow," I countered: "But, of course, the whole point is not simply to arrest him, but to confront him, show him the documentation, and interrogate him with a presentation of the evidence."

Sukharev had nothing reasonable to say in response, and it was obvious to me that I never would get an answer out of him; for I knew that he was not properly informed of the matter. In short, it was clear that interested parties had succeeded in putting pressure on him.

There were even allusions to people acting at the very highest level. It soon became apparent that at the level from which these instructions had come, representations were being made about the outcome of this case and the disposition of this particular person that were directly opposed to our attempts to prosecute the case. On 21 December 1988, I was summoned to Moscow to meet with the Judicial Board for Criminal Cases in the Office of the USSR Procurator-General. They began to put pressure on me literally, saying, "In the course of two weeks the investigation must be concluded." It should not be difficult to understand the absurdity of such instructions. A documentary review of the case to my knowledge could not be concluded until right now as we are speaking. But no, they said: "Take out two or three incidents, only wind up the case successfully." This was absurd on the face of it. Then they made the point: "If it turns out that you cannot accomplish this, you will discover just who is looking into the matter."

It became obvious to me that this was not the position taken by Sukharev himself. Generally, he had no position of his own, but he was very receptive to opinions that came down from above, and inasmuch as there was not one position but a number of them to be considered, it was quite impossible to get any sort of categorical answer out of him.

It even happened that some deputies from Armenia called on me and said that they had talked with Sukharev, and in a very short time Manucharov would be released from custody. I am not able to vouch for their conversation with him, but have concluded purely on logical grounds that some sort of assurances were indeed given to them.

On a Friday Sukharev signed an order terminating the pre-trial investigation. Thereafter, every half hour the phone rang, and the question was always the same: When would the case go to court? I requested at least another week. At home the phone rang in the evening. "Get everything ready over Saturday and Sunday," I was told, "because on Monday the case is supposed to be in the hands of the USSR Supreme Court." In speaking of the pre-trial investigation therefore, it must be acknowledged that since the case was arbitrarily torn to pieces, it remains incomplete. On the other hand, however, in March 1989 the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a ukase granting the USSR Procurator and his deputies permission to make decisions with respect to the limits of the investigation.

Thus the instructions given to me were correct in a formal sense. They were signed by Deputy Procurator-General Katusev, and the Manucharov Qcase was sent for trial in a truncated form.

[G. Karapetyan] A number of questions come to mind on the basis of what you have just said. First: Since you did not have the opportunity to proceed with the investigation to its conclusion, was it from the very beginning doomed to failure as a matter of law? So that any court that might have to deal with the case would realize that it had, in your words, fallen to pieces?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] Yes, that is just how it was. The most I could do was to let the court handling the case become aware of its true dimensions by preparing a mass of evidence to reflect the case as a whole. That is, if we are to maintain that he conspired to create massive public disorder and rioting so that the investigation would be unable to expose his criminal activities, then we are obliged to specify in the charges this very form of criminal offense and the disorders that followed it.

[G. Karapetyan] Earlier, you spoke of the fact that the Manucharov case went from the category of an ordinary economic case to that of a political case against the background of the events that occurred at that time in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. You mean that as the case became a matter of urgency, it acquired a political coloration?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] I believe that this transformation occurred after the organization of massive public disorders, involving thousands of protesters, including both adults and young people. I should like to place the emphasis where it belongs.

Anyone who will take this case and conscientiously look through it from the very beginning will see that things came apart at the seams just as I said they did.

[G. Karapetyan] As I listen to you, I get the impression that against the background of the political and international events that took place during these years, you turned not so much into an intractable or intransigent person as a specialist and, most important, one who did not let himself get drawn into the political games going on at higher levels. Is this so?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] No, it is not altogether so. Those of us who were working in Nagorno-Kabarakh were not naive individuals. Moreover, we remained there long enough to be able to understand what was going on. Undoubtedly, we were aware of the fact that—

[G. Karapetyan] You were a pawn in a larger game?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] No, I do not want to say that. Let me give you my perspective on this matter. We saw that the state authorities were unable to deal with the task confronting them through political means. We saw the endless delays. One day they would reach one decision; the next they would turn to another. In the early stage of the rather serious conflicts that were now spreading, our central government, seeing no political means of resolving the problem, at first transferred its task onto the shoulders of the investigative agencies; and when they could not cope with it, it put it on the shoulders of the Army. Whose turn will be next? The fact is, by this time the authorities were in a state of utter confusion.

I for my part always understood my task to lie in one direction—to investigate everything related, directly or indirectly, to the public disturbances that arose at the start of the Manucharov investigation.

[G. Karapetyan] A specific question: Was it not a mistake in your opinion for law enforcement authorities to transport Manucharov to Shusha, where he became very ill and damaged his health?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] Why send him to Shusha? Anybody, and not just an investigator, should be able to understand that it was impossible to keep him in custody in Armenia. The situation was no different in Baku. Two options were examined. Moscow was too far away. Tbilisi, Rostov-na-Donu, and Krasnodar were closer. But in Georgia they told us categorically: "It is your affair, not ours; you may do what you want, but we are not going to provide you a place for this purpose." And to reach Rostov or Krasnodar, it would be necessary to cross the territory of Azerbaijan.

Manucharov was under arrest because he had hid from the investigation, depriving us of a chance to confront

him and produce the documentary evidence. Our purpose in transferring him was to complete the preliminary investigation in Shusha as well as we could, produce the evidence, and then send him on to Moscow until such time as he might be needed for any further pre-trial investigative activities. I want to state categorically that there were no repressive measures used in the course of his incarceration.

[G. Karapetyan] That is to say, you are stating positively, no physical coercion of any kind was used against him?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] I am not about to justify myself, you understand—I am telling you the facts. You can believe me or not. I will not demean myself by self-vindication. Never. I have been simply telling you how things were. Rules of procedure were followed strictly, but there were no beatings—no torture as it was called in a number of publications. There was no such thing, nor could there have been. In the group with us was the deputy chief of investigations for the country as a whole. Imagine what a high level for Stepanakert or Shusha! He came into the isolation ward and said: "If Manucharov loses so much as a single hair, the head of your supervisor will fall."

[G. Karapetyan] Konstantin Karlovich, did the Manucharov case serve as the last straw in ending such a career as yours? Did you submit your resignation from the USSR Procurator's Office after turning over the Manucharov case for trial?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] (With a deep sigh) Yes, of course, it was a motivating factor. All in all, I have 17 years of service behind me. However, the thought of leaving, you will agree with me, does not arise in a single day.

[G. Karapetyan] Why was it exactly that the Manucharov case became the boiling point, as it were, in your decision to resign?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] (Deep sigh) There were certain considerations of an ethical nature. Earlier, I told you in passing that it is impossible to resolve political matters by putting them in the hands of either criminal investigators or soldiers—of whom it may later be said that they came to occupy the country or dig in with sappers' shovels.

I myself, by the time I left the NKAO Procurator's Office, was aware of how they spit on soldiers and throw stones at them. And now my son serves in the Army. I thought: Why should he have to stand there? And why should they spit on him? Why? Only yesterday he lived in Moscow, walked to school, and today he must stand in Fergana or in Karabakh and be spat upon. Why? What purpose does it serve? Each one of us has his assigned duties; a soldier has his duties, an investigator has his, and a politician likewise has his. But we do not need to substitute for one another.

[G. Karapetyan] Can you tell us now about the final phase when you turned the case over to the court? Did you realize then that one thing was expected of you and

you were serving a completely different "dish"? After completing the final page of the case, so to speak, and leaving it in the hands of the USSR Supreme Court, what was your prediction of the outcome?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] You mean, the prospects, as I saw them, for reaching a verdict from a purely pragmatic standpoint? (Heavy sigh) In principle, you know, I was not far from the point of view I had expressed before the Judicial Board for Criminal Cases in the USSR Procurator's Office on 21 December 1988. It was my conviction at the very end, as it had been at the start of the case, that it should be investigated in its entirety; and only if it were done in this way would the verdict be a just one.

[G. Karapetyan] Right now, as I understand it, the Manucharov case has been shelved permanently, and it would be very difficult to get it moving again; for in the course of time the political aspects of this case have so outweighed what you were investigating—economic crimes committed by A. M.—that it would be difficult to compare them or put them on the same scales, as I understand the situation.

[K. K. Maydanyuk] You see, these scales with which to weigh the situation are not in our possession. They are located in a place where we cannot know for certain what is being weighed or how. I realize that I myself am in an ambiguous position. On the one hand, I understood that the case could not be sent for trial in this form; on the other, it was I and no one else who signed the bill of charges. And I must speak out about this—if only now with you.

[G. Karapetyan] Who could be opposed to you? Who, theoretically, might go so far in trying to pressure you?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] Let us suppose, those who nominated him for people's deputy of Armenia. After weighing all the facts, they nevertheless decided to name him as a candidate. This means that they should bear in mind the moral aspects of the issue, does it not?

[G. Karapetyan] My own view of the matter is this. It has become the current fashion to get into politics and be a superpatriot; it is no more than a hobby for some people. In contrast to the nomenklatura, the temptation arises to pose as a national hero; so they shift impetuously from words to deeds in accordance with the well-known principle of creating the image of a populist. Try to remove the crown from such a conqueror at meetings and they will shout you down and stone you—whereas the conquerors themselves are not judged. Is that not so?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] Yes, not long ago I was in Leningrad. There, scrawled on the walls everywhere, is the slogan: "If you are not a wimp, vote for Ivanov—the authorities want him out!"

[G. Karapetyan] This has already reached the level of street folklore since a national deputy of "ours" in Armenia is named Ivanov. (Author's Note: Or Ivanyan—as a colleague called him at public meetings.)

[K. K. Maydanyuk] Nevertheless, this inscription epitomizes everything we were talking about. An idol is created that can neither be toppled nor discredited.

[G. Karapetyan] It is difficult to find a rebuttal your line of reasoning. But this is what confuses me. If you are right, why is it that, by your own logic, Manucharov has not been convicted?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] Quite honestly, in the early stages I was able to follow what happened, but right now I am removed from it and have lost the sequence of events. I do not know the motivation behind the recent judicial rulings made in Belorussia and in Moscow, which the USSR Procurator's Office made in connection with this case, or why it is that Manucharov has not yet been released from custody.

[G. Karapetyan] Almost everyone speaking or writing about Manucharov is convinced that soon or later he will be released—there is no way to convict the fellow, and that is all there is to it. What is your prognosis, if you have one?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] You know, I think that at a certain point this is entirely possible—and with each passing day, it is becoming more probable.

[G. Karapetyan] This answer of yours to my mind is the major revelation of our long conversation.

[K. K. Maydanyuk] The thing is, evidence has a tendency steadily to disintegrate. From the day an investigation is concluded to the day it is examined in court, it never becomes more solid or convincing, because the political situation in our society is always shifting. People, in the presence of other people and under the influence of public opinion, change their minds; of course, they do not want to look like traitors to their own cause, and this comes to be a very important factor. There is almost no one who for the sake of the truth is willing to bear universal contempt and isolation, saying, "No, let them drag me through the mud—I will uphold the truth to the end!" There are no such people, or if there are, there are very few of them.

[G. Karapetyan] Nonetheless you have made the logical deduction that owing to the present situation in our society, the case will be nullified and Manucharov will be released very soon.

[K. K. Maydanyuk] Yes, we must look at the facts realistically. If these people cannot substantiate the charges in court—if the evidence in the case now seems insufficiently convincing—that is just what will happen.

[G. Karapetyan] Let us fantasize a little. Since it cannot be ruled out that Manucharov may soon be released, let us suppose that he came out of Butyrka, and you accidentally bumped into him. What would you talk about? If indeed you and he would associate with one another, what would be your reaction?

[K. K. Maydanyuk] For me there would be only one question, and it would amount to this: Could I succeed in looking him squarely in the eyes? To which I say: I would look him evenly in the eyes just so long as was necessary and without any hesitation. I say this unreservedly and unequivocally.

IN PLACE OF A POSTSCRIPT: I want to reiterate that we talked over a protracted period, about a month and a half, prior to the emergence of A. Manucharov in Yerevan, which occurred a few days after this period was over. Naturally, I am not divulging many of the observations voiced by the former investigator. Let me state further that the most acerbic of his utterances with reference to A. M. were simply omitted; or more accurately, they were consciously omitted by me. Let us agree that verdicts are pronounced by judges—not readers. And let each of us, as K. Maydanyuk aptly observed, mind his own business.

Some who knew about my discussion with K. M. prodded me to come up with a more definitive article than this one, and subsequently expressed their dissatisfaction by asking: Why did I stop? Did I really change my mind about covering the case? Absolutely not. Each fruit ripens when the time comes. But when it is opened prematurely, you yourself know how it tastes.

Let me say frankly that I had two options in preparing this article. One was to print the entire stenographic record of about 30 pages, edited and approved by A. M., and reviewed, for example, by G. Starovoytovaya or those who backed him in the past elections. But I made the decision instead, because of the limited amount of newspaper space, to get along without "crutches." Each reader is free to interpret our conversation, like any other, as he chooses. He can find what stirs his sense of protest or approval; and, most important, whatever he finds of interest to ponder at his leisure, either alone or within the circle of his family and friends.

Today, however, there is only one reader of this conversation that I have in mind, and that is Arkadiy Manvelovich Manucharov, Armenian people's deputy. From the pages of KOMSOMOLETS, and with the approval of its editorial staff, I should like to suggest that he have a similar conversation with me at his earliest convenience (depending on his state of health). If so, my first question will be: Having read through this interview, what would you say to K. Maydanyuk if you accidentally bumped into him?

Estonian Labor Council Head Views May Protest
90UN2106B Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 19 May 90 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Yarovoy, the head of the OSTK, by I. Ristmyagi: "After Tuesday"; date and place not given]

[Text] Without question, the main topic of conversation in not only the newspapers, radio and television but in each home is the events of last Tuesday. It can be said with

certainty that they have considerably complicated our life. It can be asserted with no less certainty that the Toompea incident is not the end of the matter; on the contrary, it has unleashed a chain reaction which will be very difficult to stop, and a return to the initial condition is hardly possible. The impatience of the parliament and government is rising. Resistance is growing among the advocates of federative relations of the republic with the Union. The directive of the USSR President "On Recognizing as Invalid the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR 'On the State Status of Estonia'" has thus far not changed anything and is in practice not being implemented.

The government and Supreme Soviet of the republic have expressed their opinion on the matter. Let's hear the other side and ask questions of the leader: OSTK [United Council of Labor Collectives] director Vladimir Yarovoy.

[Ristmyagi] Vladimir Ivanovich, on Thursday Estonian radio announced that you had been in Moscow the day before and met with M.S. Gorbachev. What was the conversation about?

[Yarovoy] On May 16 I did fly to Moscow, but I met not with the President, but with member of the President's Council G.I. Revenko. I reported on the events of Tuesday, on the concern caused among most of my constituents by the Law on the State Status of Estonia.

[Ristmyagi] Did someone on the President's Council authorize you to present such information?

[Yarovoy] No, it was my own initiative; or rather, at the instruction of the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power and of Citizens' Rights. After the picket meeting, after—according to PRAVDA—the clumsy storming of the gates, after the appeal by E. Savisaar to the people to suppress the attempt at a "coup" and to defend the government, which almost ended in bloodshed and open civil war, after all these tense hours threatening an irreparable tragedy, our Committee met that night and adopted the decision to inform the President of what had happened, on the explosive situation in which the republic finds itself. G.I. Revenko promised to bring to the President's attention our documents, which explained the course of events, analyzed the situation and offered proposals of an organizational nature.

[Ristmyagi] The republic's government has decided to temporarily suspend the decree of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers by which the OSTK's charter was registered, to freeze your organization's bank account and to make a final decision by May 23 on the legality of the OSTK's actions and their conformity with the approved charter. This appears to be unprecedented in our republic, which is actively creating a democratic, law-based state. Were you at this government meeting?

[Yarovoy] No. I was in Moscow on that day, Wednesday. The OSTK was represented at the meeting by V. Lebedev and S. Petinov, both deputies of the Estonian Supreme Soviet. According to them, the draft of the

government's decision was harsher than the document adopted. At least, their arguments were carefully listened to and amounted to the following. The OSTK charter provides for economic and social activity, as well as defense of the civil rights of members of labor collectives which are members of the united council. Can't a meeting be considered a form of such defense? Aren't labor collectives authorized to direct their demands to the head of the parliament?

Two months ago, when the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the new convocation opened, the representatives of the People's Front came here to Toompea to voice their support for the parliament. A. Ruutel at that time accepted the congratulations of the people. But in our time of the polarization of political passions the head of state, including Gorbachev, must also listen to dissatisfaction.

[Ristmyagi] Yes, many republic newspapers have written rather harshly about the fact that Gorbachev left the reviewing stand on 1 May without wishing to listen to the democrats who stopped the procession and held a meeting at the Mausoleum, where threats were addressed against the President and the government...

[Yarovoy] Yet when something similar occurred at Toompea the local press reacted quite differently. I am firmly convinced that if A. Ruutel had talked to the people the succeeding events would not have taken place. Even if there were not a genuine conversation, the inflammation of passions could have been avoided. But this time as well everything took place according to the logic of our previous political practice: if the People's Front brings people out onto the square, they are people who have come to express their unanimous aspiration. If labor collectives hold a meeting, they are a group of extremists egged on by the directors of national enterprises, or simply drunk hooligans, as was written this week, even though you yourself saw that there were many women and elderly persons at the meeting. But even so they are a mob, plotting a coup. But the government met with the people several hours later...

[Ristmyagi] But even so, Vladimir Ivanovich, a "clumsy storming," judged by E. Savisaar either out of fright or for political purposes, which apparently is much closer to the truth, as an attempt at a "coup" did in fact occur. Today, several days later, how do you evaluate the actions of M. Lysenko, who provoked the attack on the gates of Toompea?

[Yarovoy] I judge them to be a violation of the law, placing a peaceful meeting under the threat of a conflict with consequences difficult to predict. You want me to agree with you: a hooligan, a criminal. I can't. Uncompromising, inflexible, uncontrollable—yes. Should he have been restrained earlier? I agree, he should have been, absolutely. But we weren't able to, we didn't react right away. Many events were unpredictable, after all. For example, with the flag. Who knew that a young man

would risk climbing up onto the roof? Or that an ambulance was called, you'll recall, when the next speaker did not feel well?

As far as provocations are concerned, was Lysenko the only one guilty? What preceded this unfortunate and—I repeat, so that everyone understands correctly—illegal “storming?” At ten in the morning that same day a group of deputies reported to A. Ruutel that the people will come to the square at four in the afternoon to present him their demands. The people came, Ruutel did not appear, the people became agitated. Then they calmed down, listened to speakers, and decided to hand over the demands read aloud through their parliamentarians. With two leaflets in their hands, one of our “activists,” a worker, and two women with him from the “Pegelman,” went to the building's doors. They were not allowed in. A new burst of indignation. Then the young man with the flag acted. The flag was removed. The square became noisy. I went to Nugis and asked that the flag be returned, that it be allowed to fly until the meeting was over. Nugis wouldn't hear of it: “there's no longer any such flag.” Of course there isn't any longer, according to the letter of the law on symbols. But it still exists according to the President's Decree. But that's not the point. The people, already insulted that no one would listen to them, were standing around and getting restless. It's clear that all that was needed was a match...

[Ristmyagi] Which Lysenko provided... Excuse me, Vladimir Ivanovich, but one question has been bothering me since Tuesday, and I'll ask it: why did you not stop the meeting? I got the impression, and I listened carefully since I was assigned to write a report on the meeting together with my colleague Vladimir Tsion, that people were already getting tired, that they had slowly started to disperse. When you announced over the microphone that the demands had been given to the speaker of the parliament, and he had assured you that they would be considered on Thursday at the session of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, that was the most appropriate time to close the meeting and disperse. People would have listened to you. Why didn't you do that, Vladimir Ivanovich?

[Yarovoy] You think people would have listened to me, but I'm convinced they wouldn't have. It seemed to me that the correct thing to do was to let some of the pressure subside. Somewhat later, when people had calmed down, I wanted to suggest leaving a small picket line. The square and have the rest go home. That would have been a compromise: it's one thing to leave empty-handed, but another to leave a picket line.

[Ristmyagi] You haven't convinced me, Vladimir Ivanovich; let's each keep our own opinion. Let me ask you one last question, related not to the past but to the future. The document read on the square and later published states that if the demands are not met then a strike will begin on 21 May. The answer of the Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet is already known. But something else is also known: on 9 October 1989 the

USSR Law “On the Procedure for Settling Collective Labor Disputes” was adopted, which in practice prohibits such radical forms of protests in the enterprises of many sectors. How do you personally, as the director of an enterprise, and as a people's deputy of the USSR standing for compliance with national laws, feel about a possible strike?

[Yarovoy] As a director and a deputy I am opposed to a strike. However, the law you refer to addresses the nature of settlement of labor disputes. We are talking today about a political strike. And today I agree with those who support it. Today, I see no other possibility to express disagreement with a change in the republic's state structure, which is in effect provided for by the Law on Symbols. There was a meeting yesterday in Riga of the Council of Labor Collectives. We have been informed of the decision adopted: to begin a political strike next week. There are now meetings and votes under way in the enterprises of Tallinn and other cities of the republic. Our collective has already decided. I have also.

Estonian Komsomol Assesses 15 May Events

90UN2106A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 19 May 90 p 1

[“Statement of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Estonian LKSM”]

[Text] We, members of the directing body of the Communist youth organization of Estonia, have with sadness learned of the events of May 15 in Toompea: the fragile hope for civil peace is collapsing.

The meeting became the logical consequence of events and decisions of the last two years. A sovereign state is being recreated step by step, the cherished dream of the Estonian people. But the methods of decision making and the nature of the decisions taken prevent the union of forces of all Estonians to build a democratic republic, but rather increase the concern and uncertainty about the future of a large part of the Estonian public.

We feel pain and shame for those participants of the meeting who, succumbing to provocative speeches, in the heat of emotions undertook illegal actions. For one does not violate rights by defending them. One does not violate the law by demanding legality.

We cannot understand the position of the members of the Supreme Soviet and the Government who did not consider it possible to enter the square and listen to the demands, even if those demands were already well known to the republic's higher leadership and were expressed this time in the tones of an ultimatum. Or do they enter squares only for applause? Or those who came to Toompea were not part of the Estonian people?

The extremism and fervor of some of those at the meeting were continued at the official level. Judging hooligan actions to be an attempt at the overthrow of the

state, the Government appealed not to law enforcement agencies, but to specific organizations: "People's Front, Committee of Estonia, Union of Working Collectives, all forces of renovation, come to our aid!"

A direct clash was provoked by the combined efforts of both irresponsible people and responsible political officials and informal and formal leaders. For this time, the sides dispersed with spitting and shoving, with mutual insults and threats. But tomorrow?

We appeal to those for whom respect for the Estonian people's right to self-determination is not simply words, to those for whom the "Russian policy" is not a campaign buzzword, to those who are not playing the "Estonian card" in a political game, but who are sincerely fighting for the future of Estonia and of those for whom it has become home: it is not too late to meet each other halfway, to take a step towards civil peace; it is still possible to stop the slide towards civil war.

We appeal to the members of our organization to maintain restraint and reason, to be a constructive and stabilizing force in any situation.

We are prepared for a dialogue in the name of civil peace in Estonia with all youth organizations of the republic. Youth—without differentiation by nationality—can and must be a cementing force for the future of Estonia.

Estonians in Narva Demand Rights

90UN2106C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 31 May 90 p 2

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA staff correspondent G. Komlev from Narva, "The Voice of the Narva Estonian Deputies"]

[Text] They are only four of the fifty deputies of the Narva city Soviet. Despite the fact that one of them, R. Annik, is the deputy chairman of the city council, and their position on several questions is shared by a few, a very few non-Estonian deputies, their voice at the sessions is like a voice crying in the wilderness. They sound out, but all decisions are invariably adopted by an overwhelming majority, completely ignoring the opinions of those representing in the Soviet the small Estonian community in Narva. In other words, it is the same

situation about which the members of the group "For Equal Rights" are constantly complaining in the Supreme Soviet of Estonia, but with a reverse sign, so to speak.

Under such hopeless conditions, deputies R. Annik, R. Murd, A. Paal and M. Silland have decided to publicly appeal to the Narva city soviet and the Presidium of the republic Supreme Soviet through the newspapers of the northeastern region of Estonia with an explanation of their positions and with their demands. This step is in fact an appeal to public opinion, to the wide mass of voters, and not only to the Estonian community, but to the non-native residents of the region as well.

"In our city continues the political demagoguery in the name of all or the majority of the population of Narva around the laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Estonia," states the appeal. "Not only referendums, but even polls of the residents are not conducted. The opinions are not considered of the city's native, Estonian population, nor the actual situation presently prevailing in Estonia." The deputies further appeal to all those "for whom democracy and freedom are not simply a slogan" to support the adopted laws of the Estonian Republic.

The appeal's authors ask the Narva city Soviet to recognize and register their new group in the Soviet "For the Rights of the Estonian Population and Persons of Other Nationalities Recognizing the Laws of the Estonian Republic in the City of Narva," and to define its rights in the Soviet; in particular, to allow participation in any discussions affecting the future of Narva.

The appeal calls on deputies of the cities and districts of the region and of the village of Narva-Yyesuu to support this initiative.

The members of the new group have expressed their categorical protest against any form of autonomy on a national or territorial basis within the Estonian Republic.

The appeal contains a request to the Supreme Soviet of Estonia "to defend the constitutional rights of the Estonian population and of people of other nationalities who want to live according to the laws of the Estonian Republic."

USSR MVD Commendary on Rise in Youth Crime Rate

90UN2108A Moscow CHELOVEK I ZAKON
in Russian No 5, May 90 (signed to press 26 Mar 90)
pp 17-19

[Commentary by Internal Services Col B. Mikhaylov, candidate of juridical sciences: "USSR MVD Press Center Comments"]

[Text] Society is greatly alarmed about the increase in crime among young people and juveniles. Persons aged 14-29 years comprise nearly 60 percent of those involved in crimes, and for certain kinds up to 90 percent. During the years 1977-1988 crime among 14-15 year-olds doubled. Crime among juveniles and young men continued to climb in 1989 and 1990.

The composition of the minors taking part in crimes has changed. With a relatively small increase in the number of students, the number of minor-workers committing crimes has increased sharply, as well as the juveniles without a job nor occupied with studies.

Crime patterns continue to change. The proportion is shifting to crimes of avarice: 67 percent of the crimes committed by juveniles consisted of larceny, theft and other property crimes. For 14-to-15 year-olds this indicator exceeds 80 percent.

Lawless youth groups are a subject of special concern. For example, over the last year-and-a-half 65 groups of an anti-social bent, consisting of over a thousand people, were exposed in Kazan. Among the reasons for such a situation is—serious neglect in interaction between agencies and the public in educating the young people, and in prevention. Work on identifying and exposing the leaders of criminal groups was done poorly, and proper protection of public order was not ensured. Thanks to glasnost, these circumstances have become known to the public. Concrete measures have been defined. In Kazan the number of policemen assigned to maintaining public order around-the-clock has been doubled. The number of auxiliary police [druzhinniki] has increased by a factor of 1.5. Since 75 of the leaders were brought to justice, 65 of whom were convicted and incarcerated, the number of gang fights in the city has declined noticeably.

The USSR MVD continues to render assistance to Kazan Internal Affairs organs. But it is hard for the police to achieve success alone. One would like to see more active participation in solving the problems of youth crime in Kazan—and also in other cities where anti-social groups have appeared—on the part of party and Soviet organs, social organizations, pedagogical collectives, and parents.

We have ascertained that young girls are showing up more often as law violators. Five years ago they comprised less than 4.0 percent of minors committing crimes; at present they account for 7.0 percent. Over 60 percent of the law-violators began to use alcoholic beverages while still in school, and began their sex life early.

Every year juvenile reception and placement centers handle up to 20,000 girls. A significant portion of them sell themselves while in a period of vagrancy, thereby paying for transportation, temporary lodging, food, and protection. At present there are over 4,000 prostitutes on the records of internal affairs organs, more than half of which are young people, and nearly one in ten is under 18. The venereal disease rate is not declining. In one year, more than 14,000 cases were recorded among juveniles. Among those infected, almost 10,000 were young girls: one in six is under 14.

In previous commentaries we have spoken of poor family conditions as a factor with a very deleterious effect on the juvenile crime situation. As a result of the increasing number of divorces, every year 700,000 children are found in broken homes. Every year one-half million children born out of wedlock are registered. Lack of proper control in broken homes leads to lack of supervision of juveniles. In the course of a year nearly 900,000 juveniles have encounters with the police for various violations of the law (including nearly 200,000 under age 14), and 100,000 children and juveniles are sent to reception and placement centers.

Parents living an antisocial lifestyle have the most deleterious effect on their children. It is precisely from such families that most juveniles and young people committing crimes come. There are serious shortcomings in individual educational work. Presently more than 1.5 million juveniles have police records. Among them are narcotics addicts and toxic substance abusers who have committed crimes prior to reaching the age of criminal liability, who have been convicted conditionally and handed suspended sentences. But until recently juvenile affairs commissions have not assigned public mentors for the majority of these juveniles, while commissions have relaxed their control over finding them jobs. At the same time, in connection with the transition of enterprises to economic accountability, one more and more often encounters administrators and collectives who do not want to accept juveniles (much less the "difficult" ones) for work. In many cases they are forced to go to work at collectives where neither the moral climate nor the working conditions help to correct them.

And yet another severe problem: among a significant portion of the juveniles with a police record, a lack of psychological and mental development can be observed, to one degree or another. Records at health-care organs list 1.4 million minors with mental disorders. Many of them systematically commit crimes. There is no effective system in the country for healing and re-educating them. Gosobrazovanie [State Committee for Public Education] does have special schools and special training facilities for children who have committed thefts, rape and similar acts but were not made liable under the criminal justice system owing to their age. But they do not accept juveniles who have mental and physical problems. Moreover, even these institutions as a whole are incapable of accepting more than 15-20,000 law violators per year. For comparison—every year nearly 100,000 juveniles

are released from criminal liability owing to their age and other non-rehabilitative conditions. The majority of them plus nearly 80,000 who have received suspended sentences remain among their peers. It is no accident that the level of group crime among juveniles is four times higher than among adults.

The USSR MVD, together with other state organs, is implementing an entire complex of measured directed toward improving prevention, and improving educational work with the "hard cases." Subunits have been established for preventing lawbreaking among minors and youth. The preventive service comprises the juvenile affairs inspectorate, the corrective labor colonies, and reception-placement centers for minors. A quest is under way for new, non-traditional forms of work: for example, employing the capabilities of the juvenile reception-placement centers for conducting psychological-pedagogical consultations; and, for aid to difficult juveniles, teachers and instructors. These subunits include—psychologists, medical personnel and lawyers. In cooperation with the USSR Procuracy and other agencies, we have begun an experiment to render assistance to juveniles left without any means of support, via the reception-placement centers.

We are planning to set up public assistance centers for juveniles, and a training program for parents; and we are studying a proposal to transform juvenile affairs commissions into commissions for social-legal defense of children.

Work is under way to prevent the transfer of criminal traditions to minors. To this end, a decision has been adopted to set up special investigative detention cells at VTK's [Corrective Labor Colony]. By 1995, conditions will be established under which juveniles sentenced to incarceration will serve out their punishment only in the oblast, kray or republic of their permanent place of residence.

As before, the severity of the struggle with consumption and distribution of narcotics is not diminishing. At the present time there are 118,200 people in the country who have been arrested at least once in connection with narcotics use. Among these nearly every other one, upon examination at medical institutions, is given the diagnosis of "narcotics addiction." Work with these persons is directed primarily toward accomplishing voluntary treatment. At the very same time, 1,240 persons who have persistently refused treatment, have been placed in mandatory treatment facilities.

However, the main efforts are directed against eliminating the market for narcotic substances. These efforts include control over production, storage and sale of narcotics; surveillance and destruction of wild plots and underground plantations of the plants which are the raw materials for making them, and also discovery and exposure of the manufacturers, den-owners and other distributors of narcotics.

The severity of the problem has not gone away: narcotics dealers have reacted to the sharp reduction in available narcotic plants by raising the prices two or three-fold. An increasing number of persons have begun to use powerful medications, not in the category of narcotics, but which provide a similar effect: the so-called psychotropic substances. Last year more than 1,000 cases of pilferage were exposed at medical institutions, storage facilities and pharmacies. Underground laboratories for making narcotics have been found in Moscow, Leningrad and Kirov. And narcotics addicts committed 28,471 crimes, which is 9.3 percent more than in 1988.

An inter-regional department, operating in the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, has been set up at the Main Administration for Criminal Investigation. Through the efforts of this department, a large group of narcotics dealers was exposed, whose activities took in a significant part of the country. Two-hundred kilos of prepared hashish was discovered, and weapons were confiscated.

But all this, I believe, is only a holding action. It is necessary to set up a unified nation-wide program.

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Special MVD Units to Combat Group Crime

90UN2484A Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by Ye. Ukhov: "A Combat Strike Battalion"]

[Text] Yesterday MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] subunit personnel took the oath. They are from a special motorized subunit that has been deployed in the capital of the Mari ASSR.

Reinforced with armored personnel carriers and other latest modern equipment, the special battalion is tasked to combat group violations of the law, especially by dangerous criminals.

Officers and rank and file personnel—participants in putting down armed clashes on interethnic grounds—are arriving in Yoshkar-Ola from the country's "hot spots." The battalion's backbone will be made up of those personnel who have proven their skill under extreme conditions. The fighters' arsenal consists of sniper rifles, grenade launchers, flak jackets, and special shields.... A transport helicopter has been placed at their disposal to transport operational militia groups.

City residents feel a lot calmer since patrols from the special motorized unit appeared on the streets: Militia roster strength is increasing significantly and there will be more professionalism in their activities.

Ban on Illegal Armed Groups Viewed*90UN2484B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 27 Jul 90 p 3*

[Article by N. Panyukov: "Henceforth Without Weapons?"]

[Text] Thus, a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Presidential Decree has been promulgated "On Banning Creation of Armed Formations that Are Not Stipulated by the Law of the USSR and Seizure of Weapons in the Event of Their Illegal Storage." Exhaustive assessments have been given to the problem which has already been disturbing the population for a long time.

A great number of letters have arrived at the editorial office during the past six months whose authors are perplexed with regard to the position of the country's leadership and with regard to all kinds of "guerrilla" bandit escapades. Human victims and weapons and ammunition seizures—all of this has heated up the situation. RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has all sharply raised the question about this: "Weapons seizures and a complete ban on the existence or the attempt to create any type of formation in the likeness of an army formation is a step that is not and cannot be an alternative"—a July 5th newspaper article titled "Armed and Very Dangerous" stated this in particular. The situation has become explosively dangerous: According to USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] data as of June 1st, rifled weapons alone numbered 11,455 barrels in investigations throughout the country. And if we also add to this "homemade" and "trophy" [weapons] from battle sites?

And based on Article 127³, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the USSR, the President has declared all such formations are illegal and subject to being disbanded within a 15 day period. During that same period, it is proposed that these formations unconditionally surrender weapons, ammunition, explosive devices, combat vehicles, and other military equipment to representatives of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Will these illegal military formations disband? Will these guerrillas voluntarily surrender their weapons and ammunition? This is the question now. In principle, the attitude toward this problem is quite simple. For in example, already in March the USSR Supreme Soviet had adopted a resolution that provided for disbandment of all extremist organizations and their surrender of weapons in Azerbaijan and Armenian SSR's. And as it turned out, the result turned out to be almost zero.

In this situation, the President's Decree is a very important step on the path to a positive resolution of the problem. However, much will nevertheless depend on the position of local authorities. We would like to hope that the republic Supreme Soviets will immediately adopt the appropriate measures for unconditional execution of the President of the USSR's Decree. Really everyone has certainly already become convinced that the existence of

militarized structures alongside official ones and as counterweights to them, does not result in anything other than exacerbation of the confrontation and the irreversible process of the State's self-destruction. And we think that discretion should triumph here.

For now, as we were told at the Main Military Procurator's Office, relative quiet has reigned locally. And shots do not ring out so furiously but those desiring to surrender weapons are also not getting in line right now. People are beginning to comprehend the situation. In the end, they will have the last word.

Lvov Forms Municipal Militia*90UN2430A Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 July 90 p 4*

[Interview with V. Shpitser, chairman of the Lvov city council, by correspondent G. Klyuchero: "Mini-interview: A New Militia"]

[Text] At a session of the Lvov city council, a resolution was passed concerning the creation of a municipal militia. Our correspondent assigned to the western oblasts of Ukraine asked the Chairman of the Lvov City Council, V. Shpitser, a couple of questions.

[Correspondent] What called for the creation of such a militia?

[Shpitser] A number of reasons. I will not deny that there is also a political factor involved here: the Higher Council of Ukraine in its still older form accepted a resolution concerning withdrawing the militia from being subject to the authority of the local organs. We regard this as wrong and decided to create our own, city [militia], which would be subject to the authority of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of the USSR and to the local councils, to their executive committees. But this only one side of the question. Life itself compels us to enlarge the number of such services.

[Correspondent] Won't the service which is created simply be a duplicate of the "traditional" militia?

[Shpitser] No. We will see to it that the new detachment will fulfill its specific functions. Moreover, that it will act in close cooperation with the existing units. We also want to see that the newly formed organization does not so much bring about law and order, but rather play the role of a "police force of morals" and an "ecological militia"...

[Correspondent] What will the overall organization look like?

[Shpitser] It will have somewhat less than 1,000 people. This will require money, but we are counting on not only the local city treasury, but also on the fact that the militia will be able to earn money by itself. One would think that the working collectives will not reject offering help. We think that the salary for professionals should be sufficiently high. This will allow us to get people on a competitive basis. The physical features, education, and also moral qualities will be considered.

Concerns Raised About Aspects of Press Law

90US1116A Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 5,
May 90 pp 12-15

[Article by Nikita Vaynonen: "Who Is the Newspaper's Boss?"]

[Text] This article, like the article that inaugurated our "Press Law: Letter and Practice" column (ZHURNALIST, No 4) must be preceded by the qualification that it was written before the law was passed. Nonetheless, we see no reason to cut off the discussion already under way. One cannot assume that the problems that gave rise to the sharp debates over the law and its passage are going to disappear automatically. One of them is the chain of relationships: publisher—publishing house—editorial staff—reader (as well as viewer and listener, of course).

I shall start by citing the text of article 6 of the draft press law passed in its first reading by the Supreme Soviet:

"The right to institute means of mass information appertains to state and public organizations, creative unions, religious, cooperative, and other associations of citizens formed in accordance with the law, as well as to the labor collectives and citizens of the USSR."

No permission needs be asked. Simply register and you may—assuming, of course, that you can, that you possess the ability and means for the undertaking—you may legally inform the world of whatever you so deem necessary. Naturally, within the limits of the norms of law and morality accepted by civilized society (limits outlined in article 5).

About a year and a half ago, when work on the current draft law had only just begun, the very idea of this kind of possibility was breathtaking. Now, on the contrary, apprehension seems to have replaced euphoria: Will this provision work? Judging from conversations with my colleagues, many are convinced that the party-state apparatus is not going to give up its monopoly on the means of mass information so easily and the right for everyone else to institute their own publications will remain on paper. The inauguration of new publications will be encumbered by the simple circumstance that the party-state apparatus retains the existing publishing organs, and so naturally will retain the available printing facilities and paper, and it is unrealistic to expect quick growth in the material base. The same holds true even more so for television and radio. Regardless of how much our printers, papermakers, and postalworkers lag behind the world level, all of them, from timberjack to mailman, are keyed into a unitary system which for better or worse still works and will, naturally, strive to persist, to preserve the productive relations, the channels of supply, the distribution, and so forth that have already been set up. Will new publications and broadcast channels be able to elbow their way into, or, to put it more mildly, subscribe to this system?

Practice seems to show that they will. The extensive shoots of new newspapers are greening rapidly, attempts

to create various "alternative," "independent" television channels and studios are taking hold. And everything seems to be available, and without even much trouble—typesetters, paper, distribution, decent journalists.

Perhaps the fears were unfounded?

On 3 March, on the eve of the elections, at the Kashirskaya metro station, I bought from a young man with a bundle of newspapers the first, freshly published issue of a newborn publication. It's called KONSOLIDATSIYA. The publisher is not indicated, written is simply: "VLKSM [All-Union Komsomol], Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon." Evidently the Komsomol raykom. I'm not going to say anything yet about the content; overall it was quite interesting. Let's look at the publishing data. Size—one quire; circulation—30,000, typesetter—MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. The only possible trap is that the frequency isn't indicated. Doesn't that mean the publisher couldn't or wouldn't guarantee its regular publication? That's the case with other rayon newspapers in Moscow as well: no one can say precisely when the next issue is going to come out, since that depends "on opportunities," and sometimes, more than likely, simply on the private interests of whoever is filling the order. For him this work is outside his plan, and naturally he'll take whatever job is more profitable. Not even paper is just lying around waiting to be picked up.

For readers, these new publication are frequently preferable to the traditional ones; for the publishers they are, as a rule, a sideline, a nonobligatory product. One of the results of this imbalance is the high price the publisher and editorial staff are forced to set for the issue, in order to cover expenses. KONSOLIDATSIYA, for example, costs 20 kopeks, seven times more than the rayon newspaper that has the same size and circulation but is part of the traditional system.

The reader is generally prepared to pay more for the new press, but why seven times more? And often the difference reaches much greater proportions. I can't bring myself to accuse the journalists of greed, although I do know that in these newspapers of Moscow's municipal rayons the employees earn no less than people in cooperatives. But they are earning after all! And not, in any case, seven times more than the others. Who is getting the lion's share of the profit? And can we swear that these "lions" earned their share and didn't snatch it?

Skimming off the top of the unusually high price for an issue of the new, unusual newspaper are chiefly not those who made it but those controlling the paper and typography, first and foremost the publishing houses, or, more accurately, those organizations and departments to which the publishing houses belong. By possessing, disposing of, and utilizing the means of print production, they, strictly speaking, are exploiting other people's labor.

Here we are running into a situation similar to that which arose in the discussion of the basis of the legislation on land: they proclaimed "Land to the peasants!" But there is no land, it all belongs to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. A resolution to the problem was found in the right of free exit from the kolkhoz with one's own plot of land. But what about a journalism collective of some newspaper put out by a publishing house whose print shop prints another dozen various newspapers and magazines, as well as books, brochures, supplements, and so on and so forth? After all, you can't split up a print shop. That kind of publishing house (or its analogue, say, an oblast press administration), possessing the printing base, turns out in essence to be for all practical purposes the owner of the means of mass information they put out—newspapers, magazines, and their editorial staffs. Besides the print shop, as a rule, it owns everything essential to the life and work of an editorial staff—the building and furniture, cars and typewriters, copy machines and staplers, and of course, the pay window where the journalists line up twice a month. A publishing house dispenses scarce goods, from housing to automobiles; moreover, it often has the interests of the print shop, mail room, and motor pool more to heart than those of the editorial staff. (That's understandable: if printers aren't indulged, they can quit, or even strike, whereas journalists if they do strike aren't going to because someone didn't get a Zhiguli-9.)

Present relations between publishing houses and editorial staffs resemble an inverted pyramid: those who directly realize citizens' right to information and freedom of opinion, that is, the editorial staff, the journalism collectives, are on the bottom, and those who are only supposed to be serving them are on top, in the role of master of the situation.

An argument even arose in the group working on the draft press law: who is the producer of mass information? The question is by no means academic. After all, on its answer depends who should utilize and dispense the goods received from its realization. At an auto plant, let's say, it's all resolved simply: the labor collectives makes the Zhiguli-9, so the labor collective manages the receipts from its sale. The Zhiguli-9's designer, whose thoughts, embodied in his drawings, are circulated by conveyor belt, in the given instance does not have the deciding vote. Attempts have been made to equate the journalist to that designer: the journalist, as it's put, created only the "design," but the print shop made it a use value. Not so fast! The Zhiguli-9's owner makes direct use, naturally, not of a design but of a material value, an automobile in the flesh, so to speak. In a newspaper, understandably, its content comprises the use value, and only afterward, when it's been read, possibly, does the paper soiled by printer's ink represent any use interest. The receipts from the means of mass information are created above all by the labor of the journalists. Why then do they have the fewest rights over their distribution?

I believe that the current subordination needs to be rectified. Right now the publisher is on top. He, as a rule,

is the owner of the means of production of mass information. A significant portion of the rights of the user and distributor of these means have been transferred to the publisher of the publishing house (or its production-managerial analogue). The editorial staff has nothing to do with this whatsoever. They are hired hands whose minds, talent, and labor belong for a set price wholly to the boss, whose role and function in everything that relates to the material-economic aspect of the matter is fulfilled by the publisher. But how should it be? The publisher himself remains at the head. Otherwise why should he bother publishing anything? But he ought to delegate the right to utilize and dispose of the productive base, I believe, not to the publishing house but directly to the editorial staff (or staffs, if there are more than one). The press law permits this (it doesn't prescribe but specifically permits, which is very important, since many editorial staffs, for example, of unprofitable but essential publications, would not be able to take on such a role). Article 4 talks about how the means of mass information (that is, its editorial staff) is a legal person, that is, it can have property and its own bank account, and it has the right to carry out productive-economic activity under conditions of economic independence and economic accountability [khozraschet].

This situation both in the working group and in the press has been the object of suspicion on the part of representatives of the publishing house. It's said that the well-established publishing-printing system will be at risk of destruction, that editorial staffs desirous of taking up production will have to inflate their staffs and take up an unfamiliar business. At first glance this is sensible. But only at first glance. In order to overturn the pyramid, nothing has to be destroyed or created anew. All it takes is the bosses and employees changing places.

Let the newspaper-magazine publishing houses (and we are talking for the time being only about those in their specific book-publishing nature) retain all their current productive-economic functions. With just one small correction: their apparatus, along with the production base, should be able to be rented by editorial staffs (say, in the person of a council of editors-in-chief), which would have the deciding voice in all financial-economic policy of the corporation they form. Naturally, with full and even, probably, preference for the interests of the publisher.

There can be various specific arrangements in these relations. What is important is the general principle: the relations between the three basic participants in the system of mass information—the publisher, the editorial staff, and the publishing house (or any other institution carrying out the circulation and distribution of information, say, a television center)—are to be built on the basis of agreements defining the mutual rights and obligations of the parties, including the distribution of receipts. This is what the law prescribes.

Relative economic independence for the editorial staff (and even full independence is possible if the editorial

staff itself acts as publisher) gives it also a new, higher degree of political and creative independence.

With its own receipts, an editorial staff can buy or lease a publication from a publisher (if the publisher is so willing), lease printing facilities, purchase paper, and so on. An existing publishing base can without any particular restructuring serve a new publisher as well—as is partly happening already.

The press law, in this way, reveals a real opportunity for the demonopolization of the material base of the means of mass information, although, understandably, this is a long and thorny path.

Of even greater significance, evidently, will be the demonopolization of the right to dispose of the results of journalistic labor. It could hardly be right that today's publishers profitably appropriate exclusively for themselves a disproportionately large portion of the fruits of the journalist's realization of his intellectual property—the fruits of his thoughts, passions, experiences, sleepless nights spent bent over the page, his conscientious pursuit of information, his courage, risk, sacrificed health.

According to the press law, the journalist is obligated to fulfill only the publisher's program (although even here he is given full professional independence). In everything that concerns the distribution of the property rights the editorial staff can set its own conditions. Here already, apart from the press law, all the other laws regulating economic relations come into force—on the labor collective, on enterprises, on leasing, on property, on tax assessment, and so on.

The publisher can be the owner of a print shop, a radio station, a television studio, that permits him to circulate the result of the journalist's intellectual labor, but that result itself can in no way be the publisher's property. With respect to the editorial staff and the fruits of their labor he is not the owner but specifically the publisher, that is, the individual who gives the means of mass information its program, its idea, its direction, and only that.

Herein lies the progressive character of the present draft press law, that it provides an opportunity, opens the way for eliminating any kind of indivisible ownership of the means of mass information, regardless of what kind of "Springer," individual or collective, might desire it. After all, to be honest, up until now our bureaucratic apparatus has acted just like some grandiose "Springer," which makes a Western newspaper magnate look like a pygmy. We hardly need to continue to develop what is, in essence, the Western tradition with its immutable rule—whoever pays is the one who names the tune—on such a hyperbolic scale. Even now it's all simple there: play the wrong tune and you're out. Our press law in this sense is more democratic and even, I dare say, more modern, inasmuch as it takes into account new realities, in which the press, continuing to serve its immediate

bosses (in our case, the publishers), is increasingly oriented toward the interests of society as a whole. And the law must take this into consideration.

One of the earmarks of the law, as we know, is maintaining the balance of interests. This is not a matter of a "golden mean" but of the fact that the law is the working mechanism for restoring social equilibrium, which never was and never can be total or absolute. Nevertheless there cannot be absolute disequilibrium either, the constant outweighing of one side by the other. By no means do the critics "on the right" always take this into account in their objections to the press law. When it becomes a matter of the press's current bosses—the party committees, ministries, and so on, concerns are voiced about not infringing upon their rights in favor of journalists. Here, critics "on the right" are not bothered by the issue of property and exploitation. That issue comes up immediately, however, and on the level of principle, as soon as the conversation turns to new, especially alternative publications. Here, on the contrary, these same critics are concerned that the publishers are acquiring too many rights.

Critics "on the left" behave in the opposite manner. Justly defending journalists' right before the present publishers, these critics do not want to see that if you take this too far, then those whose rights have been infringed upon will be the ones publishing the new publications. After all—excuse the platitude—everyone is equal before the law.

This is probably a good time to recall that the information process includes one more participant—the reader, the listener, the viewer, in short, the people, in whose name we willingly swear, as master of everything, including the press. Alas, up until now the press has belonged to the people only in words.

APN correspondent V. Nizskiy, in the November 1989 issue of *ZHURNALIST*, recounted a curious instance. On 2 March 1989 the Mezhdurechensk newspaper *ZNAMYA SHAKHTERA*, next to the traditional words "Organ of the Mezhdurechensk City Committee of the CPSU and the City Council of People's Deputies of Kemerovskaya Oblast" inserted the line: "The newspaper belongs to the readers as an instrument of control over the state of affairs in the city." There was great consternation in the gorkom. They ordered the line deleted. Sentence was pronounced on the editor, and it was not rescinded even after the editorial staff managed to restore the slanderous line, having shown that it represents nothing other than the rephrased thesis of point 5 of the resolution "On glasnost" from the 19th party conference. Only there it's a matter of the press as an instrument of control over the state of affairs in the country instead of the city.

In placing the line about the newspaper belonging to the newspaper's readers, the editor of *ZNAMYA SHAKHTERA*, P. Shabrikhin, reasoned thus: the newspaper has 30,322 subscribers, each of whom has paid 4 rubles

44 kopeks apiece, which comes to a little less than 134,630 rubles. In other words, the subscribers have gone shares on the property. After all, a subscriber is not a buyer. He is not paying for a readymade good but in advance, creating the capital on which the publication exists.

This is something to think about. Especially since the reader has become exceptionally discriminating. In subscribing to a newspaper or magazine he is not choosing some faceless, impersonal publisher but increasingly is oriented toward a personality. As a rule—toward the personality of the editor, inasmuch as that determines to a decisive degree the position and quality of the publication. Isn't the publisher infringing on the right of the reader when, not taking his opinion into consideration, he changes editors, to say nothing of the direction of the newspaper or magazine? As the editor of KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, E. Averin, rightly noted in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI (No 47, 1989), "The press law must become a law protecting the rights of the consumer of the means of mass information. Then it will defend both the good publisher and the good editor." A very correct thought, and one that probably ought to become a guideline in sorting out arguments between publishers and their publications.

True, not everyone agrees with this. The opinion was expressed in our working group that the publisher is by definition free to dispose of the publication as he likes, and there's nothing you can do about that, after all there's no sense in him publishing an organ of mass information if he's going to be limited in his rights toward it. And the reader, if he doesn't like something, is free not to subscribe.

This reasoning is hardly irreproachable. It is highly reminiscent of the comment you often hear over a state trade counter where you're trying to find one edible apple in the pile of dumped ones: "This isn't the market for you! If you don't like it—don't take it."

Of course, the information market that is taking shape significantly limits the publisher's will (whoever he is) and compels him to give more consideration to the reader, viewer, listener. But, in the first place, the market too has its own constraints (this interesting theme needs to be addressed separately), and in the second place, given that market, as experience has shown, the legislative defense of the consumer's rights can (and must!) be transformed from fiction into reality.

Here, unfortunately, it proved impossible to introduce anything coherent into the press law. There was a proposal to write in general that all relations arising in association with the creation and functioning of the means of mass information shall be regulated by the present law, assuming the priority of the rights and interests of the consumer. But this norm was considered too general and therefore powerless to influence practice. Concrete suggestions, on the contrary, proved too petty, suitable only as administrative acts but not as norms for

law. Indeed, we hardly need the force of law, say, to include a representative of the reading public on editorial boards or to envisage returning the subscriber his money. Such measures cannot encompass all editorial staffs and all forms of SMI [means of mass information]; the law should be universal. So that this part of the press law, evidently, will still have to be refined, not with the help of any speculative constructs but on the basis of what practice suggests.

It is possible, say, that somewhere the necessity is being created to choose an editor at the session of the Congress of People's Deputies or even by general vote by the entire population. And then the line of the draft about how the editor is to be named by the publisher or chosen in a procedure envisaged by the editorial regulations will prove outmoded.

But in defense of the rights of the SMI consumer there is also no cause to overstep the bounds of reason. The voice of the people is by no means the voice of God. It can be hard enough for an individual, to say nothing of collectives, classes, or society as a whole, to learn how adequately to recognize his own objective needs and interests. Competent, enlightened, mature public opinion is born only within a free market of ideas oriented toward the pursuit of accord. And we gain nothing—on the contrary, we lose heavily—if we replace the party-state monopoly with the truth of the monopoly of commonplace consciousness. If, say, the popularly elected editor of a rayon newspaper is going to express only the "opinion of the crowd," suppressing everything else, this could turn into a genuine misfortune. And such fears are not unfounded.

Having been born in the Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon of Moscow, the newspaper KONSOLIDATSIYA, as a whole, I repeat, an interesting one, has printed certain material that cannot help but evoke sad reflections. Its author, V. Markov, who signed himself "A Voter," without a shadow of doubt that he is speaking in the name of the rayon's entire population, calls "to proclaim legislatively that the rayon soviet is the owner and dispenser of the rayon's multilevel property, including its territory, land, natural resources, infrastructure, monuments, . . ." etc.: "to increase the budget of the rayon soviet to 50 per cent of the gross national product produced on its territory instead of the current 2-3 per cent"; to create its own, rayon economic base, "including productive capacity for housing construction, social services, and consumer goods for the priority (!) saturation of the local market"; to develop "a conception of and program for the socioeconomic development of the Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon of Moscow on the basis of attaining first all-union and then European and world standards for satisfying the needs of the population."

During the times of the Grishin program for transforming Moscow into a model Communist paradise, a joke went around about building Communism in one city taken separately. Voter V. Markov goes much further, proposing overtaking the flowering West in one

rayon. And that would be fine if it were only his own personal misunderstanding. After all, the program is being published, applauded, people are going to vote under its banner, taking its author for the obliger of the people's interests.

This is wrong. In a rule-of-law state, in a civil society, the press is still, I think, called upon to enlighten, to disseminate sensible ideas, at least weighed on the scales of sober reason. The same issue of KONSOLIDATSIYA cites some curious facts. According to a study by a political study center in California, in its degree of receptivity to mythologizers, Soviet public consciousness is close to the Iranian or the Nigerian. No matter how much one would like to think that this is an exaggeration, life shows that there are grounds for such a conclusion.

In summing up, I would answer the question, Who is the newspaper's boss? like this. It is the publisher, the editorial staff, and public opinion, with the qualification that all three be sufficiently civilized, responsible, and competent.

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Media Mavens Ponder Perestroyka Issues in Journalists' Union

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[Report on Roundtable by Marina Cherednichenko: "Who are we? Where did we come from? Where are we Going?"]

[Text] Roundtable participants—USSR People's Deputy Lyudmila Batynskaya, Mikhail Poltoranin, Anatoly Yezhelev, Valeriy Kucher, Artistic Fund Director Valentin Sergeyev, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Publishing House Director Viktor Novikov, and ZHURNALIST employees—reflect on the problems of restructuring our creative Union.

[ZHURNALIST Chief Editor Dmitry AVRAAMOV]: We are grateful to everyone who came to talk about the fate of our Union, and on its place in society and in the life of the ordinary journalist.

Criticism addressed to the Union has been completely justified. For a long time we have taken as a given the existing conditions of our activity, and rarely have we tried to change them. Today a completely different role is required of the Union. It must represent the interests of all journalists and actively defend them before the organs of power. And the question is posed once again of its role in drafting legislation: we are talking about legislative initiative on all questions which touch upon our life and our work. Obviously, for this we should assume the rights of a trade union.

After the Law on the Press is adopted, many unofficial publications will become legal. We must not fence ourselves off from their employees. The platform for association in the USSR Journalists' Union, in my view, should be the USSR Constitution and the Law on the Press. We should unite our colleagues on the very broadest basis.

The problem of Union membership: It is not right to accept only those who are employees, as was the case until now. There are a great many talented people who live a life of literary work, are published in newspapers and magazines and take business trips for publishing houses, but are not accepted in the Union. In my opinion this is clearly discrimination.

When the Journalists' Union was being formed, we patterned it after the party structure. It seems to me that the basis for the Union of Journalists cannot be identical for everyone. For instance, for TASS it is the primary organization; while for a rayon newspaper—it is an inter-regional creative association. This can be both a creative section and an association according to interests. We must depart from standards.

The Journalists' Fund must play a larger role in the reformed structure of the Union. And we cannot get along without qualified economists, who know how to "make" money: the poverty of our Union, the largest of the creative unions, is obvious. Nor can we get along without lawyers, ready to defend our colleagues who fall into misfortune. Even a simple list of the imminent problems says that we will not be able to get to all of them in a few hours today. But we can always continue our dialogue, and involve the readers in it as well.

"WE ARE FROM THE COMMAND-ADMINISTRATIVE..."

[USSR People's Deputy Lyudmila BATYNSKAYA, IZVESTIYA correspondent for Krasnoyarskiy Kray and Tuva ASSR]: We ought to make it clear at the very beginning of our conversation, just what, actually, does the Journalists' Union represent in our day? That is to say, Who are we? Where did we come from? And where are we going? A little philosophizing won't hurt us; after all, in essence we are talking about working out a concept for a new Union...

[USSR Journalists' Union Journalists' Fund Director Valentin SERGEYEV]: There was a time when the badge of membership in the USSR Journalists' Union was for me and my colleagues—especially in the localities, among workers on rayon and factory newspapers a mark of professionalism, and aroused feelings of respect. To a certain extent I would like to see this attitude toward the Journalists' Union preserved, as toward a Union of Masters of their Trade. When I came to work on the staff of the Union, to head the organizational-instructor department, I was not sure it was for me: why would a journalist need an instructor? Today the department has been redesignated, the "organizational-creative" section; but of course, it is not just a matter of changing the

signboard. A great deal must be changed in essence, in order for the Union to become truly a Union of masters, a union for the defense of journalists, that would try to resolve social questions; in order that it might become an organization that takes a definite political position in the state and in society.

It is easiest of all to ascertain that the present Union is not the kind of organ whose voice is heard in society as one that speaks for all journalists. Today we should be thinking about working out the status of the Union: political, legal and economic, proceeding from contemporary conditions and the interests of journalists. When we understand what our Union should represent in the new conditions, we can proceed to build its organizational structure. But to tear down the old one... I would not be in a hurry to do so.

[USSR People's Deputy Mikhail POLTORANIN, board chairman, USSR Journalists' Union Moscow organization]: Valentin Mikhaylovich has said, "a Union of masters." That sounds nice, but I think it is a Union of both masters and apprentices. No Union of any kind can get along without them. Created for representation abroad, the Union has played its own role in uniting the people of our profession. But life has begun to go out ahead, and the Union has begun to hold back. The very structure of the Union, as already stated here, was copied from the CPSU structure. Cadre selection of the leaders of the Union led to the fact that it has become a subdivision of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, its appendage. It is a paradoxical situation: the journalists produce value, a product, which brings in considerable profit. But the party devours the lion's share. From the latest data cited in PRAVDA, according to the plan for last year, the CPSU budget was to receive 1,069,500,000 rubles in profits from party publications. And at the same time the party apparatus strictly regulates where one can step, and where one must not. The situation is increasingly analogous to serfdom—you live off the labor of the worker, while ordering him about.

Why, today, has the Union with its structures and its leaders seemed unreceptive to the changes in the country, although a great many journalists are in the front ranks of perestroika? Because the leadership finds administrative-command methods to its advantage, and the previous cadre policy as well, which permits one to live rather well until retirement.

And it is not simply a matter of such cadres, but also of us: we have begun to limit ourselves only to creative study, and to be satisfied with a secondary role.

I do not think it is the Union's business to extend the knowledge and skills of our members. This a person learns at the university, and in life. In our Union we should assemble on the principle of a professional community—a professional one, I say! And above all journalists should find in such a Union the defense of their rights, the defense of their intellectual property, and the defense of their economic interests. Presently, when the

Law on the Press is adopted, I am more than certain: the publishers and founders will seek a method to hold onto their positions. They will probably convene their own congress and agree not to give in to the journalists when drawing up contracts: how they would get 10 percent of the profits, and the publishers—90 percent, so that's the way it will be! What can the journalists do in such a situation? As individuals—nothing. Our Union must prepare for such a situation, and we must have all the methods of battle in our arsenal, right down to strikes.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Publishing House Director Viktor NOVIKOV]: As far as the apparatus's ambition to crush the Journalists' Union is concerned... In my own time I have covered the Urals, the Volga Basin and Kazakhstan for the Moscow press—for a little over five years... Not once in our Propaganda Department was there such an instance, wherein we pressured, drew in or pushed someone somewhere: the role of instructor on the staff of the party Central Committee is not as great. But as far as the higher echelon is concerned—yes, that is true. There were instructions, and there was pressure; it was all there! Today we have gone away from this. Let us be fair.

It does not suit me either, for example, that our journalists do not occupy the position in society which they are called upon to take. If you want to be honest about it, they hardly ever consider it. These are not the journalists with which we all meet and chat with in the West. There they have been placed in the proper position. Therefore, one of the tasks of the Journalists' Union is, no doubt, to place our press workers at the proper height.

Does the Journalists' Union suit us today? In its present form, I think not. But this does not mean that we should now go into battle, and then discuss what comes of this! It's not for nothing that folks say: "You can't build by breaking down!"

It is not a matter of the persons leading the Union: when we reach retirement age, every one of us will leave... But I am particularly bothered by the fact that right now, all the Union members assembled here are "of an age." We have no young people. They are not following after us. Let us give some thought to why. The renewal of our Union by young people—that is the question of questions!

[POLTORANIN] The question is not put properly: If we turn around right now, it's true we will not see the young people behind us—they have gone far out in front. There is no longer anyone to follow after us, because we are in the rearguard...

[USSR People's Deputy Anatoly YEZHELEV, board chairman of the USSR Journalists' Union Leningrad organization]: Concerning the kind of relationships we have with the younger generation of journalists—apparently they are not the same everywhere... At our place in Leningrad last summer there was an extraordinary conference of the Journalists' Union, where the previous leadership was replaced, after being censured

for inaction and conservatism. And who started to "rock" the entire organization? Two of the primary journalistic organizations—the Pioneer newspapers, and SMENY, a youth newspaper. And who worked out the most interesting ideas at the conference? Who insisted that we must necessarily publish our own political newspaper and have our own book publishing house? At the present time 65 percent of the board membership at the Leningrad organization are—young fellows. At the secretariat—young people again. There are such disturbers of tranquillity, I am sure, everywhere. But often they stew in their own juice. And so they must simply be supported, and organize as a force. Viktor Ivanovich is absolutely right—without the young people there can be no reform of the Union. But there are such people; only we must not stand in their way.

[USSR People's Deputy Valeriy KUCHER, editor of the newspaper MAGNITOGORSKIY RABOCHIY]: I have met with the journalists of Arkhangelsk, Noginsk, Kalinin and the Urals. The demands for changes in the Union are not coming from individuals, but from the majority of the country's corps of journalists.

I would not say that all journalists are waiting for reform while watching the sea and warming themselves in the sun. Some are trembling with fear from the risk they are taking. Both Muscovites and Leningradites could cite an example. But many... Alas, in their historic essence they are still awaiting the word from above. But the desired words of change will not come from the center on down. And it cannot come under present conditions. And here is why. At the basis of the construction of the Union as it still operates lies the ideology of exploitation of certain of a journalist's feelings: the feeling of duty and his absolute obligations. The vital needs of the journalists have been moved to the background and are not worthy of attention. To a certain extent we have educated journalists in the puritanical traditions of abstinence. And even their professional needs are satisfied meagerly. As we all know, the indicator of the culture of a nation is its use of the printed word. In America, for example, there are 300 kg of printed products per capita; here at home we have 36 kg. There is not enough paper. And at the same time 30 million cubic meters of wood is made into boxes, which we burn up every year. One can say without exaggeration that our potential is being burned up there—our professional, vital, spiritual possibilities... I have been a member of the Union for nearly 20 years and only recently marveled over why, after experiencing feelings of dissatisfaction for years, I personally did not come forth as the initiator of the reconstruction of our Union? And yes, we in the Union have slept through five years of perestroika, although as workers we have stood at the very sources of glasnost. And only now have we suddenly remembered. After all, in all Unions war has managed to begin and to end: the writers have bred discontent, and the musicians and the artists. And we have not even started a fistfight!

[POLTORANIN] We are dueling with the bureaucrats...

[KUCHER] And our own home-grown variety we have overlooked. And so the answer to part of Lyudmila Batynskaya's question, "Who are we and where did we come from?" is simple—"We are from the command-administrative [system]..."

A UNION OF UNIONS. ASSOCIATIONS. GUILDS...

[BATYNSKAYA] Why are the young people not following us? I have also been asked this question. In one way or another, I have been editor of a territorial [kray] youth newspaper for eight years. I will respond. They will not follow us in the future either, if no changes take place. Because they are tired of looking at our disorganized state and our poverty.

Examples from my own experience: When for the past two years nearly every quarter they tried in turn to have me fired, or to be expelled from the party, it never even entered my mind to go to our primary organization at the Journalists' Union for real help. I went to Valentina Dmitrievna Martynova, the Union's executive secretary, a splendid woman—simply to cry on her shoulder. Have the territorial organizations in the localities or the Journalists' Union itself ever given any thought to how to protect the person with the least rights—the young editor?

Two years ago at the Komsomol Central Committee we declared: "You will not be able to defend us, or else you will be a hindrance, if there are questions which reach the level of the kraykom or obkom first secretaries." We have banded together as an independent council of youth newspaper editors, to which we have elected people who are, as they say, hardened, and solid. There you have a ready-made association in our reformed Union. Because in the old one we once again cannot do everything... A colleague from another city phoned me at home: sitting on his board of editors are the secretaries on ideology from the party and the Komsomol obkom—they will not permit the pre-election program of one of the candidates to be published. He read the program to me over the telephone. I asked that he hand the receiver to the leaderships, and I ask: "Comrades, just what in this program is unlawful?" And I persuaded them... But is this really normal—to resolve the fate of an editor and the publication of a newspaper by means of phone calls?

Today, let's say, the Council of Editors is one of the associations which might be blended into the new structure. But it is natural to ask the center: "What sort of rights will you delegate to us? What specifically can you provide, for example, to that association of youth editors?"

[POLTORANIN] Look how hot they are, and then they try to persuade us—not to hurry! In order for our Union to be in the forefront, we must quickly, on the march, restructure ourselves. I, incidentally, agree: haste may indeed cause harm, but no one with such a reputation is, as they say, trying to catch mice. We have carried out restructuring in the Moscow journalists' organization:

this model will perhaps suit some people, others perhaps not. But perhaps it will at least help others to orient themselves. Strictly speaking, there are for now two conceptions of the perestroika of our organization. One—as a Union of unions. This means, for example, the Moscow Journalists' Union, which is already established, and the Journalists' Union of Russia, which plans to hold its constituent assembly in May. They could unite on the basis of an agreement and, of course, commonality of goals; let's say, the requirement to participate in the formation of the so-called Fourth Estate—that is, the public estate, expressed via the press. They could combine their assets, which they could earn jointly, and build vacation houses for their members, and so on and so forth. The other conception is—a Union of associations. I am a proponent of the former, because a Union of associations is a vertical structure, which presupposes a strong center; whereas a Union of unions is a horizontal structure, which delegates part of its rights and all its obligations upwards, to a coordination council.

[SERGEYEV] A part of their rights and all their obligations?

[POLTORANIN] That is the way it already was with us: all the obligations to someone, and to someone else just the rights... There could be leagues in the structure of such a union. In ours, for example, a league of commentators has been created. These people themselves will have the right to establish and to receive into their league, for example, photo-journalists and television workers. Naturally, these leagues or associations would carry on economic and financial activity and would publish a newspaper. They have their own fund, from which they give a portion to the Journalists' Fund, which Valentin Sergeyev just happens to run.

[AVRAAMOV] You have said that, perhaps, there will be many different unions. Having many parties is understandable. But many unions? After all, we are talking about joining together for professional interests...

[POLTORANIN] We need not fear a situation of many unions. This, after all, is diversity not of political passions, but precisely professional diversity. I have already cited this example at a conference of the Moscow Journalists' Union organization—Today our large Union is like a tightly-bound raft. As long as it stays on the stretch of the river, it holds together normally. But you see as soon as it enters the rapids, such a raft is unstable, and it comes apart. In order to pass the rapids normally, we must loosen the bindings...

[AVRAAMOV] There is experience in this in the West. In Greece, for instance, the journalists' union of Athens daily newspapers unites workers standing on various political platforms. They believe that both communists and conservatives can have common professional interests... Perhaps under real multi-party conditions it would be worthwhile for our press to consider this.

[NOVIKOV] As soon as we achieve multi-party conditions, the press will be multi-party as well. The social democrats will have their own, the communists also, and the agrarian party, which will declare itself any day now, will also have its own press. But journalists should resolve their own professional problems independently from their view. I would nevertheless devote some attention to setting up, so to speak, shop associations and guilds.

The publishers, for instance. Today there is only a nominal amount in the Union; and even in documents they are given short shrift: "workers of newspapers, magazines, radio and television," and last—the publishing houses. After all, this is a huge army, and it is being left out of the Union. In the structure of our Journalists' Union, I am deeply convinced, we must give a place to the question of regional interests—and must give everyone equal rights, to include the Russian Federation.

There are over 50,000 Russian journalists in the Union. And the situation in Russia is the most pathetic: it is embarrassing to say that the Russian Federation has no newspaper-magazine base, just as they do not have their own mass information media.

[KUCHER] Viktor Ivanovich unwittingly pointed out the sorest subject of all: How, under conditions of real political pluralism can we unite, and how can we teach a sense of tolerance to one another? After all, journalists too, in conditions of political monopolism, have clearly run wild. Right and left fierce battles are waging in the newspapers only because someone has views that are "not ours." Structuring the Union on the principle of professionalism will also entail the supreme task of—teaching tolerance! But here is one thing we must really tolerate no longer—and that is poverty. I won't go into details; everyone is aware of the conditions in which newspaper people literally eke out an existence, especially on the periphery...

POVERTY—A DISGRACE!

[BATYNSKAYA] Journalists have been preaching on poverty for so long—for everyone and for themselves, that it will take considerable effort to overcome this stereotypical. I am in solidarity with everyone who has touched upon this "impolite" topic today one way or another. Valeriy properly pointed to our well-worn puritanical grimace. I will even take the risk of restructuring the folk-saying: Poverty—is a serious disgrace!

I can recall how there suddenly appeared an opportunity to buy two Nikon cameras for the editorial offices, with a complete set of equipment, for 47,000. Why did it ever enter my head to go to the Union for money? I made the rounds of the directors of publishing houses and enterprises and solved the problem. How long will we have to walk around with outstretched hand? One of the most urgent questions which in the future, and I hope the near future, the new Union will pose as a legislative initiative

is—the need for a Law on Intellectual Property. But deciding it is a long, drawn-out process...

My pre-election program contained a point, on which I also spoke at the session which discussed the draft Law on the Press. I insisted on voting on the article that by agreement with the publishing house, a portion of the receipts would be given to the newspaper. Suddenly, in the last variant, which were tossed to the deputies a few hours before the discussion, this article had disappeared. Later it returned. Will it list until the end? Whatever our new Union will be like—whether a Union of unions, or associations, I hope that the journalists will conduct a cerebral attack prior to the congress and choose the most convenient variant—it should be a rich one. Because only if it is economically strong will the union be able to in fact, and not in words alone, stand up in the defense of our legal, human, social, medical, and many other interests.

[POLTORANIN] Lyudmila has incidentally touched upon the topic of "deputies and the Union." It deserves a separate conversation. Precisely because today the Union needs our real assistance: journalists are posing the question of wages, which is unique of itself. I can tell you altogether accurately—journalists' wages (except for party publications) have not been raised since 1 March 1966. At one time we took it up not entirely in the right way—in the pose of a supplicant, "as an exception." Our task today—is to receive a Law on the Press. We also need a Law on Social Organizations. Thus far we have been discussing the Union abstractly—such as it should be or some such. But for now we are living within definite bounds—this is a certain kind of Malinovshchina. For example: the staff of the Moscow journalists' organization—not the entire Union, but only for Moscow!—was approved by Ye. Ligachev. It's not enough that they take our profits, but they are also in command of our contributions, since the staff is maintained on the dues. Why? There will be a Law on Social Organizations, and the status of the Journalists' Union will also change. But for now...

But without waiting for the Law on the Press, the Journalists' Union should begin to "make" money even today. Of course, it is not worthwhile turning the Union into a purely commercial organization. We have already taken up this matter, having established joint production by the Moscow journalist organization and Hollanders—of the magazine MOSCOU MAGAZIN. Even under unfavorable circumstances we shall earn 350,000 dollars per year, and under the most favorable—close to a million. Construction of a home for our veterans is becoming a reality, and many other things. Under contemporary conditions the actual role of the Union's journalists' fund becomes more urgent. I think its director will describe this in more detail.

[SERGEYEV] The Journalists' Fund of the USSR Journalists' Union is, strictly speaking, and should be, the kind of service, if you will, the kind of center, which works for the journalist. It is above all the center of his

social and legal defense. In order for it to operate robustly, it should have its own credit bank, where the financial powers of the journalists' fund would be brought together. Also needed is a bank for vacancies: our brother journalists must frequently move and change their place of work. Here he would receive assistance both with finding a job, and when necessary it would pay for his business trip, so that he could come and determine whether he could work there, whether the conditions would be suitable or not. The editorial-publishing department will take up commerce and publication of literature journalists need and, perhaps, according to their orders. And finally, the advertising bureau, which in addition to commerce will also teach a journalist advertising. It goes without saying, there should also be a group occupied with recreation, health care, and tourism, including foreign tours as well. In their present state, our international departments are inflated, and in a number of instances their functions are not understood. It would be appropriate to start up a service bureau for journalists; I wanted to purchase office equipment, but a business question arose... All these services must, in the final analysis, operate at the social and legal defense center. And the center—for them. Here is a self-financing organization, which it should be. The center is headed by a council, which consists of representatives from both the Union of unions, and the Union of associations—a democratic council. There may also be a directors' council. Money must be managed, and there must be someone to ask: where did the money go, you spendthrift? Or how do you earn it? It goes without saying, this is a working diagram, and it requires breaking-in and approbation...

[YEZHELEV] If this plan begins to work in real life, why do we need a trade-union for culture? We should withdraw from it.

[POLTORANIN] Today there is a dispute over whether to make it a professional Union or to let it remain a creative one. I think that it is in some ways far-fetched, and is gravitating toward the scheme. Yes, a professional one! Since the publishing house pays us, it is the employer. Semi-professional—because we will always help the journalist materially. At the same time we are both a creative and a political Union. And perhaps it is not necessary to make a trade union out of the Journalists' Union? Relations with the publishers are being restructured, we are gaining independence, and a powerful fund will appear. Can we ourselves offer material assistance and protection against all misfortunes? The situation in Nogilsk is the very same. If we at the Journalists' Union were truly consolidated, moreover, we ourselves could call a strike and could provide for them materially from the strike fund, and we could bring in a raid of "specialists" for a thorough investigation, so that the party gorkom itself would break out the "white flag."

[YEZHELEV] But does it not seem to you that we have left out one important matter? People who band together in order to achieve a great social end, start with the

creation of their own press organ. And does the Journalists' Union have its own political newspaper? Here you have a "bootless bootmaker"...

[POLTORANIN] Anatoliy Stepanovich was correct: we do not have such a newspaper. And we shall not have one as long as the CPSU Central Committee once again has to give permission... Today, if a journalist is walking in a crowd, he can be distinguished by his bended knees. Because he has been standing on his knees in front of the party apparat for a long time, and now you see he cannot unbend his knees right away. In order to put things right once and for all, we truly need a Journalists' Union that is completely democratized and politicized. The Union must be a kind of litmus test for all of society as well, so that one might check his position by it, and rapidly advance. I can see our Union in the first ranks among all equal creative unions.

[YEZHELEV] Why is it that the Writers' Union can have a newspaper, but for us it is unrealistic? Here is what the search for new opportunities should bring us to. Here, let's say, the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA is considered radical-right, and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, radical-left. But journalists, members of the USSR Journalists' Union, work on both of them. Which of these papers can represent, so to speak, the face of our Union? Both the one and the other, and at the same time, neither.

But on the other hand, one must not deprive the founder—mark well, any!—of the right to influence and demand, in order that their publication realises a certain direction. Thus, you see, the interests of the journalist can be truly defended only when our political status is strengthened. And it is growing in proportion to our influence on public opinion on a nationwide scale. How can one get along here without a newspaper? Today in Leningrad they made up eight large-format columns of the first issue of CHAS PIK [Rush Hour], our newspaper for the Leningrad Journalists' Union. And I have already managed to sense that they have begun to treat us differently at the very same party obkom. Our very intention to publish precisely a political newspaper, and not an internal "herald" has raised our prestige. And prestige—that, my dear colleagues, is a fully material force...

[POLTORANIN] If I may speak figuratively, the Journalists' Union must crawl out of the trenches. Of course, the Union is not the only one; the mass information media as a whole is the target of a most powerful attack on the part of the apparat. The more the glasnost and the more complex the situation in the country, the more they will hang labels on us—the press is to blame for everything: for inflaming passions, for the hysteria, for the poor education, and for the collapse of morality. To put it crudely, they are pinning all the accusations [Lit: "hanging all the dogs"] on the press. But we must not hide our heads and not simply protect ourselves from the hail of stones, but go onto the offensive, expose, and win our positions.

[AVRAAMOV] We've made an abrupt turn to the next topic. This only proves that one cannot solve all the problems in a single day. Once again, thank you very much for taking part in this timely conversation.

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Editor Explains Goals of Journal Referendum

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[Interview with REFERENDUM Editor Lev Timofeyev by Ye. Korolkova: "The Editors Declare Non-Party Affiliation"]

[Text] [Korolkova] I've read REFERENDUM prior to our meeting and I am, I think, familiar with your position. I do not want to discuss it now... But tell me, how do you explain the fact that you are a professional literary figure who is rather widely published, yet you've established your own magazine?

[Timofeyev] Well, to be an author and to be an editor—these are completely incompatible occupations. An editor—well, it's as if he's the author of the entire publication, which one has to be able to design—that which was created by various authors and in various genres, and turn it into a single literary entity. A good magazine can be read in a single sitting, from the first to the last page. Putting it together, believe me, is a fine thing to do!

But of course that's not the main thing. I don't want to say that we are living in the epoch of free speech; but nevertheless, considerable ground has been covered in that direction. Soviet journalism today, while officially registered, does not know many closed topics. But in December 1987, when our first issue was published—nine months after my release—there appeared only the beginnings of that which we have come to call glasnost.

[Korolkova] We must explain to the reader, that that was when you came out of the camps, where you had served two years of an 11-year sentence defined for you according to Article 70: "antisoviet agitation and propaganda." The reason for your arrest were several works published in foreign publications. These works will soon appear in OKTYABR and YUNOST, and one of them, the play, "Moskva. Molenie o chashe" [Moscow: Praying over the Chalice], has already been published in the magazine TEATR.

[Timofeyev] Well, I'll go on. Then one felt very strongly the need for some kind of print organ, which would be skilled enough—and I am so bold as to assert that we are publishing a professional, unofficial magazine—that is you see, one that would be skilled and objective, and would illuminate and comment, apart from the prevailing dogma, on the problems troubling society, be it the Afghanistan War or the events in Sumgait. Public demand arose, and we reacted to it.

[Korolkova] What caused you to use the name—REFERENDUM?

[Timofeyev] It appeared more or less by chance. Returning to journalistic activity after the camp, I began it, while participating with Sergey Grigoryants in creating the magazine GLASNOST. And I was one of those who dreamed up this title. But when I left the editorship of GLASNOST, I became quite uncomfortable, because it was as if I was left with nothing. And so I began to ponder, just what should be the next important step in political and social development after glasnost; where is social consciousness heading, that in this connection can become our goal, our dream? And I understand that our goal and our dream could be the readiness of society to decide all questions of our corporate life with the aid of a referendum. And that is how the name sprang up. And later on, while looking in the dictionary, we learned that the word "referendum" has yet another meaning, which could not be better suited to the nature of the publication. In Latin, "referendum" is that which must be said. And so everything came out well. It's true that certain people confuse "referendum" with the more common "referent" [seminar leader].

[Korolkova] You have written on the cover, "A Magazine of Independent Opinions." What kind of meaning do you attach to these words?

[Timofeyev] Well, you've seen the magazine, and you've noticed that our editorial office firmly declares its non-party affiliation. And that is what independence is. We, that is, those who appear in print with us, appeal to the public consciousness as a whole, and not at all to this or that politicized grouping or to some kind of trend in social thought. We are neither creating pamphlets nor slogans. We are opposed to speechifying—understand? We ourselves are learning to think, and we do think. And if someone thinks the way we do—that's fine. That means the process is normal.

It seems to me the need for such a magazine as our REFERENDUM is very great. Of course, with time it will die down. But not before Russian society learns to be non-party people; not until an atmosphere of democratic freedoms triumphs in the country.

[Korolkova] Are not independent opinions necessarily in opposition? I ask about this, because I have encountered among the unofficial editors the opinion that an independent press is one which opposes the official structure.

[Timofeyev] Opposition? Oh no. That is politics already. I can designate only one thing, with which we are undoubtedly in opposition. We are in opposition to that ideology of revolutionary violence which was created by the Soviet state that has existed until just recently. I say: "until just recently," because with the election of the President, Soviet rule ended, and presidential rule has begun. At the very same time we are especially devoted to polemical opinions. Take, for example, the 1-15 March issue, in which materials were printed under the combined heading, "Two Views on Gorbachev." Each of

the authors adheres to a point of view diametrically opposite his opponent. Such an approach is important to us.

I would like to stress once again: right now is a time of sharp political skirmishes. Of course, they are inevitable. But the fact of the matter is, that while understanding their inevitability, and perhaps even becoming involved in the political struggle in our other social roles, we nevertheless believe that this is only a part of life; that even in the position of someone from the political opposition there is a grain of truth. All the more so, one must not assert that some kind of single party possesses the whole truth. In this sense Andrey Dmitrievich Sakharov was an amazing, unique person. He was able to maintain his moral independence in any situation. No one is able to do this any longer. But we—are trying.

[Korolkova] I've leafed through REFERENDUM with interest, especially such sections as, "On the Other Side of Glasnost," "According to Analysis by Specialists," or "Chervonets." And now new ones have appeared—"The Epoch and the Individual" and "Symbols of the Times." There are commentary, reviews, rejoinders, and even poems and astrological forecasts... I must admit that much of what is said in the pages of the magazine does not impress me personally; although, of course, far from everything. But you see it seemed to me that your authors are not all that much removed from what is going on around them; sooner the other way around. The ironic intonation, that's OK, but you see one also encounters unparliamentary expressions.

[Timofeyev] We do have certain general philosophical, general political, and general historical sympathies, and we do not conceal them. And we perform our analysis on the basis of these very sympathies or antipathies. We sympathise with all processes of reform and liberation. And, on the other hand, we speak out decisively against the forces striving to restrain or distort this process, or move it in the direction of coercion. But at the very same time, while adhering to general sympathies for democracy, for freedom of market relationships, for religious spirituality—we, I repeat, are not at all hesitant about nominating our own candidate for deputy to the Supreme Soviet, or trying to achieve some kind of power within the rayon or city, as many are now doing. It is enough for us if we achieve power in the minds of that portion of the populace that reads us.

[Korolkova] To whom is REFERENDUM oriented?

[Timofeyev] From the very beginning we have been addressing the qualified reader.

[Korolkova] To the intelligentsia?

[Timofeyev] I think that here it would be more appropriate to use the term "intellectual," which is accepted abroad; that is, a person who tends to take a rational approach to actuality, and thinks independently. Incidentally, judging from the letters—and they come in to the editors' every day—not only intellectuals read us. On

the whole our audience has developed a great deal and has grown wiser of late... All our authors—economists, psychologists, cultural specialists, and representatives of other areas—all are people who write professionally. This has become our principle: to collect readers around "names," around sufficiently well-known specialists, whose opinion must be considered. If, for example, material on the Church is needed, then it will be prepared by Georgiy Edelshteyn, a priest, candidate of philosophical sciences, expert on Medieval literature and, naturally, on church problems. At the very same time this is a rural priest from a remote parish in Kostroma Eparchy [diocese], thus, he is not acquainted with life by hearsay. We immediately oriented ourselves on names and, as it turns out, were right on the mark. Interest in the magazine sprang up immediately, in spite of the fact that for quite a long time its circulation did not exceed 2,000 copies. It was hard to achieve more; after all, the editorial office consisted of five or six people equipped with a personal computer, printers and a xerox...

[Korolkova] Do you have a lot of readers?

[Timofeyev] REFERENDUM has the capacity for self-distribution, which is in general characteristic of samizdat literature. For example, the issue with the article about Lenin's Mausoleum as a socio-cultural phenomenon enjoyed special demand. It was reprinted on duplicating machines, spread in recorded form on computer diskettes, and was photo-copied... According to our estimate a realistic estimate of this issue is up to 10,000 copies. And well, the number of readers is, I think up to 100,000, because copies have been found in unofficial public libraries. What's more, RUSSKAYA MYSL [Russian Thought] willingly republishes our material, and many articles are reproduced by the foreign radio-voices—now, you see, they are no longer being jammed.

[Korolkova] How much did the magazine cost? I, I must admit, almost came to ruin over samizdat literature, buying it when I could on the streets or in the Metro.

[Timofeyev] We did not sell REFERENDUM; we distributed it free of charge at various meetings and conferences.

[Korolkova] But, excuse me, by just what means was the magazine published?

[Timofeyev] On the basis of readers' donations. The editorial office had a philanthropic fund. Contributions coming in ranged widely: from three and ten rubles at a time up to a thousand. At the same time a curious incident took place. One night a guy called me at 4:00 AM and said: "You know, I'm afraid to call during the day. I work at a cemetery, and I have loads of easy money. I, of course, know the immorality of this money, but what can I do with it—you can't spend it all on drink you know!" I had to advise the comrade to send the money to the fund to aid political prisoners...

Contributions came in to the editorial office steadily, and they were sufficient. Incidentally, the contributions are to a certain extent an evaluation of our work. Here, if you please, is a money-order: "Samizdat is a part of the everyday life of millions. But in all that mass of publications, you are remembered for your weightiness, your in-depth analysis of problems, your constructiveness and at the same time your boldness."

[Korolkova] And so, from the very beginning you've been set up in grand style. But there was, after all, judging from the publication dates, a gap in the work of the editorial office, was there not?

[Timofeyev] There was a gap. By the spring of last year we had begun to grow weary. On the one hand, because of our limited technical capabilities, and on the other—and here of course is the basic reason—it began to seem to us as if the process of democratization and glasnost had gone through the country so swiftly, that there would not be anything for the editorial office to do. We had placed especially high hopes in the rise of a parliamentary opposition. After last year's March elections, when people showed up at the Congress of People's Deputies whom we fully trust, we had hoped that they would also take upon themselves our functions, and we would have an opportunity to engage in something else—science or literary work. I, you see, even commenced a large project on the creativity of Varlam Shalamov... But then it turned out that our place in commentary had not been taken. I do not want to cast aspersions on anyone; there is probably an historical logic in this; but the content of current political life once again became the party struggle. Who then could provide a non-party, if you will, non-party analysis of the situation in these conditions if not we? In addition, an opportunity appeared for us to renovate the magazine on a completely different organizational and polygraphic basis, and we took advantage of it. This spring, REFERENDUM took on new life, and two of its issues came off the presses in industrial fashion.

[Korolkova] Probably no longer free-of-charge?

[Timofeyev] The price of the magazine is one ruble: we are operating on a cost-accounting basis. Receipts from the 50,000-copy circulation go to printing expenses, to payment of a trade discount (We've concluded an agreement with one of the stores in the Soyuzpechat system), and for paying the employees' wages.

[Korolkova] Has the editorial office expanded?

[Timofeyev] There are now 16 people on the staff; nevertheless we want to come out twice a month with a two-page publisher's accounting sheet.

[Korolkova] And have the [wage] rates been determined?

[Timofeyev] The rates too.

[Korolkova] What kind, if it's not a secret?

[Timofeyev] They are higher than for ordinary Soviet publications, especially for our leading employees.

[Korolkova] And who would the leading employees be? Introduce them, please.

[Timofeyev] Basically they are the ones who were there at the founding of REFERENDUM: economist and commentator Larisa Piyasheva; economist, commentator and political scientist Boris Pinsker; sociologist, cultural specialist and journalist Larisa Lisyutkina; Minsk writer Yevgeniy Budinas; and literary critic Sergey Yakovlev...

[Korolkova] Are the honoraria large?

[Timofeyev] We try to pay more. We pay individually and by the piece. Journalists in whose creativity we are very interested are paid a lot. I'll not say just how much; let that be our commercial secret, but—a lot. After all, we cannot guarantee our employees the same working conditions as an ordinary editorial office provides. We have no facilities; to this day we are working out of apartments, and this makes it difficult—the family, children and all that. We have to compensate for the inconvenience somehow. But in general, the periodical press and publishing activity has to be a commercial activity. It must justify itself, and it must produce an income. That is the way it occurs throughout the world; or else it is fated for collapse, or dependence, which is one and the same thing. We believe that without private ownership one cannot speak about freedom of speech.

[Korolkova] Under such conditions, is there not a danger of exploitation of the journalists' labor; will not your own Hearsts appear?

[Timofeyev] Well, you know, no Hearst would be able to exploit journalists more than the official press organs do. If someone among your colleagues received the wages that he could get from Hearst, I am certain he would consider himself much more free: both politically and professionally.

[Korolkova] Well, it seems that REFERENDUM is able to stand on its own two feet.

[Timofeyev] You seem to have the impression that everything is fine with us. The fact of the matter is, that is not so. The near-term fate of the magazine is extremely problematic. Moreover, I do not know how long we will be able to hang on. You see, the magazine is registered in Lithuania, and for the time being one does not make forecasts on the relations between the Soviet Union and Lithuania.

[Korolkova] When the Law on the Press goes into effect, it will be possible to register here, in Moscow.

[Timofeyev] We have high hopes for that; that the Law will give us a more solid basis for existence. But for now our future is unclear. For now we are forced to search for some kind of roundabout way for contacts with printing facilities; we need to seek special opportunities to

acquire paper, and undertake altogether unnecessary and artful activities in order to get around bureaucratic bans and obstacles. Therefore, while we, as all other unofficial publications which have begun, in your words, to stand on our own feet, need the protection of the public—the journalistic public above all. But I can find no kind words to say about them. When I was arrested, the first thing that happened was—I was immediately expelled from the Union of Journalists. Even before the investigation; long before the trial; and before I was found guilty. I do not think that one can call such a position honorable, from a professional organization that is supposed to defend its own members. It is true, I do not know how the present leadership of the Union relates to such problems today...

[Korolkova] A great deal has changed. That topic was just discussed in ZHURNALIST. We trust that our creative Union will not let the unofficial publications go unnoticed. By the way, how do you rate their general level? That is, so to speak, as ideological activity or as something close to professional work?

[Timofeyev] I sense a certain amount of contempt in your words. That's not necessary: ideological, as you put it. And samizdat—that is a manifestation of the sociopolitical initiative of people seeking an opportunity to speak out. In the West, a newspaper is published in practically every city block or rural community; every church parish publishes a pamphlet; and there are even special computer programs with the help of which it can be put together properly. As for the level... Quite a few home-made press organs have appeared, very interesting and useful ones. Take Aleksandr Podrabinek's EKSPRESS-KHRONIKA. It is very well-informed, well-organized, and has a high reputation not only here but abroad as well. And so something is happening with the samizdat press: it is becoming commercially viable. Some things from REFERENDUM, by the way, are being reprinted in certain of the central publications—MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI, Riga's RODNIK, and even the magazine MOLODOY KOMMUNIST.

[Korolkova] And one last question. What is your attitude toward the official [formalnaya] press? What, in your opinion, would prevent them from imitating samizdat?

[Timofeyev] I have a very good attitude toward the open press. And I do not consider it the "official" press, because I am acquainted with many of the people who work at magazines and newspapers that are subject to censorship, and I know that all that these people can do, they do. And my wish for all of us, for the entire corps of journalists, is that the Law on the Press would go into effect sooner; a law that will liberate all publications—some from censorship, and others from uncertainty and poor organization. And then the employees of these publications, I assure you, will do everything, under the new conditions, to create the finest examples of freedom of speech in the world.

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NOVYY MIR Publishing Plans Reported

90UN2145A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 24, 13 Jun 90 p 7

[Report by Andrey Vasilevskiy, senior secretary of NOVYY MIR: "NOVYY MIR: What We Still Haven't Read"]

[Text] Readers ask us with concern: Is it true that NOVYY MIR has been closed (as it was put in the magazine's editorial board's release for participants in the 24 May 1990 press conference)?

Could we ever have anticipated, having overcome in the last year virulent opposition at every possible level and having published Grigoriy Medvedev's "Chernobyl Notebook," Sergey Kaledin's "Stroybat," and most important, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's "GULAG Archipelago," what the immediate future had in store for us? It seemed as though all the worst was behind. . . .

And in truth, right now virtually everything has been resolved for NOVYY MIR. We are working with complete freedom (no problems), but now we have no paper, and we don't envision getting any, and the same goes for our printing facilities, although the magazine is highly profitable (to put it mildly) and the money is paid in advance.

An utterly paradoxical situation has come about. NOVYY MIR can allow itself just about anything at all, with the exception of one small thing: participation in literary and public life as a normal monthly magazine, as its subscribers would like to see it.

We have been excluded from the process. There is no us. And at the same time there is. We are already working on the September issue, without being certain that it will reach the reader at all—if only next year.

In this respect LG's gracious offer to tell our readers what precisely they ought to have been reading on the pages of NOVYY MIR in April and May of this year is especially important for us.

When this issue of LG goes to press, even the March issue won't be fully printed, but a significant portion of our subscribers will still get it and be able to read both S. Averintsev's poem "Annunciation," and M. Kurayev's story "A Small Family Secret," the stories of Grigoriy Medvedev (about dying irradiated nuclear workers) and of Irina Yemelyanova (about our country's "prisoners of conscience" who have maintained their conscience and faith in prison), the notebooks of Khodasevich, the poems of Ivan Elagin, S. Mikhoels's daughters' reminiscences of her father, and a pointedly topical chapter from A. Avtorkhanov's book on the origins of the partocracy.

As for the April issue of NOVYY MIR (which is just now starting to be printed in Kiev), I would like to share four outstanding publications from it.

Unfortunately, up until now we have not known much of the work of Nobel laureate Saul Bellow. "Catch the Moment" (translated from the English by Ye. Surits) is an early (1956) story of his which presents the reader with a simply very good prosaist without pretending to become the literary sensation of the year. I think, though, that it will afford pleasure to readers who are tired of all the historical revelations and eschatological prophecies.

However, even the most politically weary reader cannot remain indifferent to the important work by Aleksandr Tsipko, who poses the question, "Are our principles sound?" (the title of the article) and confidently replies: no, they're not. "We thought we were linking our destiny to a great truth, but it turned out that we had put our trust in an intellectual fantasy that was doomed never to be embodied in the flesh and blood of human life," writes the author, who appeals for the total surmounting of all "Marxist dogmatism." Aleksandr Tsipko "investigates" the role of the classics of Marxism in our present-day misfortunes, affirming the "criminal" (his term) nature of the teaching on revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is entirely likely that his thoughts will prove utterly unacceptable to some of our readers, but for the rest of our subscribers, by the time the magazine reaches them, all of Tsipko's harsh words will have become commonplace.

We encounter an equally blatant rejection of revolutionary radicalism (but on a much higher philosophical level) in the selection of articles by the well-known Russian thinker Semen Lyudvigovich Frank (1877-1950) under the overall title "On the Other Side of 'Right' and 'Left.'" Not only does the title sound topical today, the entire selection (like other materials in NOVYY MIR's "From the History of Russian Social Thought" section) is composed as a sharp polemic on the essential issues of our life.

In 1988, NOVYY MIR published an article by Marietta Chudakova, "Without Anger or Bias: Forms and Deformations in the Literary Process of the 1920s to 1930s." Now Chudakova continues her discussion of the survival of a literature deformed under a totalitarian press in her article "Through the Stars to the Thorns: The Shift in Literary Types." She analyzes in detail texts by Arkadiy Gaydar and Boris Zhirkov. The selection might seem odd, but it is perfectly justified, as the readers themselves will be convinced; the third subject of her article—Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn—will not be surprising.

In the 5th, May, issue of our magazine, we complete the publication of Solzhenitsyn's novel "The First Circle" (Nos 1-5); upcoming are "Cancer Ward" (Nos 6-8) and "The Calf Butted the Oak" (scheduled for later in the year). We are keeping our word.

"Notes from the War Years," by Mariya Stepanovna Voloshina, keeper of the house and legacy of the famous poet, is about the German occupation of the Crimea. Unique too are the comments of Anna Andreyevna Akhmatova about Nikolay Gumilyev. Perhaps less sensational but, in my opinion, extremely interesting is the hitherto unknown text by Boris Pasternak entitled "2nd Scene, Petersburg," a fragment of a story whose title has been lost.

The reader may be surprised that I speak more about the "legacy" than about contemporary literature, which naturally is present in our magazine (to suit various tastes—Vyacheslav Pyetsukh, Ivan Yevseyenko, the poets of the war generation, Olga Sedakova . . .), but the texts by Boris Pasternak, Anna Akhmatova, and M. S. Voloshina published in the 5th issue have an unconditional value; they lose nothing from waiting to meet the reader, whereas the long-waiting reader does.

How long must he wait?

URAL Editor Defends Publication Policy

90UN2028A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 June 90
Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Valentin Lukyanin, the chief editor of the journal URAL in Sverdlovsk: "Concerning Tickets in Literature and Censorship regarded as a Necessity"]

[Text] All the "thick" journals in the nation, and first of all the regional journals, like our journal URAL were created in their time in order to serve as instruments for conducting government politics in the sphere of literature. And to speak more plainly, as instruments for strengthening the conformity of thought.

One is no longer summoned now, "put on the spot" for making an artistic "slip up"; one is not ordered to "reflect" and "praise" the non-existent successes—it would seem that no one and nothing interferes with the manner in which the editorial board members put together a journal, what their personal taste, professional experience, and civic temperament prompts them to do. It would seem so...

Actually, our possibilities have widened a bit. The practice of giving instructions from above has been abolished; however, the decades old system of relations, which has fallen aside, continues to function, tenaciously holding back potential disturbers of the regimented literary order, an order based on a framework of old principles and representations, which is destroying the living soul of literature, as it is said, without signs of external force.

To write, not losing heart in the territory of your own theme, your own tone, your own literary technique, to agree that it has somehow become easier and more comfortable—is this wise or not, that new generic forms, which have combined an emotionally paltry outline with a documentary-like, unauthentic novella or novel, have

been gradually taken up again by writers, and are accepted by the reader as standard generic forms; from the point of view of the writer and reader, this is certainly preventing a search for alternate paths in literature.

Here is in its entirety an ordinary commonplace collision of our time. A writer comes into an editorial room—an author of ten books of prose, in which the plots and the characters are "taken directly from life"; one wonders whether these authentic names have really been substituted by invented ones. He brings the draft of a new, eleventh book—and again everything in it is authentic (in the sense of not being invented); but once again, as in the past—the work is standard fare, stereotyped, for it lacks the pathos of dedicated, personal, and meaningful thinking. This writer, of course, is a well read person; he has Platonov and Marquez in his bookcase at home. But he is convinced that the experience of world literature does not relate to him personally; moreover, he really knows life; he has a knowledge of life itself ("unasked for [knowledge]"), which is what the critics taught him to have, but his much older writing colleagues free him from the need of "attracting" the reader by means of formal research.

Now imagine yourself in the place of an editor and try to find the arguments that would convince an author that the profession which he has served with faith and integrity for many years and in which he has attained recognition in, in the capacity of a qualified professional, must be practiced nowadays somehow differently, in some type of manner which contradicts even his personal experience... Moreover, this author is convinced that he has his own "ticket" to our journal—according to the bureaucratic and regional practice. I admit, we are looking for compromises, trying with all our powers to provide support for a work that has viability, for a work which shows, if only, a glimmer of a new way of looking at the world. Is this what must be done? This is not a simple question.

Having given the younger authors freedom, at the same time it has been decided to publish works of a standard level—"The Gift" and "Under the Sign of Illegitimate Ones" by V. Nabokov; "Sivtsev Vrazhek" by M. Osorgin; "Shosha" by the Nobel Prize Laureate, A. B. Singer and "America" by F. Kafka are next in line... And again independent censorship flares up: the attention of regional literature is being devoted [to this publishing venture] in the name of commercialism. Who would say that our "tickets" to engage in artistic creativity would be torn away from us?

Concerning the phenomena of commercialism—there is much which is not clearly understood. As far as we have been able to establish, last year's subscription edition for Nabokov's "Gift" grew by thousands, requiring three printings—such a printing generally has 100,000 copies. And can the reader be attracted, satiated, as he is by the journal-book hits of the last two-three years, by names, which he has not even heard of before? And this is

exactly how the matter stood with V. Serzhem and M. Osorgin, when we were talking about preparing their works for publication. Readers hardly know anything about A. B. Singer, whose novel will undoubtedly become the most significant publishing event this year.

In the past, we did not even exploit the big names, preferring to play the role of the initial discoverers and perhaps rather self-confidently assuming that in time our reader will believe in the journal, that he will learn to value our selection. The path to such trust is difficult, but, it seems to me, it is the only interesting and productive path; in any event, our collective is convinced of this.

That is why, incidentally, we are firmly resting our hopes on the youth's artistic growth—on youths that are not burdened by negative social experience, not harassed by stereotypes, and who are at all times accustomed to value literature for the sake of literature. We are convinced that only those writers with talent, who have their own point of view and style, should have an "ticket" to a journal. The readers' censorship in the form of their unwillingness to accept new writers and literature has forced us to cover up the hardly uncovered layer of non-standard literature. But we held our ground, and since last year, once or twice in a quarter, we began to print and provide a haven to those writers who are different and unrecognized within regular issues—a journal in a journal, TEKST. Two streams of literature have flowed in one channel, without merging. And two hardly separated by any distance, reader's "lecture halls"—each without any hesitation, convinced of their correctness!—curse today's editors for inconsistent politics and for being burdened by what they call "anti-literature". But what can you instruct us to do, if for the entire enormous Ural area—with six large oblasts and two autonomous republics—there exists only one "thick" journal in the Russian language?

However, the aesthetic discord—this, as it is said, is peanuts in comparison with the differences in ideas. The central journals are free to lead their literary cohorts, with their mutual insults and prejudices to various sides of the barricades. When just one of the regional journals tries to pull "true patriots" or "true democrats" into its camp, we perceive this as an order to separate writers into "ours" and "not-ours", writers, who have grown up, one can say, by URAL and in helping URAL to grow. Besides this, this would mean admittedly creating unequal conditions for competitors in the artistic plan. Naturally, our first awakenings were dictated to us by a moral feeling—not to allow oneself to get pulled into the fray, to preserve a rational sense of neutrality. Nowadays, it becomes constantly more difficult to maintain such a position.

First of all, in the argument, which has outgrown the level of groups' differences of opinion already long ago, which has been constantly touching on the issues of the civic honor and the conscience of each of us—to have remained silent in this argument would have been

unseemly. Second of all, the readers are already demanding something. During one, recent meeting I attended, I was called on to answer a question publicly—but why, it's being said, you, URAL, do not reorganize yourself, do not become like NASH SOVREMENNİK and MOLODAYA GVARDIYA? And a fresh breeze blew—I recalled the incandescent hall of the 6th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Union of Writers of the RSFSR, during which writers were stigmatized as "apostates", in the hope that after such exemplary criticism one had to suppose these writers would again return to their way of thinking in fraternal conformity...

Trying to find our path, we more often continue to sense storm clouds looming over our heads, the pressure from the repressiveness of the government literary structure, one in which thousands of adherents were raised for long years to conform in their manner of thinking. Our shepherd, the Russian Writer's Secretary, is also not inclined to stand on ceremony with the artistic competition of various groups with different views.

In the overly long speech of Yu. Bondarev at the 7th Plenum of the Executive Board of SP [the Union of Writers] of the RSFSR, a dilemma was in fact put before us: either to become a part of the "bastions of honest publishing that number in the few" or to dissolve in the current of the "extremist, narrow-minded, press." By the way, the possibility itself of such an "either-or" dilemma - -this, I admit, is my invention. The fruit of my unexpressed liberalism. Yu. Bondarev himself does not have any hesitations: "We tolerate pluralism for a time, while we are well fed, clothed, sitting in warmth, enjoying ourselves with word games, while we have not yet stopped short of the edge of an abyss feeling a deathly chill in our soul." Understandably, this bourgeois luxury is not for us; therefore, this is why in the decisions of the 7th Plenum we are instructed to condemn the heretical journal APREL, for printing the well known "The Russian writers' letter," and in general to love Russia the way Yu. Bondarev, V. Belov, T. Glushkov love her, not allowing for any dissenting independence.

I have yet another modification of literary censorship to offer to you—a censorship of one's spiritual inclination, and it is right here: the humble oblast literature is burdened with such censorship; it fulfills its orders in strict conformity with instructions that have been sent to us beforehand. (By the way, our curator from the oblast came to say farewell to us; saying, if you prefer to, come to ask for advice—some type of secrets will remain). Here [in Sverdlovsk] we have no instructions. But instead we do have the unpredictable feeling of the "true patriot"—an analogue to the former "class feeling." A feeling which is the all the more implacable, because it heats up in every event in which there is a more or less distinct awareness of the ties between what has taken shape and the dreamily recollected time of systematic relations in the artistic union, and of a firmness of one's own personal position in regard to literature and society. And the foundation of this system is unhesitating conformity.

Observing in the passage of recent years, how apologies have increased exponentially, averting a deadly incandescent explosion, how animosity arises among small groups after publication of each succeeding issue of NASH SOVREMENNİK or OGONEK, how constantly, more often from one incident to the next an atmosphere of enmity and intolerance flared up at the writers' meetings, how people changed, becoming suspicious and aggressive, some of whom are familiar literary figures, who yesterday were still thoughtful, intelligent people—having observed all this, I gradually begin to consider the inevitability of a split. Or as D. Zhukhov said at one of the recent Russian writers' plenums: "If there will be a terror, if there will be a civil war -- we should be ready for it."

Well now, if it's war, then it's war, and already now an opposition literary-political party—I have in mind the devoted "true patriots" public anathema of APREL—is calling its supporters to a founding all-Union meeting, not hiding their intention to leave the unpleasant guardianship of the monopolistic holders of the ideational-aesthetic truths of the SP USSR.

Well good, the Russian Writer's Union will be cleansed of people, who have different views; the journal APREL will not be dependent on the Union's support. And to which shore can you order the regional journal to harbor (be it URAL, VOLGA, DON, or any other regional journal), which, I repeat, is the only one in its region? Can the issue be decided in the general elections in the writer's organizations. Or can one try to sit on the fence, bringing down on oneself the embittered fire from both sides? The situation appears as if there is no way out, but in my view there is nevertheless a way out.

It is no secret that the sharpness of today's literary battles stems not only from the disagreement over issues of the political restructuring of society, but also from irresponsibility of literary organizations in responding to today's political realities. The structure of our literary organizations, including in this number all the active publishers, is based on the ideational-aesthetic monopoly, and simply does not allow for the coexistence of artistic movements and groups that are different from one another. In the pluralistic conditions which have been created—and we have nowhere else to turn without them!—as the movements and groups begin to take form, they are inevitably perceived as if they were dragging one another out of the same political "cells." Thus from the above doesn't the conclusion follow that we need perestroika based on democratic principles for our entire literary industry?

At the foundation of it, in my view, one can consider two simple moral commandments: do not rush to show your differing thoughts to your enemy—it may happen to be the case that he is closer to the truth, than you are. And do not run violently struggle with people with different views—an idea can only be defeated by an idea.

Is there a danger of a split? In what way does it, exactly, threaten our literature? Perhaps, a writer X, separated from writer Y on an organizational basis, will find it harder to write his novel? And perhaps, the matter lies in something else: someone from this pair will appear as a follower of writer Z, not having known the blessed directions to aspire higher things; will he become lost in the ideational-aesthetic and class-nationalist thickets of the present day?

To speak honestly, I do not see any disaster in the fact that in Leningrad there will not be one writer's organization, but two. In the same vein, nothing terrible will happen in the event that alongside the already existing APREL, some other journal will appear, NOYABR, or DEKABR—though only if they were created not in order to conduct militant actions from cover to cover, but in order to stimulate creative exchange or in order to set up joint publishers' actions.

Without any doubt, moral admonitions are never accepted by hostile, opposing sides. This is why I regard "peaceful coexistence" as a decisive provision we need in order to set up organizational and material conditions such that one or another side will not feel the need to fight for something and to pressure someone for something. And this will become possible when both sides will receive the right to establish their own publishing houses and journals—that is why there is an urgent need for a law concerning publication. The concept itself of a group would in such an instance lose its frightening, aggressive meaning. True, then the participants would in any event have to demonstrate the merits of their artistic and civic position with concrete, artistic products—this process would replace the intrigue and the reciprocal accusations; and the "convertible currency" of true talent and artistic mastery would return to our midst.

Director Details Ukrainian News Agency Changes
[90US1082A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 22 May 90 p 3]

[Article by V. Burlay, director of the Ukrainian Information Agency: "Following An Event: RATAU Changes Its Name"]

[Text] The Council of Ministers of the republic accepted the resolution concerning changing the name of the Radio and Telegraph Agency of the Ukraine affiliated with the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR (RATAU). From now on, this agency will be known as the Ukrainian Information Agency affiliated with the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR (abbreviated as UKRIN-FORM).

This resolution is called for, because the preceding name of the agency became obsolete. The agency had this name since April 27, 1921, when the Presidium of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee Council responding to the republic's information service's new tasks, passed [a bill] to change the name of UkROSTA [no further expansion] to RATAU. Understandably,

during the time which has passed—almost seven decades—there were quite a few changes in this service. Specifically, the district newspapers of the republic stopped getting information by means of a slowly dictated text provided by radio stations, and therefore the word "radio" in the agency's name was no longer appropriate under the new conditions. In recent times, out of all the republic agencies, only RATAU had it in its name. To a certain extent the word "telegraphic" has also become obsolete, insofar as in the agency, as well as in the entire system TASS [Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union], in recent years, a shift is being carried out, to use an electronic method of broadcasting information.

Designating the republic agency with a new name, came about not because of the way it transmitted its information, which, naturally, cannot but change in accordance to scientific-technical progress from time to time, but because of the nature of production itself, that is, of information. This, in our view, makes the name of the agency comprehensible without additional explanations. It should be said that nowadays the name of a number of other republic agencies are constructed in just the same manner—GRUZINFORM, AZERINFORM, LATINFORM, TURKMENINFORM.

One would want, however, to emphasize that changing the name of the agency is not the most important thing. It is immeasurably more important to change the character of its activity, to bring about a change in the content and style of the information flow in accordance to the demands made at the current stage of society's development.

Naturally, in recent years, the agency did not stand still. First of all, the spheres of information have significantly widened; a lot of "forbidden" themes and subjects have disappeared. Chernobyl spoke here, without doubt, its weighty word. Today, I think, what was done four years ago would be impossible to do now; our agency, for example, was the first one to have received access to the "subject" on the fourteenth day after the catastrophe, and the result of this was only a photograph of the ruined block. After Chernobyl, there were an uncounted number of publications dedicated to it; the journalists of RATAU, in particular, prepared hundreds of materials, which were widely used by the home and foreign press. But the first bulletins about the event were late and incomplete.

An end was also put to a phenomenon which existed from the times of the cult of the individual, when things were often seen through rosy colored glasses in the information agencies' publications. Now there is a profound searching look taking place into the agencies' publications, into their problematical-critical origins; the sharpness of life's situations has begun to find an objective reflection.

However, the main changes lie ahead. We, like other branches of mass communications, need to learn how to work in the conditions of the republic's political and

economic independence, in the conditions of a multi-party system, in the conditions of the operating law concerning the press and so on.

There are serious problems, which are being left unsolved. For example, at newspaper editorial offices, as in the past, an excessively large, disproportional to the newspapers' capacity, number of official materials floods the newspapers—a flood of material, that is not under the control of the information agencies. Moreover, the extent of the official information has a tendency keep growing. In my view, this is explained by several circumstances. First of all, due to the activity of the nation's current, dynamic leadership, there is a consequent need to keep up the constant, high volume of such special information. Secondly, the demands of glasnost have led to an unforeseen increase in the size of reports about various meetings. Even a brief abridgement of the texts of the lectures and speeches would be accepted by the speakers, and sometimes by the public, as an excision of the truth and critics' pressure. The central, and following it, the republic and district press, carry out a very precise, and also complete reproduction of lectures and speeches. Thirdly, in striving to "uncover all secrets," in striving for a more complete demonstration of their activity, many organizations have established in recent times their own press services, which also prepare quite a few news items.

One cannot say that these materials are not needed. But they are really going, as a rule, to one party, intended for the same ill-fated four pages (abroad, the newspapers are printed with 12-16 and more pages), which the newspaper has. Because they are overloaded with official organ news, newspapers do not have the possibilities to show the local life as they should. In addition to this, far too often, the reader sees the same material in the central and in the republic and in the oblast publications. And this uniformity, tediousness, and excess of propaganda is capable of sooner yielding the opposite results, to provoke the people's aversion and irritation.

It is paradoxical, but not only are the newspapers suffering, but so also are the participating informational agencies themselves from the excess of official organ news. Yet besides the official news items that the information agencies pass on to the press organs, as do all the agencies in the world, they also pass on needed information from the economic, social, political, cultural spheres of the society, and also views, interviews and other materials on important and relevant themes. The idea should not be excluded, that newspapers would willingly use this information, but as it is, there is not enough space for their own news. As a result—significant amount of valuable information perishes, and our reporters experience a moral trauma, because unpublished work is a journalist's most painful experience.

I hope that the changes in the structure of the press, which are expected, will encourage a more rational distribution of official information among publications in accordance with their task. Along with this, a need will

clearly arise for a greater variety of approaches to preparing unofficial information for various categories of newspapers, in particular, for the newly established soviet professional organizations and other publications.

It is not secret, that the administrative-command style of life led to, in particular, in the past, to a singular monopoly on information, its limited presentation. At informational agencies, against their will, an alteration of their manner of presenting literally all events, including also in this number those of local significance, was taking place. It came to the point that RATAU was given a prepared report about the plenum of the Kiev District Party for the Kievan district newspapers. In this, there was no common sense. We are happy that today newspapers are more independent in their choice of themes and subjects, that relying on the information agencies, they are publishing more of their own publications about events, which were not reported on in the past. To those, who would want to blame the agency in monopolizing information, I could decisively answer: our collective in no way aspires to such a monopoly; it is a convinced opponent.

A serious problem is the development of our own agency's foreign ties. A year and a half ago, I travelled to Warsaw, where we met with the President of PAP signed an agreement concerning the direct exchange of information. An informational newsletter about the life of the republic, which until now has been given to the progressive, Ukrainian newspapers of USA and Canada, beginning this year is being sent by mail for Ukrainians in Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia to take advantage of it. Now the possibility of spreading such information among publications of Ukrainians in diaspora is being studied; materials of an economic nature for active business circles in foreign nations is also being prepared.

In recent time, journalists from RATAU began to accompany the republic leaders in their travels abroad; this occurred, for instance, during the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, V. A. Masol's travels to the FRG. Now we have our own correspondent abroad in New York. Talks have begun concerning the establishment of a similar post in Canada, where there are especially a lot of citizens of Ukrainian descent. We hope, that the development of diplomatic foreign service of Ukraine will give us a chance to also accordingly develop the agency's network of correspondents.

And in the republic our ties should become wider. We regard it is necessary to prepare effective informational marketing [techniques], to constantly learn the newspapers' demands—ranging from republic to district newspapers to those with a high circulation—to more often prepare materials as the newspapers would like it to be prepared and to prepare materials for direct orders. However, not only newspaper editorial boards should be our customers. We plan, to say, create a newsletter THE BUSINESSMAN'S WORLD, proposing to circulate it to manufacturing unions, firms and organizations, as a an

operational reference handbook about current events associated with the introduction of methods of progressive economic activity, as an advisor in question of law, as a helper in listing advertisements. Together with the Institute of Language of the AN Ukrainian SSR, we plan to regularly publish an organizational newsletter for firms and businesses, which would deal with issues involved in the shift to using the Ukrainian language in business (to give, for example, models of contracts and orders and other typical documents), in this manner helping to implement The Law regarding the language of the Ukrainian SSR.

We also dream about having our own newspaper, which would give the freshest and the most varied information that people would find useful; we are dreaming of having a photo journal, which would interest not only photo-journalists, but also the mass reader in Ukraine. We regard it as unjust that in comparison to other, even to smaller, foreign news agencies, we still do not have any of our own publications and are still completely dependent on the publishers' will, when as regards publication of this or that material.

Today the Ukrainian Information Agency contributes to almost one-fifth of the total amount of information produced by all the republic agencies and the subdivisions of TASS, which is prepared for presses at home and abroad. In Ukraine, 1,200 organizations, including in this number 970 editorial boards from newspapers, subscribe to our information services. By virtue of its extent of information and the number of its orders, UKRINFORM can be put alongside fairly large, foreign national agencies. In our informational work, we are striving to get rid of stereotypes from the past, though, to speak plainly, at times, to do so is not so simple. We are striving to make our information objective, competent and varied, reflective of everything that is most significant and the most commonplace, which is taking place in our republic.

Tikhomirov Details '7 Days' TV Program Affair

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[Interview with People's Deputy of the RSFSR Aleksandr Tikhomirov, political commentator for Central Television, by D. Biryukov]

[Text] [Biryukov] I am speaking with you on the eve of the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. You were elected with a majority of votes, but you also disappeared from the television screen. I heard that you were fired and were expelled from the party. In addition, you were struck by a car....

[Tikhomirov] Not just I, but the entire "7 Days" program and all its writers. Under the "steam roller" of that system of command administration, under which television continues to exist. With respect to party membership, I am still a member of the CPSU. What is more, several production teams of the State Committee for

Television and Radio Broadcasting nominated me as a delegate to the 28th congress. And I was not fired from my job. I was just absolutely forbidden to work on the "7 Days" program.

[Biryukov] The group of journalists who created that program recently announced in "Arguments and Facts" that they feel they can no longer work on it precisely because of your removal.

[Tikhomirov] I am grateful to my comrades for their solidarity. I feel a sense of guilt before them. It was in great part because of me that the program, which was conceived by us all and rapidly gained an audience, was cancelled. On the other hand, however, each member of the creative group understands that it is not just a matter of the evaluation of the personal approach of one of the hosts to the material aired. It involves the right of hosts in general to express their own point of view on the events aired.

[Biryukov] According to a public opinion poll "7 Days" gave competition even to "Before and After Midnight" for the number of regular viewers. It is the opinion of the sociologists that the main factor in its success were the hosts, who expressed their own viewpoints.

[Tikhomirov] I totally agree. Anyone who has nothing to say should not appear on the screen at all. And particularly those who attempt to pass off the opinions of others as their own. Both on television and in print every sort of lie is put across. The highest popularity ratings have indeed recently been achieved by programs in which the authors take a bold and independent stance. And we announced at the very beginning that in "7 Days" we would depict life as it actually is and say what we think about it.

[Biryukov] It appears that those who cancelled your program think differently about contemporary life in the nation and abroad. Is that so?

[Tikhomirov] It appears that way. We were accused of not depicting today's reality objectively. The discussion was brought about by a program aired on 28 January of this year, of which I was one of the hosts. It aired on Sunday, and soon thereafter many of the positions taken in "7 Days" were sharply criticized at a session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. We were told this by M.F. Nenashev, chairman of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. I do not know whether the matter of my further participation in the program was decided there, but I am convinced that the opinion of that high-level meeting was taken into account.

[Biryukov] I have had the same sort of situation. I think you will agree with me that a journalist from whom confidence has been withdrawn at such a high level does not feel very comfortable.

[Tikhomirov] Not very. But then I had no doubt that the topics and the commentary on that program—and, incidentally, on previous programs—would not suit certain members and candidate members of the Politburo. In that group of television viewers, as in any other, different, sometimes opposite, opinions exist side by side—and not just about the programs. Although M.F. Nenashev asserts that "7 Days" was unanimously condemned, I do not really believe that.

[Biryukov] Why not?

[Tikhomirov] Let us recall what the discussion was about and compare it with the present....

For one thing, as I continued the topic brought up on the preceding program, I again pointed out to the viewers that it is time, against the background of extensive discussion on the development of internal democracy, to begin publishing the texts of speeches made at plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. I stressed the fact that now, of all times, we have the right to know the position taken by this or that Central Committee member. In order to halt any kind of rumors. Is it possible that everyone at the session unanimously condemned this formulation of the matter?

In the second place, the following question came up in all the meetings of the electors with candidates for deputies, which were held at that time throughout the nation: Why were the salaries of workers in the apparatus raised substantially without first discussing it with the rank and file Communists? This question was prominently posed also in the program. Could everyone at that session have rejected its validity?

In the third place, a considerable part of the "7 Days" program was devoted to the bloody events in Azerbaijan. A meeting to discuss the introduction of troops into Baku was held in Moscow the day before. My desk in the editorial office was piled high with hundreds of telegrams asking: Why is such one-sided information being broadcast on the Baku events? Why do you not report that it was not just soldiers and militants who died in the clashes, but women and children as well? Is it possible that everyone at that session, recalling the recent discussion of the Tbilisi events, could have considered unacceptable the suggestions presented in the program and based on the desire of millions of people? That is, that there be an accurate political assessment of the events which occurred in Azerbaijan, let there be reports in stages on the steps taken to clear up the aftermath and deadlines set for the removal of the troops.

In the fourth place,....

[Biryukov] Excuse me for interrupting.... You apparently want to make a detailed analysis of your program. I recall it fairly clearly, and it does indeed seem to me today, after the passage of 3 months, that much of what was said at that time has now been confirmed and developed, and has even receded into the background to some degree, departed from the field of view, so to speak....

[Tikhomirov] It is therefore all the more annoying to feel guilt for sins which were not committed....

[Biryukov] Forgive me once again. I know that you were also accused of self-promotion, since, although you were running for people's deputy of Russia, you continued to work on television and even delivered reports from the district in which you were running for election.

[Tikhomirov] That happened once. At the very beginning of the election campaign, I gave a report from Kolomna on that same program.... By way of justification, I want to say that thereafter, up to the end of the second round of elections, not once did I appear on television. Incidentally, I am not in full agreement with those who say that the journalist's job, particularly on television, gives one a great advantage in an election campaign. It is true that I was known to a greater number of electors than my opponents. I also had a larger number of people against me from the start, however. Those who did not accept either my stance on the programs or my image as a host.

[Biryukov] Were there many of these in the final count?

[Tikhomirov] A total of 31% of those who voted in the second round. I believe, however, that they included people who had nothing against me but still gave their votes to my opponent for various reasons.

[Biryukov] It would be interesting to know whether you feel that you would have received 69% of the votes had it been known by the time of the voting that the Politburo had withdrawn its trust in you. Or would the number of your supporters have dropped? After all, many people see you not just as a host on that program which caused a sensation, if I may, but also as a television reporter who has accompanied top leaders of the state on trips in recent years.

[Tikhomirov] It is difficult to say. It is doubtful, I believe, that the crucial criterion for assessing a candidate could have been whether he was on Gorbachev's team or was against him. You will recall that it has been asked more than once from the speaker's platform at the Congress of People's Deputies: Whose side are you on, Mikhail Sergeyevich? The President considers this a tactless question. I do not know his opinion of me, or even whether he has an opinion, but I have up to now considered myself to be on his team. I have defended his position personally in the nation, abroad and on "7 Days." Furthermore, it has seemed at times that I had a duty to defend his image on television not just from his foes, but also from his assistants.

[Biryukov] How do you mean? And Why?

[Tikhomirov] Take the foreign trips. I felt and still feel that it is senseless to show on television all the formal meetings and receptions, all of their pomp and circumstance. In Italy, for example, I could literally feel the irritation which the snow-white plumes on the guards' helmets and all the ceremonies with sun-drenched Rome

in the background had to evoke in our viewer. Image our people, who have once again during their day experienced all the inconvenience and poverty of our life, sitting in front of the television set, drinking tea—unsweetened, because all the sugar coupons have been used up. And the television shows a dinner with formal speeches. It was very difficult to convince our directors in charge of airing these visits that we should cut down on such reports.

[Biryukov] Was the question which you asked in Rome, which drew the attention of so many, dictated by your own thoughts? I refer to the time the President chided you.

[Tikhomirov] Yes, I considered it necessary to ask the question to counteract all of the senseless prettiness of our previous reports. Near the Madama Villa, official residence of the Italian government, I asked Mikhail Sergeyevich: "People watching these broadcasts in the Union are probably justified in asking what these meetings in Italy will do for them personally, for their families, are they not"?

[Biryukov] Many of my acquaintances told me it seemed to them that Mikhail Sergeyevich was irritated.

[Tikhomirov] Nonsense! I do not doubt that at that time Gorbachev could already foresee a situation in which the conservatives would hold his stunning popularity in the West against him. And this is what happened soon thereafter, at the next plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. There, at the Madama villa, to be sure, he did not fail to underscore the fact that our people view his trips far more broadly than the significance I put into my question. I was not talking about narrow-mindedness on the part of our people, however, but about a specific perception of televised information. This was because, unfortunately, what is shown on the screen with good intentions very frequently has the opposite effect.

[Biryukov] Is this not just what happened in the case of "7 Days"?

[Tikhomirov] For the vast majority of television viewers, no. Only 2% of 1,000 people polled wanted the Vremya program returned on Sundays. The rest felt that the program is needed, that it reflects the real state of affairs. However, since the 2% included participants in that meeting—some of them, I repeat—their opinion prevailed, as is usually the case here.

[Biryukov] But we have become convinced recently in the process of developing democracy that the opinion of the minority must also be considered, that it is frequently the right one.

[Tikhomirov] Are you serious? If you are joking, then I shall do the same. We could possibly have reached a consensus with that "minority," had they wanted to talk with us. There was no invitation to talk, however. The decision was made to return the Vremya program on Sundays, even though, I am convinced, it was based not

on political motives but on adherence to stereotypes to which we have pledged allegiance. What do I mean by this? The *Vremya* program was always extremely official. Even the setting suggested that the announcers were coming into the homes of the television viewers right from behind the Kremlin stars. So that it was only naturally to assume that what was said was the opinion of the nation's leadership.

And then, at 21:00 on Sunday, Sagalayev, Tikhomirov, Krutov and Slipchenko appeared. Hello out there! And our own feelings and views began to be woven into the pattern of the detailed subject matter of weekly events. The program was a sort of wrap-up of the week. And you know what events we can have in a week. Compressed into a single program, they made an impression and revealed a harsh but honest picture of our reality.

I have to admit that a feeling of nostalgia sometimes awakens in me for the optimism-filled topics of the former *Vremya*. Combines crawling along, oil gushing forth from wells.... And when I worked on the "7 Days" program, I myself constantly looked for sproutings of new and positive things, for positive heroes. Amazingly, though, as soon as I found them, I immediately discovered forces eager to stomp them, to slander and destroy them. Naturally, one would like to see as many comforting things as possible on Sunday evening. But look around. Are there a lot of them today?

An old friend of mine, the general director of an agroindustrial combine, perhaps the best-off of any in the nation, told me: "I was summoned by the secretary of the village Central Committee. He kept me for an hour, and then a second. He kept asking: How are you doing in this area? Well? How about this? OK, I told him. So you have no problems? Yes, I told him. There is one. We do not have enough crates. We have something to pack but nothing to pack it in. He was happy. He kept me another hour. Later, he called me in again and kept me there a long time. Why do you think he did this?"

The director and I wracked our brains for a long time before figuring out that the secretary taking a break, filling up on positive feelings. He is now retired with a pension. Everything is the same on the farm, however.

[Biryukov] Do you really seriously think that it was only their emotions as television viewers which possessed those who made the decision to cancel the program and remove you?

[Tikhomirov] Of course not. I have thought about it constantly and have reached this conclusion. There was a time when a fierce battle was fought on TV and radio over the personas of the reporters. In 1969 the committee was headed by S.G. Lapin, and many leading popular programs were replaced. That of Yuriy Fokin, for example, known to everyone at that time, and art critic Andrey Zolotov. Television reporters on the informational programs also disappeared from the screen. Only the backs of our heads and our ears were visible during interviews. We were turned into microphone stands. We

did not understand at once that this was not just a whim of the new chairman but a considered action. Just prior to that, of course, popular Czechoslovak television hosts had played an important role in events during the Prague Spring. And it proved extremely difficult to silence them. The people believed in them.

In our situation, of course, this was an ordinary matter of playing it safe. It had its effect, however, in the renewal of the freeze following the Khrushchev "thaw." Television became tame, obedient and servile even in carrying out the whims of the leadership at that time. The "brilliant successor" was the main hero. It is both comical and awful to recall the awards ceremonies and other scenes shown us from the halls of the Kremlin....

The level of trust in TV approached zero, however. There was one thing on the screen, something else in life. I am prepared to argue with whomever that all those years the "box" worked against those who managed television in this way. It took revenge for the lies with which it was violated. The ideas pumped through it became an absurdity, a joke.

Can anyone still not understand that trust in television can only be restored through the personas and prestige of the hosts with whom the television viewers regularly communicate, if only one way. And can it not be clear that people are beginning to trust only those who they sense think for themselves and are independent and whose positions have been reached through suffering?

[Biryukov] Suffering in what sense?

[Tikhomirov] In this sense. The last time I spoke with M.F. Nenashev, he asked a question which, it seemed to me, summarized the significance of the entire situation: "You cannot change, can you?" Looking inside myself, I answered "No." And he said: "Well, there you have it...."

And this revealed the full hopelessness, as it were, of his attempt to find a compromise which would permit him to put me in charge of the "7 Days" program again and would obligate me to hold my tongue in my commentary on the most acute problems.

Yes, it would have been a compromise, but not between equals. I understand, of course, that he sometimes has to say and do things which go against his convictions, but he does this away from the camera, in his office or somewhere else. However, I would have to do it on the screen, before millions of people.

[Biryukov] And you have never done this in all your years in television?

[Tikhomirov] I covered space matters until 1985. I sometimes had to tell half-truths in that situation of total secrecy. I had a slogan: "If one can avoid lying, one should not lie." I recall moments in my broadcasts of which I am ashamed today. I truly felt that way at the time, however. Those were my convictions then. And I did not have a name in television. I have one today,

though, such as it is. Perhaps it will be difficult for some people to understand this, but when Molchanov or Nevzorov, hosts on *Vzglyad*, or my other colleagues clash with the administration, it is not due to personal ambition and not the malady of stardom.

[Biryukov] And what about objectivity?

[Tikhomirov] That is precisely what we are accused of: lack of objectivity and balance. It is constantly pointed out, however, that since the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting is a subdivision of the Council of Ministers, it has to represent the interests of the state, i.e., the government. What kind of objectivity can there be? It is the same as if the machine-building branches were working not for the economy but for the apparatus of the Council of Ministers, turning out violins, chairs, telephone rests.... Are we, then, required to refrain from criticizing certain decisions adopted by the government? To zigzag with the line it implements?

Forgive me for worrying about my "image" again, but how would I have appeared in the eyes of the television viewers if, on that January program, I had sung the praises of a government program for improving the economy which had already proved to be a failure, to put it mildly, in April. Or if I had not sounded the alarm about the hush-up at "[high] levels" of alternative drafts of the law imposing an income tax on enterprise profits, an idea which, thank God, is now being discussed in the Supreme Soviet? Yes, we have state television. It exists with tax-payers' money, however, and should in the final analysis reflect their interests. It should! For now, however, from the time it was established, it has operated not for the millions—its political programs in any case—but has served a few dozen or perhaps hundreds of officials. And this continues today.

[Biryukov] Let us not be naive, or, on the contrary, crafty, because I am convinced that you know what I know: that throughout the world television serves this or that group of politicians. And is controlled by them. We have only one such group.

[Tikhomirov] No, not just one. This is precisely why there is a struggle underway for television today. Not inside but around it! What goes on inside only reflects what is outside. Not just the visible and noisy struggle such as the "take-over" of the television center by Leningrad deputies or steps taken by the Moscow Soviet, but also a secret, silent struggle by telephone. Oh, there has been no agreement for a long time, and therefore no verbal unanimity, not even at *Staraya Ploshchad*, where our main subscribers have been and continue to be located! I myself have seen orders coming from there which were—How can I put it accurately?—mutually destructive.

Since the opinion of the television viewers is considered last, our management apparently views objectivity and equilibrium as a certain balanced reflection of the current interests of certain groups—within the leadership of the Central Committee, let us say. It has to walk a thin

line so as not to offend any of them. We therefore consider this structure to be monolithic. When you encroach upon a part, you encroach upon the whole.

How can a balance be struck, however, when calls are simultaneously coming from there for the destruction of the cooperatives and for accelerated transition to market relations in the economy? For broad internal party discussion and for purging from its ranks those who have not affirmed their loyalty to the platform announced at the plenum? Are we to share one point of view today and the opposing one tomorrow? Or both of them at once?

[Biryukov] Yes, we television hosts have a difficult situation.

[Tikhomirov] Thank you for the sympathy. Indeed, one could go insane if he did not base his work on his own intuition, his own experience and concept of life, if he permitted himself to be dominated by various kinds of television favorites. I feel that, with the way television is being handled by the higher-ups today, a situation like that of 1969, about which I have spoken, will inevitably occur. They are already making preparations to tame television, to make it pliant and obedient. Plans for a corresponding reorganization are already circulating in the bowels of our committee. Economically autonomous creative associations, the producers of television programs, will be set up in the main editorial offices. And the General Program Board will be the only customer. If it wants to purchase something, it will. If it does not want to, it will not. I am convinced that it will not purchase such programs as the current *Vzglyad* or our "7 Days." These are the prospects.

[Biryukov] We workers in the press have a fairly simple solution. If *OGONEK* does not publish an article for whatever reasons, I have the right to offer the article to another publication.

[Tikhomirov] That is the way. But there is only one television [agency]. You can as a last resort find work on another publication. You could go to *SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*, for example.

[Biryukov] I would give it a lot of thought.

[Tikhomirov] I understand. That newspaper now has its own slant. Here we have confirmation of the fact that there is an extremely broad spread of positions in the press today. *SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA* reflects the opinion of a very definite part of the people, conservatively minded in my view. And I consider this to be the inalienable right of the editors. Your magazine holds different views. I do not know whether there is a balance between publications on the right and the left, but there is pluralism. But television must maintain the opinion of the center, you say? The center can only be identified when both the left and right wings are visible!

[Biryukov] Do you incline toward the left?

[Tikhomirov] Yes, but only as a counterbalance to those inclined toward the right.

[Biryukov] And who among you is inclined toward the right?

[Tikhomirov] That is difficult to say. Only the awful radicals take part in the discussions. Take a close look at most of the informational and sociopolitical programs and then study the overall impression from them. It strikes me as fairly onerous. This is because bits of life do manage to break through onto the screen—often unmercifully candid.

[Biryukov] And you see "rightism" in this?

[Tikhomirov] Yes, substitution of concepts is the main method of struggle used by conservatives today. It is like opening the blinds in the morning and seeing the moon and stars in the dark sky. It is not immediately clear that it is not all drawn on the window. This is the way it is in the discussions today. If the party is renewed, everything will be fine and we can really begin to live. And there are endless discussions on the subject, and suggestions about the best way to build communism. But beyond the window the morning is gloomy, more gloomy than anyone could imagine. And the people, the vast majority of them, remain silent. I fully agree with Nikolay Travkin, with his rejoinder published in your magazine: "Enough of saving the party; we need to save the nation." In this sense I am prepared to continue earnestly following Gorbachev, who, it seems to me, has proclaimed a forced transition to a market [system]. And prepared to defend this line of his against those who are ready to unleash civil war just to retain power and precisely that party which has for decades made it possible for them to exist in comfort and to issue orders without being held accountable for practically anything.

[Biryukov] There is the lack of balance again. I recently read about two hosts on the "7 Days" program in a PRAVDA editorial. One of them, in the author's opinion, is trying to reconcile and consolidate citizens; the other, to provoke hatred and animosity. In which of them do you recognize yourself?

[Tikhomirov] Since the article did not mention names, I can pretend to be the "good guy." You would not believe me anyway, though. All of us do indeed have different work styles on the screen, and the programs come out different.

Let us say that I have a greater bent for economics, and maybe I appear somewhat aggressive in my approach to these subjects. Perhaps you have noticed, however, that on recent programs I have returned to a problem previously discussed and carry the conflict through to its resolution. I also try to conduct the discussion, albeit a heated one, with specificity. Now, I want to cite an excerpt from an interview given to one of the Moscow newspapers by P.Ya. Slezko, deputy chairman of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee:

"I am very much alarmed by the increasing support given by the press to individuals trying to establish their

unconditional right to super-incomes, frequently simply unearned or even wrongfully acquired. Here is a specific example. Defending the cooperative members 'abused' by the finance agencies, well-known television commentator A. Tikhomirov defends his clients with the argument that upon becoming cooperative members, the energetic fellows immediately doubled labor productivity (which is very good, of course). He tactfully remains silent about the fact that their earnings increased 6-fold in the process, however. Furthermore, the monthly earnings of the chairman of the huge cooperative are more than twice the salary of the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Tell me, how does one explain this to a person whose earnings are strictly based on current wage-rates? It is difficult to believe that it has never occurred to the venerable journalist that the model for stimulating growth of labor productivity which he categorically defends is fundamentally flawed. Can he not see that it is rapidly accelerating the inflationary spiral? And if he thoroughly understands this, then what can this mean? Is it a manifestation of inordinate conceit combined with confidence in his impunity for abusing the important position of television commentator or the precise execution of a social order from cooperatives with an interest in preserving the status quo? Be that as it may, it is still state television—I underscore the fact—and not privately owned television."

Forgive me for such a long quotation, but, I take it upon myself to state, what we have concealed here in classical form is that mechanism used by the conservatives for substituting concepts for purposes, among others things, of evoking hatred for the cooperatives and distrust of the new and effective methods of management.

This pertains to the history of the Krasnoyarsk and other yeast plants, extremely unprofitable, which were converted into cooperatives operating on a lease. They inundated their areas with scarce yeast within less than 6 months. And note that they sold their product strictly at the state price.

Yes, at one time wages in Krasnoyarsk did increase 6-fold. In the first place, however, 49 people worked there instead of 150—one for three. In the second place, productivity actually did double. In the third place, these were not "energetic fellows," as Comrade Slezko would depict them, but those same workers, primarily women, who had been underpaid by the state for years for performing heavy labor under abominable conditions. In the fourth place, the earnings should be calculated not on a monthly basis but for the end of the year, since there are no longer any guaranteed rates in effect at that plant. Repairs, modernization and wages all now come out of the same pocket. In the fifth place, about the inflationary spiral. Does the deputy chairman of the Party Control Committee, even though formerly an assistant to Ye.K. Ligachev, actually understand more about economics than the entire State Commission on Economic Reform of the USSR Council of Ministers? It was this government subdivision, after all, which, after investigating the conflict between the yeast producers and the Ministry of

Finance and weighing all of the pros and cons, took the side of the former and even recommended that that same system of management and economic relations be adopted at other food enterprises in the nation.

Now I have the right to ask, in the style of Petr Yakovlevich himself: "Can it be that such an important leader as Comrade Slezko did not know this?" He did know, it was learned. "And if he knew, then what does this mean?" I phoned P.Ya. Slezko and, since he has an enormous monitoring apparatus at his disposal, suggested in our conversation that he perhaps possessed information on my corrupt links with the cooperatives. I invited him to meet me on an open television program to explain the relations. Petr Yakovlevich flatly refused. That is a pity. I would have reminded him of the campaign of persecution of some diligent workers initiated with his support in SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA; the breakup of the Pechora artel, which cost the state more than a single sack of gold; the digging into the past of artel chairman Vadim Tumanov, which was an insult to human dignity; and of the court's subsequent decision requiring that the newspaper make an apology.... What is interesting is that I have never read and never heard of the party organs punishing any of those who erect barriers to the transition to real independence for enterprises and to the adoption of new management methods and economic relations. They should actually expel people from the party for, let us say, interfering with the conversion to the lease system. Thousands of such complaints are aired on television.

A colleague of mine was invited to the Central Committee and, in the name of some "informational committee," asked to prepare broadcasts for Central Television which would "further inflame the hatred for those who are enriching themselves." Why further inflame it? People already have a clear attitude toward thieves. Perhaps hatred for those who have broken out of the trenches of "permanent rates," organized their work in a new way, earn a lot and intend to earn even more in the future? If so, then this means increasing the hatred for those, who, as we say today, are in the vanguard of the struggle for a market economy. Are these not attempts to destabilize the society and set certain groups of the population against others? Incidentally, do you catch the general intent of many contemporary anti-cooperative publications? "Don't go there! They have capitalism; man exploits man there; homeless people lie in the gutters there; the rich abuse the poor"! Incidentally, do you know what the leadership has repeated criticized us for? For showing shop-windows in foreign countries, because this is frequently 100 times more convincing than an entire newspaper section on political economics.

[Biryukov] Has anyone criticized you at party meetings for a tendency to praise capitalism excessively?

[Tikhomirov] Where did you get the idea that I praise capitalism? If you want to know, I simply do not know about it, like anyone else who has never lived under the system. I believe that it too has its abominations, no fewer than we have. And I certainly do not believe that we need to build something which is the opposite of socialism. Let us simply regard as socialistic everything which will help us rapidly to escape from the crisis, everything which will operate effectively and enhance the standard of living of the people, all the people.

As of now the distribution system remains the backbone of our entire economy, our entire life, before which we are all supplicants and which continues to dole out funds, materials and resources. And since those who decide whether or not something will be provided will not give up their place around the common purse, the truth too is doled out on television.

[Biryukov] And what, in your opinion, is the truth? Are you certain that precisely your convictions and your point of view are that truth? Does this mean that what others say is not the truth?

[Tikhomirov] If someone wants to neutralize an opposing opinion, let him do it with persuasion, and not by simply pressing a button, cutting things out of the picture, as one turns off a lathe. The way they want to turn off me and my colleague Mikhail Leshchinskiy, whose opinion on our present relations with Afghanistan no longer conforms to the official one. The way they turned off Georgiy Kuznetsov, one of the hosts on the program "Good Evening, Moscow"!

In the swift vortex of events, who can guarantee that what is presented as the truth today will still be considered the truth tomorrow? Who can guarantee that those now referred to as irresponsible extremists will not ultimately assume responsibility for the nation's fate?

How do I feel today? Confident. I am a member of the Democratic Russia bloc of people's deputies. There are almost a million electors in the district which I will be representing at the congress. I also have support in the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. A party conference of the committee adopted a decision calling for the leadership to return the "7 Days" program to the air, with me as one of the hosts. It also discussed the flawed practice of removing journalists from their jobs without considering the opinion of the television viewers and the editorial teams.

[Biryukov] That is powerful support. But the resolution.... In the current times does the party organization have the right to intervene in the affairs of your leaders? Do the party members have the right to exert pressure from below, so to speak?

[Tikhomirov] What about that from above?

USSR Deputy Procurator General on Ineffective Environmental Law

90WN0240A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Aug 90
Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with USSR Deputy Procurator General Vladimir Ivanovich Andreyev by Yevgeniy Zhdanov: "While It Is Still Not Too Late: USSR Deputy Procurator General on Rising Ecological Crime and Ineffective Law"]

[Text] The report titled "Imenem Volgi" published in IZVESTIYA (No. 165, 1990) served as grounds for the meeting....

But first—about what is real and what is imaginary. For example, if you believe the court statistics of the last four years—those same statistics that suddenly stirred up an outburst of crime—as if precisely ecological crimes are not being committed in our country. And the guilty parties for the Chernobyl tragedy were really not convicted of an ecological crime—but for criminal negligence. And they essentially convicted the "switchmen." And what did we know about ourselves prior to Chernobyl besides the fact that we have many "forests, fields, and rivers" and can man breathe so freely anywhere else? For dozens of years—over the abyss in a lie: "In their country"—industrial monsters have poisoned the air and the water with impunity, and in our country—laws, monitoring, and concern about future generations.... Well and for greater pride, what kind of "cockroach" [tmutarakan] of ours could be compared with none other than Hungary or France... in area occupied.

Furthermore, environmental pollution has reached a global phase. There are already 290 natural habitats that cover the territory of seven (!) France's and already 60 million people under the devastating impact of a chemical attack. And all of this is—aside from Chernobyl....

Alas, geographical dispersion shields us from sensing the fact that everything in the world is interconnected and that a society living in a sick environment must be declining. Let us ponder the results of medical research: Today just one of ten male and female senior pupils remains absolutely—physically and psychologically—healthy. Is this not one of the causes of the increase of juvenile crime?

Thus, "In the Name of the Volga." The article concerned the new drainage canal: The "Volga-Don—Diversion," this gigantic (up to 40 meter depth) Martian canal to the Tsimlyanskiy Reservoir for the needs of the Rostov AES being built (according to the Chernobyl type, only with 10 power units). It is true that times have changed—society has raised the alarm: The new canal causes (similar to the Karakumskiy) devastating salinization of adjacent lands and its throughput is such that it will begin to exhaust the Volga—and therefore sooner or later will direct attention to the need to reanimate the northern rivers reversal project. It would appear that common sense has prevailed: It is as if the government

ceased construction work. But construction is continuing—secretly, using the mining method, without reducing the rate [of construction]....

I requested a reception with USSR Deputy General Procurator V.I. Andreyev, who is conducting oversight of execution of environmental protection law and who had become acquainted with the article in IZVESTIYA. We began our conversation from it.

[Zhdanov] Vladimir Ivanovich, excuse me for my abruptness.... But any embezzler [who embezzles] 10,000 rubles and change can even be deprived of his life in accordance with the law in our country but are not tens of millions of rubles essentially being embezzled before our eyes for the destruction of our environment? Just where is the procuratorial oversight? Why are people not convicted for ecological crimes in our country?

[Andreyev] I can only answer the first question for myself: Of course, it is nonsense. But you must understand the procurator: It is not within our jurisdiction to assess where and what assets are being invested. Our business is monitoring compliance with the law, that is, a legal assessment. Of course, any departmental arbitrariness is also intolerable in connection with the new Volga-Don Diversion Canal. Incidentally, the alarm signals are also reaching the procurator's office. But, unfortunately, as far as I know, the USSR Council of Ministers did not make a direct decision to cease construction and this issue has been transferred to the discretion of local authorities....

[Zhdanov] That is sad. And if this decision does not come down from above? What then?

[Andreyev] Alas, then.... The procurator is practically unarmed. Article 223 is the only RSFSR Criminal Code article in his arsenal: "Pollution of Reservoirs and the Air," yes and that one is limited, I would not even call it environmental protection. The disposition of this article is such that it is practically impossible to use it to influence the course of events prior to the advent of harmful consequences.

[Zhdanov] It turns out like in that militia anecdote: When they kill you, then come and tell us! But ecology is the fate of many lives. And if scientists are predicting disaster?

[Andreyev] As a minimum, there are two predictions. Departmental science attests that there will be no harm....

[Zhdanov] And has a committee of experts been appointed?

[Andreyev] Generally, we are justified in appointing any committee of experts—both in the event a criminal case is brought and by way of oversight. Acute problems are not here—in the quality of the current committee of experts. We frequently end up clashing not only with the organizational and technical, but even with the professional helplessness of experts when they at times are not

capable of providing a precise, clear conclusion even about the causes of an ecological catastrophe.

Today, we are sensing the brilliant lack of competent and effective ecological law literally at every step. Existing so-called environmental protection [law] is sooner loud words, a play on the public that is quite convenient for behind the scenes departmental games.

Thus why are people not convicted for ecological crimes in our country? It is not mandatory to put them in jail—I oppose that. But why—in principle? Because even the concept of ecological crime has not been formulated in Soviet law until the present time although it has long since been obvious: Both the nature and the degree of its social threat do not fit into the traditional formula. The definition of ecological damage, which can appear indirectly and on a delayed basis, has not been developed. Comprehension of the source of the heightened danger and the question of consequences are also being seen in a new way.

In short, the extraordinary requirement to protect the living environment from irrational human activity is causing a rethinking of many legal categories. It is impossible to predict what—insofar as we are part of the world community—destructive sanctions for damage to neighboring countries (Imagine, poisonous discharges into [Lake] Ladoga reach the Baltic) will threaten us in the next few years. I think that a concept like negligence that is functioning in criminal law—in the form of criminal overconfidence or carelessness—cannot in ecological law serve as a factor of a certain tolerance, or moreover exclude, as it occurs right now, responsibility until the advent of actual consequences (mass poisoning, fish kill, forest fire, etc.) even if their inevitability has been proven. When a catastrophe erupts, any retributions generally lose their environmental protection sense. Therefore, the first task of an ecological law is to strictly and timely suppress everything that (according to Engels) “contradicts the laws of nature.” And meanwhile the snail crawls along....

[Zhbanov] But there is no time to wait. The USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution “On Urgent Measures for the Country’s Ecological Improvement.” And what is the Union Procurator’s Office undertaking?

[Andreyev] Of course, we are not sitting around twiddling our thumbs. The tragedy is that ecological crime has been increasing at a threatening rate during the last four years. The causes? There are a multitude of them. The inertia of carelessness, impunity, yes and technological backwardness, and vulgarly understood cost accounting independence are having an impact. Really purification facilities—are an expensive and prolonged matter at first—some are financial losses and wage losses.... Alas, consciousness of the crisis is proceeding more slowly than its approach.... Is it a coincidence that precisely during those years when society began to sound the alarm about saving Mother Volga that raw sewage draining into it increased by a factor of four(!). In the Sea

of Azov—by a factor of three and even in the sacred Baltic—by a factor of 1.5! Total discharges reached unprecedented volumes last year—34 billion cubic meters! Discharges of harmful substances into the atmosphere are simply monstrous—60 million tons! Right now 68 cities are already essentially in an ecological disaster zone. And also add poor-quality food to all of this. How can we count on improvement if the use of pesticides has increased by a factor of four, and the zinc, lead, and copper content in the soil right now already exceeds the maximum allowable concentration by tens to hundreds of times in individual regions.

Unfortunately, the procurator has taken ecological law under special oversight just since last year. Frankly speaking, we still do not know all of the festering criminal “abscesses.” For example, just on the approaches we are finding toxic substance burial sites that have been carefully hidden from us. And in Chelyabinsk Oblast, as we discovered, they are in close proximity to drinking water.

But how difficult and extreme could the situation develop if the procurator has only one instrument of opposition—the legal one. We have established additional environmental protection structures. First of all, according to the territorial administrative principle: Difficulties arose with personnel and with our ecological “literacy” but this has been overcome. It was more difficult to overcome the “circular defense” of local ecological nihilism. Then we resorted to the formation of new and unusual structures—they are, so to speak, regional procurator’s offices, throughout the zones of greatest threat, for example: The Volga, Urals, etc. The idea consists of first, examining a dangerous situation not by individual fragments but as a whole in all interrelations and second, being completely independent from the influence of local organs and with direct access to the Republic or Union. Yes and experience suggests. For whom does it become better when a single Caspian militia has been pulled apart according to national apartments? The Caspian? No. Only poachers. We proceed from the fact that the ecology of the Caspian is one and therefore the Caspian Environmental Protection Procurator’s Office should also be one. According to common sense, this is also in the interests of all republic.

[Zhbanov] That is reasonable. Frankly speaking, I have more often had the opportunity to talk about the conservative qualities of your department but there....

[Andreyev] I appreciate your frankness. This time we really acted efficiently. However, creation of new mobile structures will resolve nothing in and of itself. It is like a new engine but without fuel. And neither emotions nor professionalism will replace the “fuel” for us. Our “fuel” is complete legal support, that is, truth along with responsibilities. And here I am afraid one danger is lying in wait for us—the slowness of legal perestroika. Really if it is dragged out, you, newspaper reporters, will be the first to cast aspersions: Well the procurator created something and crime is increasing. Is that not so?

The ecology is that special case when the procurator must have objective, verified calculations and conclusions prior to providing a legal assessment to an event. At the present time, we have brought nearly 150 criminal suits. The cases are scandalous! However, the criteria of liability are so eroded in the law that the "switchman" most often turns out to be the guilty party. Moreover, departmental experts will not skimp at juggling [the facts] while shielding "their own"—these are distorting mirrors. The paradox: Until the present, the departments that destroyed the forest, water, and soil have not themselves given their own activities an expert assessment. How do we dispute that?

Naturally if we need the truth and not a screen we need to immediately create an independent ecological inspection institute. And it seems to me most appropriately under the Ministry of Justice, according to the analogy of the Institute of Judicial Inspections. It is beyond doubt that the procurator (although at the republic level) must have the right to designate this committee of experts (let us say, construction) prior to the advent of harmful consequences. We are talking about protection of the foremost human rights—to life, health, and a valuable posterity. And this is a bit more important than someone's ambitions or pseudo-economic interests which, let us point out, are most often not without a selfish motive and are attained by abuse of position....

[Zhbanov] Quite recently I and other journalists took part in a conversation with the Lower Saxony Minister of the Ecology. And I posed this question: How will the minister act if his order—to cease production that is polluting the environment above the standard—is ignored by the firm? The Minister did not even understand what I was talking about. I had to repeat the question. He burst out laughing: "Oh... Then the Police!" Everything is simple. But how does our procurator act if some plant pollutes a river?

[Andreyev] First of all this reminds me of a "clear" parallel with our State Committee on Environmental Protection which has generally been cheated out of any authority whatsoever—it just gets down on its knees and begs.... But for today, general procurator oversight is a game of Krylov's cook and Vaska the cat.... As you can see, the legislator counted on law-abiding citizens: They said, procurator—there is a lot to be s-s-scared of.... But moral perversion is such that citizens are ready to expend greater efforts to bypass the law than to abide by it.

Let us assume that a plant is polluting a river. The procurator sends a threatening message to the director: You are violating the law in the grossest manner, I demand that you etc. Zero attention is paid to the letter. Stop production? Remove him from his position? No, the procurator is only justified to complain to a higher level. No movement whatsoever? Then, still higher. And so on, until your head runs up against the departmental ceiling. It is absurd and humiliating....

[Zhbanov] That means everything remains according to the old [system]?

[Andreyev] Not quite. Right now the economic leader, as a rule, is protected by a deputy's seat in the event of a criminal case. Although in my opinion, it is time to simply remove ecological crimes from the narrow minded sphere and no [parliamentary] seat should serve as immunity.

It is true that lately we have grown somewhat "bolder." Recently a suit by the Ishimbayskiy Procurator's Office against a soda plant won a million rubles for Iskra Kolkhoz whose land suffered. This is the first of its kind. And in the sadly sensational story from the Astrakhan Petroleum Refining Plant (poisonous discharges penetrated living quarters), the local procurator even undertook an attempt to stop particularly dangerous shops. Not for a minute [did he succeed]! He had to enter into a representation with the government. But the plant leaders' impudent opposition startled him most of all: "What are you, unpatriotic?! The country is purchasing grain and our product is hard currency. You want people to die from hunger while we become involved with your cleanup?" It turns out that destroying people with "our own" gas is sort of patriotic. What is this? Provincial discharge of administrative command system dogma: The interests of the state exceed everything, but there? Or maybe, a blind passion for hard currency profits?

Will our ecology not turn out to be legally disarmed under market economy conditions, especially in free enterprise zones? I think we have enough of our own mistakes without also repeating the West's past mistakes. All civilized countries have already experienced the "fever" of enriching themselves at the expense of the environment. The measures required are truly draconian, more precisely, a system of measures which little by little resulted in the modern consciousness that clean technologies are ultimately more advantageous. Right now up to 30 percent of investments are being placed into ecological protection. And in our country? The volumes of state financing seem to have finally begun to increase. During the current five-year plan, two million rubles are being annually allocated for construction of water protection facilities. I will frankly state that these sums are still quite modest if we proceed based on actual needs. However, even these sums are normally only half spent—they say, it is a nonproduction matter of secondary importance....

I remember that in our country at one time we effusively wrote that there are "no swimming" signs along the shores of Lake Erie in the U.S. But I saw this lake with my own eyes last autumn and the water is very clean.

[Zhbanov] I am curious, how did they handle a water poisoner in the U.S.?

[Andreyev] They do not put them in jail. But they bring them to [financial] ruin. Therefore, over there ecological monitoring inside industry is more strict than state [monitoring]. I am convinced that we should also adhere

to a system of very strict property sanctions: You have exceeded the PDK [Maximum Allowable Concentration] by one unit—pay, by two units—pay double. No compromises whatsoever! But the main thing: All of these assets must have one purposeful designation—environmental recovery work. The principle is simple: "Clean" technologies are expensive, but "dirty" [technologies] are [financial] ruin.

[Zhbanov] Yes, but "over there" there are people who fear [financial] ruin and who fear for their property and for their commercial reputation. There is a property owner, a landlord.

[Andreyev] And if there is not landlord or owner in our country, then... it is too bad for the children. Neither the economy nor the ecology are supported at the procurator's office. But if we leave everything to drift, then even my far from complete information is adequate to predict with all responsibility: Irreparable disasters await our country in two to three years.

[Zhbanov] Well, fine, an owner. But how will it be with so-called restricted enterprises? A law has not been written for them. There is no access there for an independent committee of experts.... What kind of monitoring is this? What kind of sanctions?

[Andreyev] But you know, you do not need to rack your brain: It is simpler to look—how is this being done—and for a long time!—in civilized countries. I suggest that our Supreme Soviet has adequate authority [to do this].

[Zhbanov] But nevertheless with hope.... Vladimir Ivanovich, how do you envision the creation of an ecological code? A valuable code: A general and a particular part, and the main thing—standards of direct

action—with economic, administrative, and even criminal sanctions. So that there are no reference standards!

[Andreyev] I will state further: I completely share the position of scientists who have been insisting for a long time that ecological law should be divided into a separate branch. Really, if you study it, it is law as a rational alternative to industrial irrationality and it arose at the junction of the most varied legal disciplines and did not originate from any one [discipline]. Unfortunately, our legal science does not have time for problems of the ecology. As for reference or blanket standards, I (this would not be said by a procurator) see nothing in them except a muddle or a clever ruse to remove from the law what this law also sometimes makes null and void in that same departmental instruction. Of course, we need an ecological code. For now it is necessary.

American Pharmaceutical Firm to Assist Chernobyl Victims

90P50049A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 10 Jul 90 p 1

Article by S. Anyutin: "Not Just Four Million"

[Text] The chief doctor of the Belorussian Republic Health Center, Vitaliy Vasilyevich Smyslov, told a reporter that "The American pharmaceutical company Upjohn has decided to provide generous assistance to children suffering from radiation. Four million dollars have been earmarked for treatment of our children and moreover, 70 percent of the sum is designated for our republic, 20 percent for the Ukraine, and 10 percent for the RSFSR."

"And most importantly, not only are millions being offered, but also the latest computerized diagnostic equipment and medical preparations."

Roundtable Discussion of Youth Attitudes on Perestroika, Economy*90US1109A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6*

[Report by A. Murtazayev and T. Piskaryeva on roundtable chaired by PRAVDA Editor I. Frolov: "Youth: the Search for a Place in Perestroika"]

[Text] A meeting was held at the PRAVDA Editorial Office with youth representatives and officials from ministries and agencies, concerned with youth problems. Participating were I Bannov, an electrician at ZIL [Moscow Thrice Order of Lenin and Orders of the October Revolution and Red Banner of Labor Automotive Works imeni Likhacheva]; G. Budyak, board chairman of the USSR Association of VUZ Trade Union Organizations; V. Demyanenko, docent at the Youth Institute; S. Kondakov, production engineer at the Stankolit Plant; Ye. Katul'skiy, USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee on Labor and Social Problems] deputy chairman; N. Moskvina, chief specialist at the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau on Social Development; A. Ovsyannikov, chief sociologists at USSR Gosobrazovaniya [State Committee for Public Education]; D. Polyyeva, department chief at the Youth Institute Scientific Research Center; V. Puzikov, medical therapist at the MGU [Moscow State University] polyclinic; V. Sergutin, deputy department chief at the Komsomol Youth Education, Culture and Sport Department; A. Smirnov, an assembler at the Moscow Watch Factory No. 2; A. Sharonov, Komsomol Central Committee Secretary, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Affairs; undergraduate and graduate students at Moscow VUZ's T. Borisov, E. Gamzatov, V. Kaysyn, D. Rezvanova; also reporters from the PRAVDA youth reception room V. Gorskhenin, Ye. Nikitina, A. Chereshev; PRAVDA Education and Youth Problems Editor O. Matyatin, and Deputy Department Editor V. Ryashin.

PRAVDA Chief Editor, CPSU Central Committee Secretary I. Frolov, conducted the meeting.

[FROLOV] Right now there is lively discussion among young people on a wide variety of problems, including the role and position of the Komsomol. In my opinion, so far as I know, not many people have taken clear-cut positions here, and the debate continues. But let us not talk only about the Komsomol, but also about the development of the youth movement as a whole, and about the place of the younger generation in our renewing society.

More simply put—about its life, economic and social, spiritual and moral. After all, that is just what they are talking about at the party congress. Or perhaps you think there's no need to talk about us there; that we can deal with things ourselves, and are tired of posing questions to someone?

Every self-respecting state must be concerned for its own future. And the more developed a society, the greater the

opportunities it presents for realizing the talents of its young people. Well, you see, all this requires discussion. And so, what would you say to the delegates of the CPSU Congress, if you were given the floor? What do you expect from a reformed party, and what must the party do away with in its policy with respect to young people?

And one last question: what sort of complaints do you have about the newspaper PRAVDA itself and what, in your view, should it do more of in that direction?

Defense at the Market Gate

[SERGUTIN] We sense that PRAVDA is trying to tell the whole truth about young people. And we hope that this meeting will help to delve more deeply into those complex, painful processes which are now troubling the younger generation. May one criticize right away? We noted that young readers had begun to establish "Friends of PRAVDA Clubs." This is a fine thing to do in our view. But then, somehow, all that disappeared. One would think that at this time, when we have a multi-party situation, any party would begin its activity principally by working among the young people.

And although there is persistent talk about de-ideologizing the schools, I think that it is necessary to seriously take up the establishment of "Friends of PRAVDA Clubs." For the problems of young people are urgent problems for all of society.

Right now we have 45 million young people in the ranks of the trade unions. This is about one-third the entire trade-union membership, and this is why we have been so seriously occupied with trying to resolve their problems. Today the question of questions is the social stability of the young people. The old education system is being dismantled, and the old ideals are being re-examined. Perhaps my analysis is too critical, but in my opinion we are witnessing a loss of interest by society in the future of an entire generation. On the other hand, young people have found themselves obviously out of the game, which is being conducted according to the rules of group and departmental economic egoism. All this taken together has an extremely destructive effect on those just entering life. Those who are "cast adrift" outside the enterprise gates are primarily young workers who have not yet managed to adapt, and gain experience. Here are just a few figures: one out of three graduates of schools and vocational-technical schools cannot find work. And they are in the first ranks of the candidates for dismissal in conditions of a market economy.

Today many scholars are inclined to believe that we are giving birth to a "confused generation." If the process of deepening social defenselessness of the young people is not stopped in time, we will soon be forced to speak of our lost generation. Against a background of growing politicalization of young people, along with a lack of spiritual culture, it is not hard to imagine the explosive consequences of this fall. I think that right now the priority task will be to form a completely new youth policy under conditions of a market economy. The state

has no right to leave the young people, the students, and children, especially those from poor families, alone to face the elements of the market one-on-one. We must all agree with the proposition that for society as a whole it is principally important and advantageous that a system of social protection for the new generations be in place prior to the transition to market relationships. It is especially important to protect the young people from the coming unemployment. I would like to report that such a plan has been drawn up at the Komsomol and was recently sent to the national government. It is the state and namely the state that must assume the obligation to guarantee young people a place to work under all circumstances.

In our proposals we suggest that enterprises which accept young people for jobs receive special tax benefits, right down to a complete exemption from remitting taxes to the budget.

[OVSYANNIKOV] What would I say to the delegates of the 28th Congress if I were given such an opportunity? First of all I would say that if the Communist Party remains as it is at present, then it will have no chance of winning the confidence of the young people. According to research conducted last November, only 3.0 percent of the student youth thought that one of the top priority tasks of perestroika is to raise the prestige of the CPSU. In April we held another survey; here is the result: only 15 percent of Russian students think that Russia needs the Communist Party. The unattractiveness of the CPSU is evidently associated with the circumstances of life in which we now find ourselves. One alarming symptom that has been noted is the desire of part of the young people to depart for a foreign country. Young people are unable to deal with the fundamental conditions of everyday life and the meaning of life: What are we? Who are we; and where do we come from? Is that not the reason, that among students only 58 percent are oriented toward knowledge? It is still worse in secondary schools—only 9.0 percent of the children want to study—because learning is not interesting for them. Knowledge which society does not need, of course, dries up the spirit, and creates feelings of meaninglessness in life. And a sense of meaninglessness of life is, in essence, the death of the individual. Consequently, the principal problem consists of the fact that, if we want to talk about a reinvigorated party, then this party must above all stake its claim on education. Without education we cannot feed the country; and we cannot make progress in mastering the new technologies which the modern world already takes for granted.

Well, finally I would say to the delegates to the congress: we must stop exporting our new thinking. On the whole our country has a strange habit: whichever track we take up—right away we send it abroad. Our new thinking has had certain results abroad. But at home?

We must, it seems to me, think hard about the fact that our party has a future, and it is the young people.

[RYASHIN] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, you are not the first to speak about this. Kharkov University Rector Ivan Yevgenevich Tarasov spoke at Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's meeting with the country's VUZ rectors. He bluntly stated that two words must be displayed in large letters on the Communist Party banner: "education and science." Society senses a need for the intellectualization of the party—which sense is, if you will, causing them to criticize the CPSU.

[NIKITINA] You are saying that a demand for intellectual work must be created in society; but, unfortunately, no such demand can be seen in our society today.

[OVSYANNIKOV] The lack of demand for intellectual potential has led to a situation in which education is considered secondary, if not tenth in importance. This is one consequence of technocratic thinking. As for a solution—here real changes are needed in the economy which would liberate the laborer from work paid by-the-day, and would make him the owner of the results of his labor, including intellectual labor.

[CHERESHNYEV] I have something to add, since the conversation has turned to education. It has been altogether rightfully noted that without education we will be unable to feed the country. But the present education system satisfies very few. And it has a mass of problems not at all associated with financing and the lack of study halls. I have in mind the ever-increasing politicalization of our society, wherein the social sciences themselves are given prominence. But just look at the form they are in now.

Put Your Trust in Export, But Don't Make Any Mistakes Yourself

[KATULSKIY] Our youth scholarship is, unfortunately very fragmented and poorly coordinated. There is only fragmentary research. But even apart from that it is clear, that the general social state of our younger generation is very poor.

We spoke here about the desire of young people to go abroad to earn their wages. According to data from the Youth Institute, nearly 20 percent of the young men and women want to leave. There are many reasons for this, and they have already been cited here. In the past we used to worry about the potential for turnover here within the country, whereas at present we worry about the potential for emigration. Therefore we must be thinking about setting up a system for exporting our workforce which would be truly effective.

We are talking about setting up a labor exchange, where people would be mentally and professionally prepared for working abroad; and in such a way that it would be advantageous to both the individual and to the state. The state must get back, after a certain amount of time, skilled cadres who have acquired valuable experience abroad.

[BANNOV] Here you are saying that we must get involved with exporting our workforce in order that our

young workers might live well there, in the West. But why should we look somewhere to the West; we should take a look at ZIL, for example.

We have our own problems with cadres as a whole here. And there are still AZLK [Moscow Order of the Red Banner of Labor Automotive Plant imeni Leninist Komsomol], and Metrostroy... Where are they not calling for young workers, full of strength and energy: "Come on, comrades, let's go to work!" But they are not creating conditions for a normal life. What kind of productive labor can there be when, after working one's eight-hour shift, one returns to a dormitory, where people lie side-by-side five to a cot after the production line?

One must first of all think about the working youth who are creating material wealth. If they do not have normal working conditions, then naturally they will flee to the West. They are trying to study too, but, I think there is just no incentive now. How can you finish your studies, and earn 120 rubles? Although the wage rate of an engineer has increased somewhat now, one still cannot live on today's money by oneself, let alone with a family.

And nevertheless, to be honest, it hurt me to hear the esteemed comrade talk about exporting our workforce.

[Response] This is an objective process...

That is understood. In principle every person has the right to free movement; I understand that. But before talking about that we must, as they say, dig in our own garden; and then one can decide where to go.

[POLLYEVA] I would like to return to the theme of our "roundtable," and speak more conceptually about our youth policy. For if none of us has a strategy here, it would not be worthwhile to spend money, nor to create a new structure. Why has the subject of youth policy sprung up just now in our country, whereas such policies have already existed in developed countries for 20 years? What is the source of all this? It comes from the fact that this is a problem of the sovereignty of the individual. Moreover, not the sovereignty of only the young individual, but the individual in general. In the process of drafting the Law on Youth, it was frequently revealed to us that there is also a problem with social policy for retired persons, and for the handicapped, and for women, and for children. So why are we singling out the young people?

In the Western world, a clear-cut understanding has been reached on the reasons for the priority of a youth policy. There it is oriented toward providing a cadre reserve for the political leadership, and for the sphere of management: a reserve which these structures are capable of developing and operating constructively. No less important is another purpose—to replenish the manufacturing structure with new cadres, having a newer level of education than the older generation.

Any party concerned for its future must necessarily attract young people. And having attracted them, it must think about what to entice them and enlist them with. Only those organizations that make real social policy can make real political policy, and excuse me for the tautology. The concept of social policy does exist. Even in the countries of Eastern Europe, there were special structures which were occupied with questions of social policy, including youth policy. However, in our Politburo, for some reason, there was not one single person who would take up this question.

Today the battle for resources that has begun between the pensioners and the young people will not produce any positive results until we determine which of the social, so to speak, formations is the most promising, the most capable of producing a yield, in the shortest possible time, for the entire social organism as a whole. In the West they began with, namely, the young people. But they did not forget that it is necessary to make social policy respecting the other categories of the populace as well.

I would also like to speak of the fact that money for the social needs of young people should not be distributed in the old outmoded ways: here we'll dribble out a little for education; here's a little for culture; here's some for something else. And the more the better. It is necessary to choose certain points, and the most important ones. The most important of these, in our view, are those which are called "youth enterprises." Many countries have taken this very path, beginning namely with the development of entrepreneurship among the young people. Providing preferential terms, they offered interest-free loans, and offered, for example, the opportunity to pay no taxes in general over a period of a number of years.

[BUDYAK] The second conference of our association, in which practically all regions took part, has just ended. The fellows had no problem with a national plan at the conference. All students, regardless of their nationality, had the very same problems; namely, the possibility of future unemployment, and lack of incentive for their studies.

Not long ago we conducted sociological research in order to study the situation in depth. At our VUZ today, 30 percent of the students are on the brink of poverty. Another 30 percent are only a few steps away. How does this 60 percent of the largest technical VUZ in Moscow live?

The average per-capita income for a student on state stipend support amounts to 473 rubles per year. And this is the narrow framework the subsistence wage places us in.

I believe that the young people should be supported in the social plane at the highest category. There should be privileges for student youth enterprises. But since the situation is such that the state has no money, we must be given at least the opportunity to earn the means of our

own existence. The profits earned by such an enterprise should be directed toward solving socio-domestic problems straightway. If the student collective found the money for capital investment in this enterprise, then that enterprise must send the yield precisely to its student collective. Privileges for student youth enterprises—this is one of the support systems for the youth situation, which is now very poor.

I am confident that the party will speak self-critically at the congress about its proper role in working with young people. We do not need a dialogue of fathers and children today. What we need is a frank, serious dialogue where we might lay out our problems as equals, and say what we see as their solution.

CONDUCT THE DIALOGUE ON AN EQUAL BASIS

[SHARONOV] I would like to continue the conversation about youth policy. Unfortunately, we have made this term into a cliché, so that we have not been able to grasp just what it is. We had to watch with bitterness at a session of the Supreme Soviet, for example, the deputies' condescending attitude toward it. And how absolutely wrong they are in setting priorities when they seriously discuss questions of economic reform or questions of defense.

Under no circumstances should one minimize the significance of questions of the economy and military reform. Even moreso, one should not minimize the significance of youth questions. Because young people are—the economy, and military reform, and national security, in ten years: all these things, taken together, in the hopeful future. But neither the deputies nor the executive structure understand this.

From the party we expect a profound understanding, a willingness to take up the young people's problems, and to invite them for dialogue. Our country is the only one in which the young people are brought up at the expense of the young people themselves. And still there are periodical complaints that young people are doing a poor job of bringing themselves up, at their own expense. This is a very abnormal situation.

The idea has come of age to establish a fund for the support of young deputies, in order to unite in them the intellectual potential that is now gathering around us, which embraces the new thinking, and not only in questions of youth policy: normal, unsullied, of which Ivan Timofeyevich spoke, which we had before and which we lost bit by bit. We are inviting everyone to cooperate.

[FROLOV] And have you appealed to the Association of Young Scientists?

[SHARONOV] We have been going out, by various routes, to practically all young scientists who want to work with us...

In conducting a youth policy, the municipal level is the most effective. It was correctly stated here, that no one will contribute money to a nationwide fund for, shall we say, support of young people. This means throwing your money to the winds. It's another matter when there would be a fund at, shall we say, the rayon level. That enterprise which draws its manpower from this rayon, and is located on the territory of the rayon, would be happy to help, because it would see the returns in a year or two or three, in terms of the additional manpower which would come to it.

But we do not have a system of municipal legislation. We have never thought about this.

[POLLYYEVA] We do have a law on the general principles of local self-administration, for the local economy. But we do not have a single norm which could help this law stand on its own. Even today the Moscow Soviet, and the city and rayon Soviets cannot apply to their own lives one single law of those which have been adopted at the level of federal law.

The basic principle which should have been developed today is—strengthening the authority of the standing commissions on youth affairs in the localities. Youth programs must pass through the commissions on youth affairs on the principle of effective yield. Otherwise we would expend our resources for nothing. And one can hardly expect to derive anything from our social youth policy.

[GORSHENIN] We are not taking into consideration the fact that the young people are capable of becoming a destabilizing force in society. And our students are constantly thought of as category two, behind the pensioners. Young specialists feel as if they are in a very humiliating situation. People cannot realize themselves. In conflicts in the Central Asian republics, who is out in front? The young people are out in front: we are constantly reminded of this in all the reports, but no one pays any attention to this. We must either apply the brakes to the process of young people becoming a destructive force, or we must create some kind of conditions in which people might realize themselves in genuine labor.

[FROLOV] I do not agree that our general cultural preparation is all that poor. Too often we pretend to be worse-off than we are, but we do nothing to correct the situation. During my recent trip to Japan one of my interlocutors exclaimed, "You Russians have such good heads, and how talented you are!" And this impressed a person who is used to high standards in science and technology. He came to this conclusion from associating with our people, including our young people. And so there is no need to spit upon ourselves either. Right now is a time for criticizing ourselves, because things are actually in bad shape, to include education. But nevertheless, we do have some things which others can admire.

[MOSKVIN] How can we raise the young people's standard of living, or at least not allow it to fall? We see a way out in forms of credit, and are planning ways for granting credit. Loans and credits should be offered to young families, to soldiers transferred to the reserves, to young single people, and to orphans, for setting up their household, and for acquiring durable goods: somewhere in the neighborhood of 10-15 years; such a credit policy will help us not permit the standard of living to drop for the student, for the young worker, or for the young family.

It is not easy for the state alone to take everything upon itself. We are working with the Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Affairs on a way to set up youth funds. At whose expense should these funds be replenished in the financial plan? At the expense of the funds from the state budget, and the local budgets, on the basis of the conditions in the local republic or local rayon or city, and at the expense of social organizations. This could be deductions from the profits of youth centers and youth associations, quite a few of which are now being established, and many of them are operating quite stably and profitably.

[KAYSYN] For any young person the eternal question is, where to buy fashionable clothes? Whether they are expensive, or whether they are cheap... Where can he go? To the market? Well, there they will strip him down to a thread...

[MATYATIN] That's right. There are certain positions in a young person's life which must be maintained, to which under no circumstances must one fail to pay attention. And clothing is one of them. From what do our young lads suffer most? They have nothing to wear. A youth industry manufacturing goods for young people should have been set up long, long ago. And under no circumstances should prices for them be raised. And just look at what has happened with us. We have the most costly things—fashionable, youthful. And they are inaccessible.

[DEMYANENKO] We have been speaking of socioeconomic questions. They are, of course, important. But as the saying goes, "Man shall not live by bread alone." A crisis also embraces the sphere of morality, and the sphere of our ideology. Young people are disappointed with Communist ideology. Therefore, we must now pay serious attention to developing a conception of humane, democratic socialism. There is no comprehensive, serious, well-developed and well-thought-out program for us to make progress in the ideological sphere. The young sociologists might want to speak their piece here. The newspaper PRAVDA could offer them a lot of space to publish their ideas—creative, original, non-standard ideas.

It seems to me we should offer more descriptions about young people's experiences; about youth initiatives which they managed to achieve with difficulty; about

youth experience—in order that the young people might have some kind of prospects for the future. After all, we must make progress.

[KONDAKOV] I am a graduate of the Moscow Steel and Alloys Institute, and now work as a production engineer at the Stankolit Plant. I am acquainted with the problems of students, since I was a student myself at the institute four years ago. But I want to dwell on the problems of young people at enterprises, on those that concern working people.

These are as a rule people who are already mature, who are thinking about starting a family; and many already have one. The problems are twofold: housing and wages. How can these problems be resolved? There was a stormy discussion at the plant on this subject: the state is robbing the enterprises—it takes up to 80 percent of the profits. And thus hardly any money remains for developing production or for developing the social sphere. Not long ago an experiment was conducted at our place. The plant managed to withhold a portion of the profit from the ministry. This money was immediately directed toward housing construction. And what of it? The waiting list for housing dropped sharply. This was completely unexpected even for those who were prepared for a good return on the new situation. And before, one would have to wait a full 25 years for an apartment.

[Response] What kind of wages do you get?

[KONDAKOV] My wages are miserly—basic wages are 185 rubles, and with bonuses they reach the 240-ruble range. But a young family cannot live on such wages. The young ITR [engineering-technical worker] has to work 14-18 hours a day in order to provide some kind of normal life for his family. In addition to his basic job, everyone is forced to try to earn some money on the side somehow, the wages from which are two-to-three times his basic wage. This is already private initiative. Earning money on the side is not permitted; but at the plant, if you want to do some extra work—go right ahead. But once again they look askance.

"Extra work" is not mental labor; it is physical labor. Our mental work at the plant is worth nothing, just as it is throughout the state.

[Response] Do you have to work at a lathe?

[KONDAKOV] Yes, I have to. But how long can one work like that? A year? Two? This is a recipe for burnout [rabota na iznos].

I am very worried about the state of the ecology. "Stankolit," which is situated two kilometers from the Kremlin, belches out tons of dust every year. There are very few purification facilities at the plant. But you can't just simply close down production—the people will lose their jobs. And Moscow—and not only Moscow—needs workers. Incidentally, we too do not have enough workers. We are forced to bring in limiters [limitchikov]. But that is not a solution to the problem.

[PUZIKOV] I work at the Moscow University polyclinic. I'd like to touch upon a subject that is rather unpopular among the young people. And that subject is—health. After all, the basis of our health, if we do not use it up in our youth, provides us both the joy of creativity and strength for our work.

According to data from the World Health Organization, only ten percent of a person's health depends upon the health-care system. But one-half depends upon various social factors. Unfortunately, the leadership of our health-care system is not taking any kind of radical steps on the plane of improving the nation's health, including

and above all that of children and young people. The solution of this problem "takes in" a colossal sum of money.

[MATYATIN] We truly have one large area of neglect—we rarely get together. And there should be more meetings, so that we do not have to cram everything into one day, into one conversation. The problems are inexhaustible. Behind every presentation one can see enormous layers that were not brought up.

All of you have raised very interesting questions. Thank you for coming. The conversation is not over. You know, we are always ready to see you here, at PRAVDA.

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